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The  present  volume  is  part  of  a  series  of  sectoral  studies on  the evolution  of 
concentration in the member states of the European Community. 
These  reports  were  compiled  by  the  different  national  Institutes  and  experts, 
engaged by the Commission to effect the study programme in question. 
Regarding  the specific and  general  interest of these reports and the responsibility 
taken  by  the  Commission  with  regard  to  the  European  Parliament,  they  are 
published  wholly  in  the  original  version. 
The Commission refrains from commenting, only stating that the responsibility  for 
the data and opinions appearing in the reports, rests solely with the Institute or the 
expert who is the author. 
Other  reports  on the sectoral programme will  be  published by the Commission as 
soon as they are received. 
The Commission  will  also  publish  a  series  of documents and tables of syntheses, 
allowing  for  international  comparisons on the evolution of concentration  in  the 
different member states of the Community. CONTENTS 
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November  1976 Introduction  and  general  survey 
This  report  is  a  part of the concentration-study of the  Dutch beverage-
industry,  containing the sectors:  beer,soft-drinks  and  alcoholic liquors. 
The  purpose  of this report is to describe  the structure  and  the evolution 
of  the Dutch beer-industry  and beer-distribution,especially  during the  period 
1970-1974. 
The  report  is divided  in  four parts.  The  first part deals with  some  technical 
features  ofthe brewing-process  and  the evolution of the brewinrindustry  from 
a  long-run perspective. 
In  the second part the concentration-data,  both  absolute  and  relative  for 
the  1970-1974 period are presented  and  analysed.  The  structure of 
distribution is dealt with  in part three of  the  report.  Part  four 
gives e.vidence about  some  major aspects of the  industry's  conduct  and 
performance. 
beer-
Looking at the concentration-data of Dutchbreweries  it becomes  obvious,  that 
the  Dutch beer-industry is  a  heavily  concentrated one. 
There  are  only14  brewing-firms  left, of which  the largest one  (Heineken)  covers 
more  than half of total sales.  Of  a  traditional home-activity brewinghas  become 
a  large-scale  industry,  the operating area of which  is not  restricted to 
national boundaries. 
The  industry was  already heavily concentrated in  1931,  when  six firms  covered 
more  than  85%  of sales.  However,  it's structure was  fundamentally  reshaped 
during  the  years  1968/1969.  In these years  allied Breweries  conquered  the 
second place  on  the  Dutch  beer-market  by  taking over  2  firms.  By  means  of this 
take-over,  allied Breweries  was  able  to establish its  most  important  foreign 
subsidiary:  Skol/ Holland. 
Heineken  may  have  felt  threatened by  the  foreign beer-gieant  and  enlarged its 
market  share  from  35  till about  55%  by  taking over  the  Amstel Brewery.  The  third 
firm,  active on  the merger-frontier during these years  was  the Belgian  Brewery 
Stella Artois.  It established itself on  the  Dutch  market  by  taking over  2 
breweries  in  the  southern parx  of  the Netherlands. 
The  industry's structure has  not  changed  much  since then.  Concentration was 
maintained at  a  very  high  level with  a  concentrationratio for  the first  four 
firms  of over  90%  of total sales. 
Besides  concentration,  internationalization is  an  important  aspect  of the Dutch 
brewing-industry.Not  only  are  foreign  firms  invading the Dutch market  and  did 
13 their subsidiaries  cover  19,5% of total sales  in  1974,  Dutch  firms  also  export 
a  considerable  share  of  total sales  to both  European  and  non-European  countries. 
Dutch  beer-exports  amounted  to  188 million florins  in  1974,  being  17,5% of  total 
production. 
The  export  share of beer output  i~:therefore relatively high in comparision with 
other European  countries.  (German  and  British exports  covered only  2,15%  and 
1,21%  of total productions  in  1974  respectively). 
Apart  from  direct  foreign  sales  by  means  of exports,  Heineken  the main-exporter 
also  owns  subsidiaries  in  foreign  countries:  43%  of Heineken's  total beer output 
was  produced  by  ·its  subsidiaries  in  1974. 
The  domesticbrewing~ndustry employed  6697  men  in  1970  and  8354  men  in 1974,  an 
increase of  20%.  Sales of  the  investigated  firms  erew  by  57%  in the  examined 
five-year-period  from  682  million florins  in 1970  to over one  thousand million 
florins  in  1974. 
Prices  of  the established beer-brands  have  shown  a  moderate upward movement  until 
1974.  Cartels  and  individual vertical price-agreements  preserved this price-
policy of  the big  breweries.  The  large retailing-organisations  (supermarkets) 
sold beer under their own  brandnames  at  lower prices. 
In  1974  some  leading retailers broke  through  the vertically  fixed  price-
structure of the big breweries.  These  events  led to  a  decline  in beer-prices 
varying  in magnitude  according  to retailer. 
This  down-ward  movement  is still continuing. 
Nowadays,  beer-consumption consists  for  99%  of heavy  beer.  Physical product-
differentiation  therefore  is of minor  importance. 
Non-physical  productdifferentiation by  means  of establishing brands,  sustained 
by  advertising,  specific  packaging(and distribution)  is more  important 
nowadays.  Firms  try to create sub-markets  in this way,  which  are  relatively 
sheltered  from  competition of other beer-firms. 
14 1.  HISTORICAL  AND  TECHNICAL  ASPECTS 
1.1 The  brewing process  and  raw  materials  supply 
The  brewing-method used nowadays  with little exceptions  is bottom-fermentation. 
This  brewing-method  originated  in  Germany  around  1870 but  soon  spread out over 
Europe  and  the U.S.  From  that  time  onwards  large brewing-kettles  and store-
rooms  were  needed,  so that  brewing became  industrialized. 
Beer is  a  beverage,  made of barley , water,  hop,  maize  and  sugar.  The l'>arley  is 
changed  into malt  and  by  means  of  an  alcoholic yeasting-process  beer is produced. 
Hop  is  added  in  the later stages  of  the  brewing-process.  It gives  the beer its 
characteristic bitter flavour. 
In  the Netherlands  malting is  done: 
- by  the breweries  themselves 
- by  independed malteries 
- by  malteries,  having  a  wage-contract with  the breweries. 
The  Dutch  brewing  industry uses  only  Dutch  and  French barley.  Nowadays  domestic 
barley  can  be  used exclusively,  because of  improved cultivation-techniques,  which 
have  made  Dutch barley suitable for brewing.  Since  the  foundation  of the 
agricultural  Common  Market  imports  from  non-EC-countries  were  prevented. 
Since  1948 barley is centrally bought  for the entire industry  by  the  "Centraal 
Brouwerij  Kantoor"  (Central  Breweries  Office).  This  branch-organisation was 
<rl. 
foundeEl  in  1938.  It buys  the burley  and  distributes it among  its members  an 
uniform price.  All  Dutch breweries but  one  are  menbers  of the  CBK. 
The  big breweries  preferably malt  the barley  themselves.  Only  5  small,  non-
integrated malt-houses  existed in  the Netherlands  in 1974.  Two  of these operated 
on  a  contract-basis  and  received malting wages  in return. 
The  other malt-houses  both malted barley bought  by  the breweries  on  a  wage-
basis  and  sold their own  malt  to  the breweries.  The  big breweries  only  deal with 
the  malt-houses  on  a  wage-contract-basis.  They  rely  on  the non-integrated 
malt-houses  in order to meet  peak-demands.  Total  consumption of  bar~ey was 
205.000  tons  in  1974. 
Hop  is still imported a.o.  from  Germany.  The  quantities of hop  used  are  conside-
rably  smaller  than  those of barley.  Hop-prices  are  also more  volatile than  barley 
prices,  but prices  in  a  particular year  are  equal  to all  firms,  because  no 
quantity-reductions  are  given. 
15 1.2 Consumption  and  concentration  patterns overtime 
Looking  at  the  consumption  level of beer  from  a  long-term perspective table  1 
shows,  that  beer-consumption has  been  subject  to  great  fluctuations  during  the 
past decades.  The  depression of the thirties  and  the war-years  caused  a  steady 
decline  in beer-consumption per capita.  After 1949,  per capita beer-consumpti 1on 
started to  grow  again,  but it lasted till 1965,  before beer-consumption 
reached  the  level of  1916  again. 
Table  1 
The  evalution  of beer-consumption  and  the number  of  breweries 
year  number of  firms  sales  x  1000 hl.  consumption  ,eer  ca_eita  in liters 
1916  383  2530  36,9 
1946  79  1883  19,0 
1955  44  2320  16,2 
1960  38  3552  23,8 
1965  32  5402  37,2 
1970  16  8724  57,4 
1975  14  12442  76,2 
Source:  Produktschap  voor bier,  Annual  Reports 
Concentration has  increased since  the  turn of the  century  although  the process 
of bottom-fermentated brewing required larger plants  from  the beginning, 
increasing demand  prevented the  new  techniques  from  having  a  concentration 
stimulating effect at once. 
Concentration was  strengthened by  the  brewers~ policy  to  furnish  credit  to 
their customers.  This  banking-function  required large  amounts  of capital which 
only h•e big breweries  could afford. 
The  ensuring competition by  way  of credit  facilities was  moderated,  when  in 1902 
the  "Bond  van  Nederlandsche  Brouwerijen"  (Dutch  Breweries'  Union)  was  founded. 
This  cartel-like organisation  took a hand in regulating  company  behaviour. 
Table  1  shows,  that before World  War I I  decreasing  demand  and  decreasing  firm-
numbers  went  hand  in hand.  After the war  and  especially during  the sixties, 
concentration  increased under conditions of expanding  demand. 
Already  in  1931,  the  industry's structure had  reached  a  concentrated shape. 
In  that year,  85%  of employees  in  the entire brewing-industry were  employed 
by  six large  firms.  This structure did not  change  much  until the sixties: 
the merger-years. 
16 2.  THE  PRESENT  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  INDUSTRY:  PRODUCTION 
2.1 Overall  remarks 
In  this section  the results of the  investieation into concentration-data are 
presented. 
The  data were  collected for the  period 1970-1974  and  were  acquired  from  the 
Central  Bureau  of Statistics in the Netherlands. 
With  respect  to the  collected data some  remarks  have  te be  made. 
- the research only  covers  firms,  employing more  than  10  employees 
- in  the financial  data,  excise-duties  are  included 
- the  variable  cash-flow refers to  value  added  minus  wages,  salaries  and social 
charg~ Thus  apart  from  net profits  and  depreciation  allowances it also 
contains  merits  and  some  production costs,  for  instance packaging costs. 
- wages  and  salaries  are  inclusive of social  charges  and  insurance  premiums 
- sales  are  recorded  at off-plant prices. 
Import-data were  not  included in  the investigation.  To  get  an  impression of the 
magnitude  of  imports  in  apparent  consumption,  table  1  has  been  made.  Apparent 
consumption is defined  as  domestic  consumption  +  imports-exports. 
Table  1 
Imports  as  a  percentage of  apparent  consumptions 
Year  % in hecto liters  % in florins 
1970  2,3  3,8 
1971  2,7  3,0 
1972  2,7  2,5 
1973  3,9  2,7 
1974  3,7  2,2 
Imports  measured  in value-terms  have  decreased  as  a  percentage of apparent 
consumption,  but  imports  measured  in quantity-terms  have  increased. 
This  leads  to  the  conclusion,  that  imports  have  become  considerably  cheaper 
during  the  period under  review. 
17 Table  2 
Exports  as  a  percentage of  apparent  consumption 
Year  % in hecto liters  % in florins 
1970  17  18 
1971  16  18 
1972  14  17 
1973  15  17 
1974  16  17 
Beer-exports  have  always  been  important to the Dutch brewing-industry. 
Before World  War  II  dutch  exports  exceeded both  absolutely  and  relatively 
those of other countries ..  ·Table· 2  shows,  that  the  exportshare of  Dutch beer 
sales has  diminished  in recent  times.  However,  the balance of  trade  for beer, 
still gives  a  large surplus  as  a  comparision of tables  1  and  2  indicates 
The difference between  exports  and  imports  amounted  almost  15%  of sales  in 
1974. 
In  contrast to  imports,  exports  are lareer  in value-terms  than  in quantity-terms. 
This  leads to the  conclusion,  that  export-prices  are higher than  domestic prices, 
import-prices  are  lower.  This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that Heineken,  with its 
high-priced marks,  is the  foremost  exporter. 
Table  3 
The  Evolution of  some  variables 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974 
Number of firms  14  14  14  14  13 
Sales  (x  1000  fls)  681.737  811.171  880.247  1. 003.681  107.862 
CR4  91  91  92  92  92 
Gross  wages  (x  1000  fls)  152.459  171.240  193.544  219.517  259.066 
CR4  90  90  91  90  92 
Average  gross  wages  21.739  24.044  27.430  29.850  35.773 
four  largest  firms  22.489  24.873  28.743  30.879  36.568 
(x  1000  fls) 
Number of employees  7.013  7.122  7.043  7.354  7.242 
CR4  87  87  87  87  90 
Gross  Investments  34.971  50.189  85.318  82.992  85.149 
(x  1000  fls) 
CR4  88  89  93  91  89 
The  evolution of  some  variables  is drawn  in table 3.  The  growth of the  variables 
measured  in  absolute  terms  is  also  r~cR~%~genTi§ 70 ag~a ifi9~~'  that  growth has 
been  considerable  for all variables/ Concentration however,  was  high  for all 
variables  at  the beginning of the period  and  grew  only slightly afterwards. 
From  table  3  it can  be derived,  that  labour-costs  are  about  25%  of sales at 
off-plant prices.  Average  sales  per employee  amounted  to  148.697  florins  in 1974. 
Labour-intensity  related to size-classes of firms  is presented in table 4. 
18 Table  4 
Labour-intensity,  related  to size of  firm  (1974) 
Sales  x  1  million  florins  S/E 
> 
500  163.449 
250-500 
100-250  136.545 
40-100  126.274 
5-50  92.202 
The  table  shows  an  inverse  relationship between  labour-intensity  and  size. 
Differences within  the  separate size-classes  are  important  however.  Studying 
these differences  we  noticed,  that multi-plant  firms,  belonging to  foreign 
firms  had  a  considerably higher labour-intensity  as  compared  to  Dutch  firms 
within  the  same  size-class. 
Another characteristic of  foreign  subsidiaries is  recorderd in table 5.  It 
shows  that foreign  subsidiaries,  penetrating the Dutch  market,  are  increasing 
in number,  but not  in marketshare.  Two  foreign  subsidiaries had  20%  of the  market 
in  1970,  but  their share  decreased to  15%  in 1973  and  could only  be  restored 
till about  its 1970-level  by  means  of  a  take-over  in  1974. 
Table  5 
Numbers  and marketshares  of  foreign  subsidiaries;variable:  sales 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
Number  of  firms 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
Number  of  Elants 
5 
5 
4 
4 
6 
19 
Market  share 
20 
19 
18 
15 
19 2.2 Concentration  measurement 
Concentration-data for  the period  1970-1974  are  presented in tables  6  to  19 
(inclusive).  Several coefficients  indicating both  absolute  and  relative concentra-
tion have  been  used.  Helative  concentration or the 
degree  of inquality between  firms  in  an  industry  is measured  by  the coefficient 
of variation  (V),  the Gtni-coefficient  (G),  the Herfindahl-Hirschman-index  (H) 
and  the Eutropy-index  (E). 
The  concentration ratio's  for the  largest  4  and  8  firms  measure  absolute 
concentration.  We  shall  take  a  closer look  at the different  concentration 
coefficients. 
The  coefficient of  variation  (V):  tables  6  to  12. 
The  V-coefficient  measures  the  relative spreading  and  the degree of  inequality 
within  the  industry.  Its lower limit is  o  and  its upper  limit is ~.  which 
in  the case  of  the  brewing-industry is 3,5. 
It  follows,  that  concentration  in  this sense is  fairly  high.  The  highest  values 
for  V  are  reached  for  the  variables,  sales  and  wages  and  salaries.  The  lowest 
values  relate  to  the  variables  cashflow  and  ~ross investments.  The  latter variable 
has  a  lli[;hly  volatile character.  As  far  as  the  evolution over  time  is  concerned, 
the  values  for all  the  variables  hardly  show  ups  aTld  downs  with  no  i:rr•1ortan t 
or nersistent  chane-e  in  the  one or  the  other direction. 
The Gini-coefficient  (tabels  6  to  12) 
The  Gini-coefficient  also  measures  inquality within  the industry.  The  lower 
limit of this  indicator is o,  its upper  limit is  n~l  ,  i.e.  it will be  equal 
to  1  when  n  =~·In the beer brewing  industry its maximum  level is 0.95. 
The  values  of the Gini-coefficients  are  rather high;  the  lowest  values  are 
reached  for  the  financial  variables.  The  evolution over time  shows  a  rather 
stable pattern.  No  important  changes  in  inequality have  occured during  the 
early seventies.  It should be  kept  in  mind,  that  the Gini-coefficient  does 
not  take  account  of the number of  firms. 
The  Herfindahl-index  (tables  6  to  12) 
The  H-index is  a  synthetic-index in  the sense that both  the  number  of  firms  and 
the degree  of  inequality  are  taken  into consideration.  Its values  are  located 
between  the boundaries 
1~
0 
and  1000. 
The  values  of this coefficient  may  be  seen  to be fairly  high. 
The  values  for  the variables,sales,  wages  and salaries  and  exports  are rather 
stable,  while  those  relating to  investments  and  cashflow  fluctuate. 
The  H-value  for  the number  of employees  increases. 
20 The  Entropy-index  (tables  6  to 12) 
The  E-index  again  is  a  mixed  measure  being sensitive both to  changes  in relative 
positions  and  to the  variations  in  the number of firms. 
The  value of theE-index is  a  negative  one,  its lower limit being  100(- log n). 
The  upper  limit of the index is o.  The  tables  show  that  the E-values  for  the 
variables,  sales  and  wages  and  salaries  are  the most  stable ones. 
The  E-value  for exports  is much  lower  than  for  the other variables. 
The  Concentration-ratio  (tables 6-12) 
The  CR  represents  the  degree  of  absolute  concentration i.e.  the  aggregate 
marketshare of the largest 4-8  firms.  Its possible  values  lie between  0  and  100. 
There  is no  doubt  that concentration  for  all  variables is  very  high. 
The  Linda-index  (tables  13 to  19) 
The  L-index has  to be  considered  in combination with  the  concentration-ratio. 
It measures  the  "oligopolistic equilibrium"  by  giving  information  about  the 
relative shares  and  their evolution of  the top-firms. 
N~ is  the  total number  of  firms  in  the  sample.  N~  is  the  number  of  firms,  for 
m 
which  the  minimum  L-value  is  reached. 
Vfuen  N~m ~it is possible  to speak of  two  groups  of enterprises within  the 
sample,  with  an  important  difference  in size between  the  Nm-th  and  Nm  +lthl 
enterprise. 
The  group  of  the Nm-firms  are  considered to  form  the "Oligopolistic  arena". 
Forthis  group  of firms,  the Ls-index is computed.  The  Ls-index describes  the 
degree  of  inequality existing between  the first  N m  enterprises. 
The  N~<-indexand its corresponding value  LN~h<give information  about  the 
firm  for which  the highest  L-value  is  reached within  the  leading iroup. 
When  the highest  L-value  is  reached  for  the  second  firm  (e.g.  table 3), 
this means  that within  the Oligopolistic Arena  the greatest  inequality is 
found  between  the  first  and  the  second  firm.  When  the  LN~h <value is high 
or rising  ,  this  indicates  that  the  largest  firm has  a  dominant  position or is 
.  •  .  ~  h  1ncreasing  its dominance.  The  N h  f1rm  and  the  LN  h  value  indicate  for whic 
firm  the  (absolute)  highest  L-value  is  reached.  Looking  at  the  Linda-indexes 
of  the dutch  beer-industry it is  clear that Ls-figures  are very hieh  for  most 
variables  and  that  inequality is rather pronounced.  For exports  there is  an 
extreme  dominance  of  the  largest  firm. 
The  evolution of the  L-indices  does  not  invariably  show  a  trend for all variables. 
Only  for sales  and  gross  investments 
upward  tendency. 
the- values  of ·the  L  -indices  show  a  _clear 
s 
21 It is  moreover  the  case  that L-values  for  all variables  demonstrate shifts in 
both directions. 
With  respect  to  the  N~h<( and  LN~h <(-values  however,  the  dominance  of  the 
first  firm has  increased. 
In  1974  the  leading  firm had  gained  a  dominant  position  for all variables, 
i  this  including the  variables  employees  and  wages  and salaries,  for which/dominance  did 
not prevail  in  1970 
Summarizing,  we  are  able  to conclude,  that  inequality is  very  high with  a 
pronounced  dominant  position  for the  largest firm. 
With  respect  to  the  variables  sales  and  domestic sales it is to be noticed, 
that  the  number  of  firms,  together constituting the Oligopolistic Arena, 
is declining. 
22 CONCENTRATION  COEFFICIENTS 
Table  G 
Variable:  Sales  01 
number  Spread coefficients  Other concentration-
Year  of firms  v  G  CR4  CR  8  coefficients 
H  E 
1970  14  2.21563  .79136  90.89  99.45  442.07286  -56.54562 
1971  14  2.22740  .79011  91.46  99.21  425.80850  -56.47402 
1972  14  2.22423  .79250  91.48  99.44  424.79867  -56.19737 
1973  14  2.22242  .79030  91.97  98.29  424.22431  -56.48267 
1974  13  2.12038  . 78412  92.07  99.53  422.76991  -55.23259 
Tabel  7 
Variable:  Persons  em;elo~ed 02 
number of 
Spread coefficients  Other concentration-
Year  firms  coefficients 
v  G  CR4  CRS  H  E 
1970  14  1.95027  .75383  87.45  99.20  343.11165  -64.31070 
1971  14  2. 01542  .75005  86.82  98.81  361.56489  -64.10548 
1972  14  1.94252  .74803  87.14  98.81  340.95655  -65.02023 
1973  14  2.00274  . 74826  87.12  98.91  357.92665  -64.48491 
1974  13  2.15197  . 78020  90.31  99.21  433.15303  -61.56884 
Table  8 
Variable:  Wages  and salaries 03 
Spread coefficients  Other concentration-
Number  of  coefficients 
Year  firms  v  G  CR4  CR  8  H  E 
1970  14  2.22737  .79180  90.49  99.55  425.79744  -56.08879 
1971  14  2.18677  .78208  89.92  99.18  412.99733  -57.87978 
1972  14  2.25500  .79024  90.81  99.36  434.64415  -55.94500 
1973  14  2.24663  .77809  89.50  99.09  431.95311  -57.50628 
1974  13  2.15197  .78020  92.23  99.31  433.15303  -55.46276 
23 Table  9 
Variable:  cash  flow  05 
Other  concentration-
Number  of  Spread coefficients  coefficients 
Year  firms  v  G  CR4  CR  8  H  E 
1970  9  1. 57132  .69237  93.20  99.64  385.44806  -55.91588 
1971  9  1.  71002  .69661  92.71  99.34  436.02042  -53.76654 
1972  9  1. 47952  .64186  90.40  99.31  354.33002  -61.77896 
1973  9  1.49777  .64477  90.78  99.37  360.36959  -61.16341 
1974  8  1.52465  .65583  92.36  415.57026  -54.64045 
Table  10 
Variable:  Gross  Investments  06 
Other  concentration-
Number  of  Spread coefficients  coefficients 
Year  firms  v  G  CR4  CR  8  H  E 
1970  13  1.37332  .66527  87.86  99.27  222.00107  -75.78375 
1971  13  2.09397  .75136  88.96  99.22  414.20827  -59.59665 
1972  13  1. 67756  .73889  92.88  99.68  293.40137  -65.13301 
1973  13  2.14471  .75379  90.50  99.23  430.75260  -58.17674 
1974  12  1.38890  .67690  88.49  99.88  244.08787  -70.91390 
Table  11 
Variable:  E~orts 08 
Other  concentration-
Number  of  coefficients 
Year  firms  v  G  CR4  H  E 
1970  5  1.69787  .74572  99.98  776.55488  -17.76432 
1971  5  1.65660  .73763  99.98  748.86349  -19.57292 
1972  5  1. 67015  .73964  99.99  757.88123  -19.25055 
1973  6  1. 88856  .77928  99.79  761.10974  -20.06935 
1974  6  1.85547  .77584  99.83  740.46344  -21.08283 
Table  12 
Variable:  Domestic: sales  010 
Other  concentration-
Number  of  coefficients 
Year  firms  v  G  CR4  CR 8  H  E 
1970  14  1.78194  .73517  86.87  99.21  298.23614  -68.83799 
1971  14  2.05280  .76482  89.62  99.05  372.42635  -62.10576 
1972  14  2.05663  .76792  90.17  99.16  373.55290  -61.57822 
1973  14  2.05786  .76794  90.43  99.19  373.91324  -61.52928 
1974  13  1. 91351  .74465  88.73  99.50  358.57905  -62.91756 
24 Table  13 
Linda coefficients  Variable:  sales  01 
Year  L  ~  N:x  LN:x  N:x  <  LN~  <  N:x  L~ 
s  m  m  h  h  h  h 
1970  3. 29936  13  7  1. 39301  2  1. 87467  13  3.29936 
1971  2.66896  13  7  1. 46450  2  1. 90964  13  2.66896 
1972  3.10406  13  7  1. 41984  2  1.95430  13  3.10406 
1973  2.94706  13  7  1. 43136  2  2.08822  12  2.97815 
1974  3.84703  12  5  1. 28485  2  2.02335  11  3.89732 
Table  14 
Linda coefficients  Variable:  Eersons  emElo;y:ed  (02) 
Year  L  1f  N~  LN~  N:x  <  LN~  <  Nx  LN:x 
s  m  m  b.  h  h  h 
1970  2.25006  13  7  1.02841  4  1.54076  13  2.25006 
t-.:1 
~ 
1971  1. 66771  13  7  1.04242  4  1. 61840  12  1. 69103 
1972  1.82697  13  7  1.02910  4  1.54548  12  1. 85331 
1973  1. 85516  13  8  1. 05822  4  1. 54180  12  1.86201 
1974  2.38170  12  6  1.13957  2  1. 57143  11  2.41823 
Table  15 
Linda coefficients  Variable:  wagens  and salaries  03 
Year  L  Nx  N:x  LN:x  N:x  < 
LN:x  ~  N:x  LN:x 
s  m  1!1  h  h  h  h 
1970  3.65516  13  7  1. 37322  4  1.  91802  13  3.65516 
1971  2.54288  13  7  1.29964  4  1.84552  12  2.56458 
1972  2.76680  13  7  1.44446  2  1.95570  13  2.76680 
1973  2.23992  13  8  1. 34917  2  2.15668  12  2.24742 
1974  2.80816  112  4  1.44697  2  2.08518  11  2.86409 Table  16 
Linda coefficients  Variable:  cash  flow 
Year  L  N~  N~  LN~  N~  h< 
LN~  < 
N~  LN~ 
s  m  m  h  h  h 
1970  2.21979  8  3  1.14770  2  1.33593  8  2.21979 
1971  1.70229  8  3  1.50470  2  1.99605  2  1.99605 
1972  1.25253  8  7  1.06913  2  1.66223  2  1.66223 
1973  1.36091  8  4  1.05950  2  1.:89642  2  1.89642 
1974  1.6.1618  7  5  1.21033  2  1.99020  2  1.99020 
Table  17 
('..:~  Linda coefficients  Variable:  Gross  Investments 
~ 
Year  L  N~  N~  LN~  N~h <  LN~  < 
N~  LN~ 
s  m  m  h  h  h 
1970  1.84993  12  4  .46161  2  .80203  12  1.84993 
1971  2.12441  12  6  1. 20168  2  2.55281  2  2.55281 
1972  2.91105  12  3  .71157  2  . 79339  12  2.91105 
1973  1.96889  12  4  1.1.25080  2  3.26009  2  3.26009 
1974  2.90244  11  5  .57416  2  .73846  11  2.90244 Table  18 
Linda coefficients  Variable:  ExEorts 
Year  L  N~  N~  LN:z:  N~  < 
LN~  < 
N:z:  LN~ 
s  m  m  b.  h  h  h 
1970  28o02704  4  2  3o59360  2  3o59360  3  28048080 
1971  25o34247  4  2  2o09413  2  3o09413  4  25o34247 
1972  23o54985  4  2  3o31112  2  3o31112  4  23o54985 
1973  16o31095  5  2  3o 59232  2  3o 59232  5  16o31095 
1974  20o14144  5  2  3o13981  2  3013981  5  20o14144 
Table  19 
l'.;i 
--.]  Linda coefficients  Variable:  Domestic Sales 
Year  L  N~  N:z:  LN:z:  N:z:  < 
LN:z:  < 
N:iE  LN:x 
s  m  m  h  h  h  h 
1970  2o24276  13  7  o89230  2  1o16155  13  2o24276 
1971  2o17545  13  7  1o17658  2  1o69969  13  2 0  17545 
1972  2o45552  13  7  1o16287  2  1o73653  12  2o47598 
1973  2o50765  13  7  1o17573  2  1o85306  12  2052760 
1974  2 0  63914  12  5  1o03587  2  1o81722  12  2o63914 \t f\ t'-1 E 
or. 
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Figure  1 
Linda curve  structure,  Dutch beer-industry 
Variable:  sales 
/ 
--./ 
/ 
/ 
l  ~.  't\')  ~~r() 
L "*  fl'\  ~'j··r-" 
8 
28 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
10 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 1 nOEY l 
-2 
4 
Figure  2 
Linda curve  structure,  Dutch beer-industry 
Variable:  number  of employees 
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12 Figure  3 
Linda curve  structure,  Dutch beer-industry 
Variable:  wages & salaries 
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Linda curve  structure,  Dutch  beer-industry 
Variable:  gross investments 
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SA  'M ri_ e. 2.2  Determinantsofconcentration 
The  results  presented  in  the  previous  section  lead  to  a  clear conclusion 
with  respect  to concentration:  concentration in Dutch  beer-brewing is 
high,  both  in  an  absolute  and  in  a  relative sense  and  these high  levels 
are  prese~ved over  time. 
We  will  now  investigate some  factors,  which  may  have  contributed to this 
state of affairs. 
2.2.1 Cost-structure 
To  get  an  idea of the  importance  of different cost-categories,  a  description 
of the  industry's cost-structure is given. 
Table  20  shows  the  cost-structure of  the large breweries,  the output  of 
which  covers  about  99%  of  national beer-production.  The  table  is based 
on  data,  published  by  the  Central Statistical Office  in The  Hague. 
Table  20:  Cost-structure of large breweries 
(cost-categories  as  a  percentage of production-value) 
Barley 
Barley-mP..lt 
Hop  (extract) 
Maize 
Other materials,  energy  and 
packaging charges 
Wages  and  salaries 
Depreciation-allowances  remaining costs 
and  profits 
Source:  CBS,  Production Statistics  1973. 
1972 
3,7 
6,1 
1,7 
1,3 
12,9 
25,7 
27,5 
46,8 
74,3 
100 
197J 
4,0 
6,5 
1,2 
1,4 
11,9 
24,9 
26,9 
48,2 
75,1 
100 
Brewing,  once  described  as  a  material-intensive  industry has  reduced 
material-expenditures  to  about  a  quarter of total production-costs. 
Roughly  speaking  another  25  percent  is  expended  on  labour compensation. 
The declining share  of  labour cost demonstrates,  that  rising wages  and 
salaries have  been  surpassed  by  productivity-increases. 
The  remaining  50  percent is made  up  of  some  non-incorporated  costs  and 
cash  flow. 
According to  the  CBS,  cost-structures of  individual  firms  are  rather simular 
to this  average  picure.  This  should  indicate,  theat  no  appreciable cost-
advantages  relating to materials  and  labour are  attained by  the  largest 
32 firms.  We'll  investigate the  importance of this  factor  in  the  following 
paragraph. 
2.2.2  The  technical  optimal  scale of brewing 
It is  a  crude  engineer's  rule,  that  by  doubling  the kettle's diameter,  its 
volume  will  increase  three  times  and  its costs  two  times. 
It therefore would  seeem to be  a  sound  conclusion to say,  that large beer-
plants operate  at  lower  average  per unit  costs  than  small  plants. 
.  :t:  American  investigators of the beer-1ndustry state,  that  a  plant  operating 
under  optimal  conditions will  employ  at  least  500  employees,  or produce 
at  least 500.000 hectoliter  a  year.  A  smaller plant-size is  assured to  lead 
to higher  costs  per unit of output. 
However,  a  technically optimal  plant-size is not  always  optimal  from  an 
economic  point of view.  Mainly  two  objections  against  considerine 
the  two  as  being identical  can  be  put  forward: 
1.  When  the  local  market  can  not  absorb  the  whole  (optimal)  output  of 
a  plant,  transportation costs  have  to  be  incurred in order to  serve 
distant markets; 
2.  Another  constraint  on  attaining technically optimal  plant-sizes  may  be 
a  high-degree of product-differentiation,  which would divide the industry into 
several non-competitive  sub-markets. 
With  respect  to  the first point it isto be noted  that  most  Dutch  breweries-
and  in  any  case  the  larger ones  - operate  on  a  national  scale. 
:t:  K.  Elzinga  "The  beer-industry"  in  "The  structure of  american  industry" 
W.  Adams  ( ed.  ) 
Table  21 
Structural  aspects  of  the beer-industry  in the EC-countries 
Country  Average  production  Number  of plants  Consumption  pro 
pro plant  (x 1000hl)  capita 
1965  1973  1965  1973  1973 
Netherlands  168,8  481,1  32  23  73,5 
Germany  36,0  55,5  2034  1667  146,7 
UK  176,9  373,9  274  162  112,0 
Belgium  47,5  77,3  305  190  142,5 
Denmark  175,9  347,0  28  26  113,0 
Ireland  438,3  786,3  8  7  80,2 
France  115,4  243,8  164  90  44,5 
Italy  123,2  233,0  37  37  13,7 
Source:  "Annual  Reports  of the  "Produktschap  voor bier" 
33 They  also have  succeeded  in enlargine 
their market  by  means  of exports.  Tranportcosts  thus  do  not  seem  to have 
been  an  unsurmountable  barrier for  reaching  optimal  plant-sizes.  The 
average  size of D utch beer-plants is high  in comparision  to  that of other EEC-
countries,  as  table 21  demonstrates.  This  indicates,  that  a  small  domestic 
market  not necessarily acts  as  a  constraint on  attaining plants of minimum 
efficient size.  The  second  point mentioned  above,  viz  product-differentiation 
may  contain  more  substance. 
Since  the  introduction of bottom-fermentation beer has  become  largely physically 
homogeneous.  But  company  brands  have  increased in  importance  and  this non 
physical way  of product-differentiation has  split up  the beer-market  into 
various  sub-markets,  sheltered  from  varying degrees of price-competition by rival 
beer-firms.  In  this  way  small plants  can  also survive,  because  consumers 
are  strongly  attached  to  a  particular brand. 
The  facts  bear out  the  importance of  this second point.  The  three largest 
Dutch beer  firms  can  be  considered  to be of optimal  size as  measured  by  above 
given American  standard. 
As  table 22 shows, there exists a  fairly great divergence between  the  number of 
firms  and  the number of plants. 
Only  the  large  firms  are multi-plant oreanisations,  which  provides  a  rou(jl 
support  for  the contention that  firm size is not  mainly  determined by  plant size. 
Table  22 
Numbers  of Dutch beer-firms  and  plants 
Year 
1969 
1970 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Number  of  firms 
17 
16 
15 
15 
14 
Number  of plants 
26 
23 
23 
23 
23 
Source:  Annual  reports  of  the  "Produktschap  voor bier". 
Taking  a  closer look  at the plant-sizes of  the largest  firms  now  (table 23),  it 
follows  that  a  large  increase in plant-sizes of  the  firms  in all size-classeshas 
occurred during the last decade. In 1969 only Heineken and Amstel  could pass 
the optimality test.  In  1974  all previous.ly  sub-optimal  plants  had  made  rapid 
advances  towards  optimality.  Heineken's  newest  plant,  established in 
Zoetermeer,  near The  Hague,  started production  in  1975  and  has  an  output 
capacity of 1.500.000 hl.  Ascan  be  seen  from  table 23,  this plant is hardly 
larger than  the  average size of the Heineken's  plants  already  in existence. 
34 This  would  lead to the conclusion,  that  above  a  certain point(approx.  1,5  mio  hl) 
no  more  economies  of scale are  to  be  expected.  Between  the  minimum optimal  plant 
size of 0,5  mio  hl  and  the  maximum  optimal size of 1,5  mio  hl  some  more  economies 
of scale  may  well  be  achieved,  but  the  extent  of the  advantages  is  unknown. 
Table  23 
The  evolution of  plant~sizes~ of the  large breweries 
1966 
Heineken 
Amstel 
Oranjeboom 
3  Hoefijzers 
Grolsch 
Others 
Number  of 
pl~ts 
3 
2 
4 
2 
n. a. 
21 
~ In  thousands  of  hectoliters 
Average ilant 
size 
800 
750 
125 
250 
n.a. 
40 
Number  of 
plants 
5 
5 
2 
12 
1974 
Average ilant 
size 
1400 
340 
550 
237 
Referring to the U.S.-standard of  an  optimal  plant,  producing  at least 500.000 
hl.  a  year,  only Heineken  and  Grolsch  plants  can  be  considered optimal  from  a 
technical point of  view.  Skol  plants  are  sub-optimal.  This  firm  however  has 
not  made  investments  in new  plants  to  reach  more  optimal  sizes.  Probably  cost-
advantages  of  larger plants  are not  great  enough  to justify such  investments. 
Summing  up  it may  be stated,  that Dutch  breweries  are  approaching  technically 
more  optimal  plant-sizes.  This  development  is to  a  large extent  due  to 
increased demand.  Also while  large plants  may  be  advantaeeous,  firms  do  not 
always  take deliberate action  to  achieve  larger plant-sizes. 
Given  sufficient competition economies  of scale should materialize in  lower 
consumer prices.  However,  empirical  evidence of beer-prices presented  in  a 
following  paragraph  about  prices  does  not  support  the  above  statement. 
In  the  Netherlands  prices of  the well  established beer-brands,  produced  by  the 
large  firms  are  considerably higher than  those of  the  less well-known  brands 
and  home-brands  of  the  supermarket - chains which  are  produced by  small 
breweries,  often on  a  wage-contract  basis.  Thus  it seems,  that  the  leading 
breweries  have  two  different types  of  advantages.  In  the first place  the 
economies  of scale,  connected with their large size,  lead  to  lower production-
costs.  In  the  second  place  they  earn  a  premium,  because  consumers  are  prepared 
to  pay  higher prices  for  beers of  a  well  established brand. 
For the small  breweries,  the  reverse  applies.Their profit-margins  are 
diminished both because of their  highe~ production costs and  because of their 
deficiency of  the  means,  required  to create  a  well-known national  brand. 
This  situation with  respect  to prices  also  leads  one  to  the  conclusion that 
35 competition  between  the  large  firms  is not  sufficiently intense so  that  the 
premiums  earned  by  the  leading brands  disappear. 
If economies  of scale  are not  reflected  in  consumer prices,  the  developments 
of concentration during the  last  decade  can not  be  explained by  economies  of 
scale either. 
Firms  in  all size-categories  have  disappeared  during the last  ten years. 
Also,  firms  which  could not  be  considered  to be operating on  a  sub-optimal 
scale  (Amstel)  have  been  taken  over,  while  a  family-owned  firm with  a  modest 
marketshare  confining  itself to  the  domestic market,  seems  to be  doing 
very well. 
Thus  eeonomies  of scale would not  seem  to qualify  as  the motivating  force 
behind  increasing concentration. 
2.2.3  Mergers 
Another  important  factor with  respect  to concentration  are mergers.  Most  of 
the  firms  which  disappeared  in  the  D utch beer-industry after the  second World 
War  were  acquired  b~ other beer-firms. 
The  first  important  post-war merger  occured  in  1960  and  linked the  "Zuid-
Hollandsche  Brouwerij"  in  The  Hague  with  "d 'Oranjeboom" brewery of Rotterdam. 
Both  companies  belonged  to the six largest breweries  of that year. 
In  1968/1969,  concentration  increased significantly  as  a  consequence  of  two 
mergers.  In  1968  the  combination  ZHB/d'Oranjeboom mentioned  above  was  taken 
over  by  Allied Breweries,  together with  the  "3 Hoefijzers"  brewery  in Breda. 
In  this  way  Allied's  subsidiary Skol/Holland  was  founded.  This  firm 
presently occupies  the  second  place  on  the  market. 
Skol/Holland covers  about  70%  of  Allied Breweries'  sales  created by  foreign 
subsidiaries with  a  marketshare  of  16%. 
In  1969  the  Amstel-brewery  was  taken over by  Heineken,  creating the  largest 
beer-producer  in  the  Netherlands with  a  marketshare  exceeding  50  percent. 
Amstel-plants  have  continued production since  then  and  the brand-name  Amstel 
was  preserved  too.  Only  Amstel's  label was  changed.  According  to Heineken's, 
the  merger  was  a  defensive  reaction  against Allied Breweries'  penetration. 
In  1969  the  Belgian  brewery Stella Artois  intruded the  Dutch  beer-market,  by 
taking over  two  smaller breweries:  the  "Domrnelsche  Brouwerij"  and  the 
"Schaapskooi",  an  old cloister-brewery.  Both  firms  are established in Brabant, 
the  southern part of the Netherlands.  Stella Artois  enlarged its marketshare 
(  to  4  percent),  by  taking over  the  "Hengelosche  Brouwerijen"  in  1974. 
In  1974  another acquisition  took place. 
36 Maes,  one of the  smaller Dutch  breweries  was  taken  over by  the  Belgian 
brewery  Alken;  this  brewery  too  has  continued production until this  moment. 
2.2.4 Product-differentiation 
Improved  brewing-techniques,  particularly the introduction of  the beer-filter 
have  created bottled beer.  When  selling beer in bottles had  become  technically 
possible,  the potential market  increased  appreciably.  Before  World  War  II 
drinking bottled beer was  very  uncommon.  Bottling was  done  by  non-integrated 
beer-bottlers,  who  bought  the beer in kegs  from  the breweries. 
Initially bottled beer was  mainly  used  for selling abroad.  In  1931  73  percent 
of beer-exports  consisted of bottled beer. 
After the second World  War  breweries  tried to  improve  declining sales by 
trying hard to  make  beer-drinking popular at  home.  In  this  they  were  greatly 
assisted by  the  coming of television in the early fifties.  Large  collective 
advertising-campaigns were  organised. 
As  a  result drinking-habits  changed  very  quickly  and  now  bottled beer-sales 
have  outstripped sales of beer  in kegs  (table 24).  It is noteworthy  that 
bottled beer-sales  are still gaining  in  importance. 
Beer  sold  in tins has  not  become  popular,  notwithstanding serious efforts 
and  accounts  for  about  1  percent of total.sales. 
Table  24 
Bottled beer sales  as  a  percentage of  total beer sales 
Year 
1961 
1968 
1970 
1973 
1975 
! 
58 
60 
63 
65 
68 
Source:  Annual  Reports  "Produktschap voor bier". 
Another  important  phenomenon  for explaining market  structure  and  company 
behaviour is that beer produced  in  the Netherlands  today  is to  a  large extent 
of  a  homogeneous  physical  character.  It consists  for  99  percent of the so-
called heavy  beer.  "Heavy"  refers  to  the  percentage of malt-essence  used, 
which  for heavy  beer  amounts  to  5  percent.  Two  other beer-types  are  light 
beer  and  extra heavy  beer,  which  accounted  for 0.7  percent  and  0,3 percent 
respectively of  total sales in  1974.  The  three  types  of beer have  different 
prices.  Light  beer is  cheaper  than  heavy  beer  and  the extra heavy  beer is more 
expensive. 
37 Thus  it is to be  noticed,  that Dutch beer history,  starting with  as  many 
beer  types  as  there were  (local)  producers  has  led in our times  to  an  almost 
physical  homogenity  of  the  product. 
Given  those shifts  in  the  Dutch  post-war beer market  - i.e.  the  tendencies 
towards  homogeneous  heavy  beer sold in bottles  - it became  almost  a  necessity 
to differentiate the  product  by  means  of labelling,  branding  and  advertising, 
at least for the  companies  which  marketed  on  a  national  scale.  Competition 
in  the beer market  today  is therefore  mainly of  a  product-differentiation 
type,  at  least so  far  as  the  leading producers  are  concerned.  Whatever price 
competition there is has  been  introduced by  the·supermarket  chains,  as will  be 
k:::::.own  later on. 
2.2.5  The  sub-markets 
The  total market  can  be  sub-divided between bottled beer and  beer on  fust. 
We  will  first  review  concentration  in both  sub-markets. 
Concentration-coefficients  for beer  in bottles  and  beer on  fust  have  been 
computed  and  are  presented  in tables  25  and  26. 
Roughly  speaking  the  sub-market  for  beer on  fust  can  be  identified with  the 
out-door market  while  the  sub-market  for bottled beercoinsideswith indoor-
consumption. 
Concentration  in  the  sub-markets  for bottled beer  and  beer on  fust 
Table  25 
Concentration coefficients  for bottled beer,  variable:  domestic sales 
Number  of  Spread  Coefficients Concentration  Other  concentration 
Year  firms  v  G  ratio's  coefficients 
CR4  CR8  H  E 
1970  14  2. 33566  .81971  94.28  99.47  461.09219  -50.63644 
1971  14  2.16104  .79599  93.05  99.36  405.00548  -56.25142 
1972  14  2.15097  . 79353  92.97  99.39  401.90365  -56.67044 
1973  14  2.15753  .79654  93.28  99.49  403.92309  -56.24985 
1974  13  2.05902  .78511  93.25  99.66  403.04484  -55.18305 
Table  26 
Concentration  coefficients  for beer  on  fust 1  variable:  domestic sales 
Number of  Spread  Coefficients Concentration  Other concentration 
Year  firms  v  G  ratio's  coefficients 
CR4  CH8  H  E 
1970  14  1.89455  .72209  84.07  96.89  327.80769  -68.43202 
1971  14  1.  90713  .72553  84.65  96.71  331.22474  -68.00467 
1972  14  1. 90303  .72540  85.15  96.29  330.10975  -68.17045 
1973  14  1. 89384  . 72404  85.11  96.21  327.61715  -68.48872 
1974  13  1. 79685  .71868  86.28  97.84  325.28325  -67.0060 
38 Table  27 
Linda-coefficients  for bottled beer,  variable:  domestic  sales 
Year  LS  N~m 
:Jf 
LN  m 
1970  l.H0806  3  1.51652 
1971  1.60756  3  1. 17791 
1972  1.  65228  3  1.17326 
1973  1. 49835  4  1.20743 
1974  1.38753  5  1.06720 
Table  28 
Linda-coefficients  for beer on  fust 2  variable:  domestic sales 
Year  LS  N:Jfm  LN:Jfm 
1970  1.23810  7  .H7694 
1971  1. 25324  7  .94090 
1972  1.27798  6  1. 03798 
1973  1. 25240  6  1.01424 
1974  1.16248  6  .91649 
Comparing  the  two  tables  (25  and  26)  it appears,  that  concentration  as  measured 
by  the several concentration-coefficients is  h~gher for bottled beer than  for 
beer sold on  fust.  Concentration  for  the bottled beer market  is  also higher 
than  for  the overall beer-market. 
All  investigated  firms  sell in both sub-markets. 
A  characteristic of the  market  for beer,  packed  in kegs,  is the relative 
importance  of  small  firms.  The  small  breweries,  whose  outlets are  limited to 
local  regions sell a  larger share of their total beer-sales  on  fust  than  the 
large breweries. 
Thus,  in  1974,  four  small breweries  sold 51,1 percent  of their beer- sales 
on  fust  while  the  four  largest breweries  sold 32,3 percent  of their total 
sales  in this sub-market.  This  phenomenon  is not  of  a  recent date.  In  1971 
the  picture was  about  the  same;  the  four  largest  firms  thep·  sold 32,8 percent 
of  their beer-sales  in kegs  and  the  small  breweries  52,6  percent. 
However,  these  large differences  in  relative shares of  firms'  sales  do  not 
prevent,  the  three  largest  firms  in the overall market  to occupy  the  same 
places  in the  sub-market of beer  in  kegs.  Only  the  fourth  largest  firm  in the 
total beer-market  is not  also  the  fourth  largest  in the  sub-market of beer 
packed  in kegs. 
Linda-coefficients  too  reach higher  values  for bottled beer than  for beer in 
kegs,  indicating that  inequality is less high  for  the latter than  for 
the  former  sub-market.  Taking  an  inter-industry point of view,  the  sub-market 
39 for  beer on  fust  shows  a  higher degree of  inequality  ~owever. 
It is  remarkable  that  LS-values  for both  sub-markets  are  lower  than  the  LS-
values  for  the total domestic market,  as  represented  in  table  19. 
The  number  of  firms  together constituting the Oligopolistic Arena is the 
smallest  for  the bottled beer-market. 
This  indicates,  that  there exists  in this  sub-market  a  narrow oligopoly with 
great  inequality,  as  LN~m-values demonstrate.  The  oligopoly  in the  kegged  beer 
sub-market  is of  a  more  wide  and  equal  character. 
3.  The  structure of Distribution 
3.1 General  Remarks 
As  mentioned before,  sales of beer to  common  househobs  became  important  only 
after World  War  II.  Until  then  all selling-efforts of breweries  were  directed 
at  selling beer  to public places,  chiefly cafe's. 
The  traditional distribution-structure consisted of the  following  links: 
brewery  - beer-agent  - cafe. 
Like  firms  in other trades,  the  breweries  always  attempted  to eliminate  the 
wholesale-link  as  much  as  possible.  This  was  done  by  means  of tyine beer-selling 
to  the  provision of  the  cafe's with credits.  Thus  the  cafe  was  obliged to 
buy  beer  from  the  brewery,  of which it received credits.  Under  these 
circumstances  the  only  type  of wholesaling which  could develop  was  the 
brewery-dependent  agent.  Unable  to behave  as  the cafe's  bankers  and  curtailed 
of  their commercial  independency,  they  represented  in  fact  a  vertically 
integrated wholesale- link. 
The  recent  distributional structure is  represented by  figure  5. 
Figure  5 
The  present structure of beer-distribution 
B.KEWERY 
---- --::---~-.--
~- --~  -------
~~  v  --- ~agent  indepent  depot ~
1
agent  _...-------- l  whole~aler  ~ 
~  - ""'  ca::::e  cafe  ---- --. -->lfetailer 
Outdoor-market  Home-market 
Besides  the beer-agent  as  a  link in the distributionchain for  home-comsumed 
beer,  the  brewery-owned  depots  have  emerged  as  an  integrated kind  of whole-
saling activity.  Another  new  link  in distribution is the  (independent)  grocery-
wholesaler. 
40 Grocery-wholesalers  were  first permitted to sell beer in  1948.  Since that 
year  large  amounts  of bottled beer were  sold to  the different  kinds  of whole-
salers,  thus  breaking  down  the monopolistic position of the beer-agents. 
Agents  were  not  equiped  to  compete  in this new  market,  because of their 
exclusive  ties with one  brewery. 
Thus  the  agent's  position had declined,  since bottled beer-sales have 
sharply  increased.  Today,  supermarkets  are  the  most  important retail-
institutions  for selling beer. 
Apart  from  the  supermarkets,  beer is also sold in  independent  groceries, 
greengroceries  and dairies. 
In  contrast  to  the cafe or pub,  retail shops  are  able  to sell beers  of  several 
brands.  Normally,  they  are  not  dependent  on  finance  from  the breweries. 
Given  their more  independent  position,  retailers  are  in  a  better position 
to  exert price-competition  than  the  cafe's. 
The  price-policy of the big breweries  traditionally was  to  control  the 
prices of  leading brands  all the  way  to  the  ultimate  consumer. 
This  policy was  the  complement  of  the product-differentiation described earlier. 
Thus,  until  1974  retail-prices were  prescribed by  means  of individual  resale 
price-maintenance  arragments.  This  price-policy collapsed  through  the 
actions  of  some  dynamic  supermarket-chains. 
Before  1974,  the  leading supermarket-chains  had  started to sell beer under  their 
own  labels  at prices  much  below  the established brand-prices. 
Thus the counter-attack by  the  supermarkets  was  mounted  in  two  directions: 
they  undermined  the  marketshare  of  the  leading brands  by  means  of their own 
brands  of beer  (acquired  from  smaller breweries)  and  they undersold  the 
leaders  in price.  The  latter actions  involved  them  in legal battles during 
1974,1975  and  1976. 
3.2 Wholesaling 
In  1960  about  750  beer-agents  and  600  other beverages wholesalers  existed. 
The  total number  of wholesaling  firms  had decreased  to  586  in 1974.  The 
beer agent's position is  a  specific one.  He  is not  able  to behave  competitively, 
because: 
1.  Agents  are not  able  to  acquire  new  cafe-customers  on  their own.  Only  the 
brewery  can grant  the  facilities  required  to tie a  new  customer. 
2.  Sales-prices  are  (were)  determined  by  negotiations  between  the Central 
Brewery  Office  and  the retailing organisation.  The  agent's margins  are 
determined  at  the  same  moment. 
41 Considering the  restraints  imposed  on  the agent's efforts his  activities 
better can  be  described as  distributing than  as  selling.  The  importance of 
the beer-agents has  decreased fastly  in  recent  decades. 
Apart  from  the specialist beverages  wholesalers,  the outdoor-market  and  the 
licensed retailers,  general  food  and  drink wholesalers  operate,  which  supply 
the small  unlicensed retailers. 
The  position of  the specialist beverages wholesalers  has  declined  as  a 
consequence  of  the rise of the  indoor-market.  The  general  food  and  drink 
wholesalers  sold 55  percent of all consumed beer in 1973.  The  specialist 
wholesalers  took care of  the  remaining part. 
Breweries  have  also integrated wholesaling.  Deliveries  to mutiple  shop  chains 
are generally  done  by  the breweries  themselves. 
The  breweries  have  a  stake  in specialised beer-wholesaling too.  A  considerable 
number  of  the  587  specialist beer-wholesalers  are  owned  or controlled by  the 
breweries.  Heineken  owns  50  wholesaling  firms  and  Skol  controls  20 wholesaling 
firms,  mainly  operating under  the name  Citadel.  Stella Artois  established 
recently its own  wholesale-organisation,  named  Omnidrink. 
Omnidrink  contains  15  wholesaling  fi~s. Grolsch  also has  its own  wholesaling 
organisation. 
Specialised wholesale-organisations,  belonging to  the breweries,  not  only 
integrate beer-distribution but  also open  the possibility to  the breweries 
to diversify into the spiri  ts-a.nd  wine-market  and  the soft-drinks market. 
Most  brewery-owned wholesale  firms  were  independent  before  and  got  under 
brewery's  control  by  means  of take-overs. 
Another phenomenon  is  the  integration of the wholesale-function by  retailers. 
A  large number  of small  unlicensed retailers selling beer have  joined an 
organisation,  which  performs  the wholesaling-function  on  their account. 
Several  types  of organisations  can  be  distinguished. 
- Voluntary  multiple-shop organisations,  like the Spar. 
In  such  organisations one or more  wholesalers  and  a  number  of retailers 
cooperate.  Both wholesalers  and  retailers maintain  independency,  but by 
means  of  cooperation  they  are  able  to grasp  the advantages  of big retailing, 
like large-scale advertising,  wholesaling,  central administration  and  so  on. 
In  1972  8  voluntary multiple  shop  organisations  existed in the Netherlands, 
in which  114 wholesalers  and  7500  retailers cooperated.  Together,  wholesale-
firms  of this  type  had  50  percent of  non-integrated grocery-wholesale 
turnovers. 
42 - Retailer's  buying-organisations.  In  contrast  to  voluntary multiple  shop  firms 
retailers of this  type  operate under their own  name.  Buying-organisations 
have  founded  wholesale-establishments,  which  are exploited  on  a  collective 
basis.  These  organisations  also give  assistence  to  connected retail members 
in several  respects  as  do  the voluntary  multiple-shop organisations. 
Buying-organisations of grocery-retailers  are of  a  smaller magnitude  than 
voluntary  multiple-shop  firms.  In  1972  2200  retailers were  connected which 
exploited25wholesale-establishments.  The  marketshare of these wholesalers 
amounted  to  10  percent of non-integrated  grocery wholesale  turnover in  1972. 
Voluntary multiple  shop-firms  and  buying-associations  in retailing emerged 
chiefly  as  a  reaction  to  the  overwhelming  growth of supermarkets  and 
consumermarkets.  In  time  they  have  grown  into really vertically integrated 
organisations which  perform many  maneeerial  funct~ons for  the  associated 
members. 
Besides  the  above  mentioned  vertically integrated wholesale-categories,  two 
other  types  exist  in the Netherlands:  independent wholesalers,  which  cover 
20%  of non-integrated,  non-specialised sales  and  count  175  firms. 
Another  category  are  the  combined wholesalers,  which  carry  a  large product-
assortment.  The  latter group  sells some  18%  of non-integrated grocery-turnovers 
and  comprises  about  a  hundred  firms. 
As  in  many  vertical integrations,  the  leading brewers  aim  at  a  control of 
their regular distribution  and  call upon  the  independentsunderexceptional 
circumstances.  In its 1975  annual  report  Heineken stated:  "A  good  cooperation 
with  the  indepent wholesaler is  important,  especially at peak  demands." 
43 3.3 Retailing 
Some  general  remarks 
In  discussing beer,  retailing two  different kinds  of shops  have  to  be 
distinguished  as  a  preliminary.  Alcoholic beverages  and  liquors were 
traditionally sold by  the  !incensed victualler.  To  sell beer however,  a 
license is not  required  and  therefore,  unlicensed  retailers  like groceries 
and  dairies  could  incorporate beer in their basket  of articles.  Beer can  now 
be  bought  at  some  39.000  retailing-outlets. 
As  beer has  become  a  common  product,  groceries  and  dairies  and  in particular 
supermarkets,  have  been  able  to  gain the greater part of the  take  home 
beer-market.  The  house-wife,  doing her daily or weekly  shopping,  buys  beer 
together with other grocery-products  in such  shops. 
Beer sales,  measured  in volume-terms,  have  increased by  more  than  100%  during 
the  1964-1973  decade  (table 31).  Wines  and  spirits too  experienced  a  rapid 
rise in  volume  sold.  Sales  of  alcoholic beverages,  measured  in value-terms 
increased  at  an  annual  rate of  14%  during  the  1969-1974  period,  a  rise equal 
to  the  money  increase of total personal  income. 
This matching of beverages-sales  contrasts with  the  growth of total food-sales, 
which  lagged behind  the  growth of total personal  income.  As  a  result  food-sales 
decline  from  35  percent  of  total  consumer  expenditures  in  1964  to  26  percent 
in  1973. 
44 Table  29 
Index-numbers  of beer-sales,  measured  in  volume  - and  in value  terms. 
1964=100. 
Year  Volume-growth  Value-growth 
1964  100  100 
1967  127  146 
1970  164  203 
1971  178  235 
1972  188  249 
1973  210  279 
1974  218  304 
1975  229  n.a. 
3.4 The  licensed retailer 
Table  30  eives  the  evidence  relating to numbers  of  retailshops  and  their 
marketshare  in bottled-beer sales. 
Table  30 
The  evolution of  licensed  retailshops  and  their marketshare of bottled beer 
sales. 
Year  Nun1ber  of  shops  Licensed sales  as  a  percentage 
of bottled sales  (at  current 
prices) 
1970  3.720  16.3 
1972  3.869  16.2 
1973  3.830  16.1 
1974  3.807  15.6 
1975  2.750  15.2 
Sources:  ElM  "Het Slijtersbedrijf",  1972,  Produktschap  vppr bier,  Annual  reports. 
The  table  demonstrates,  that  the marketshare of  licensed retailers is 
declining.  The  number of licensed  retail~shops has  increased until  1972. 
Apart  from  the rapid  rise of beer-sales,  this  increase was  due  to  a  widening 
of  the  law,  which  occured  in  1965. 
The  number of  licensed shops  used  to  be  legally tied to the  number of  inhabi-
tants of  a  certain region  or city area.  Differentiating between one-shop  firms 
and  multiple  shop  firms,  it is to be  recognized,  that multiple  shop-firms 
have  experienced the  largest  increase  in numbers.  There  were  2447  one-shop 
firms  in  1964,  which  number  had  grown  to  2710  in  1974. 
On  the other hand,  the  number  of shops  belonging to  a  chain  more  than doubled 
during the  same  period.  Multiple  shop  firms  exploited 535  establishments  in 
1964  as  compared  to  1097 establishments  in  1974. 
45 Thus  the percentage  of  licensed  shops,  being part of  a  chain,  increased 
from  17  percent  in  1964 till 29  percent  in 1974.  Also  their share 
of bottled beer  increased  relatively,  since overall  growth  advanced  - as 
we  have  seen  - by  14 percent  per  annum  and  those of one-shop  retailers 
increased by  8  percent.  It is only  due  to the rapid growth  of  demand  for 
alcoholic beverages  that one-shop  retailers could increase  in numbers  and 
absolute  sales. 
But  t.heir prospects  are  considered to be  rather bleak,  due  to  the 
abolishment  of vertical price maintenance  and  the  ®S..'ll.~-ng fiercer price 
competition. 
According to  a  report  of the  Economic  Institute for Middle-sized  and  Small 
firms  (EIM),  published in  1976,  the  number of licensed retailers has  to be 
halved  in  coming years. 
3.5 Unlicensed retailers 
It is  the  group of unlicensed retailers who  gained  the greater part of  the 
market  for  home-consumed beer  (table 32).  They  almost  had  85  percent of this 
sub-market  in  1975.  A  comparision  of  growth-rates of the  two  types of beer 
distribution-outlets also makes  clear the different  performance. 
Table  31 
The  growth  of beer-sales  via licensed retailers  and  unlicensed retailers 
(measured  in hectoliters;  annual  percentage  increase on  previous  year) 
1970 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Licensed  retailers 
10 
12 
4 
4 
Source:  ElM;  Annual  reports  "Produktschap  voor bier". 
Unlicensed retailers 
15  to  20 
13 
i3 
16 
Within  the  group of unlicensed beer-retailers only  groceries  and  super-
markets will be  further investigated.  Beer is also  sold in dairies  and  green-
groceries, but the im~ortance of these distribution-outlets is small  and 
diminishing,  as  a  result of the  vanishing boundaries  between  the  different 
retail-outlets  for  food-products.  By  enlarging the  number  of articles sold 
in dairies  and  greengroceries  these retailers have  become  wide  ranging  food-
shops.  Those  traditional shops,  especially dairies,  who  have  not  adapted 
themselves,  have  disappeared  by  now. 
The  shops,  selling grocery-articles  may  be  divided  into  two  main  groups: 
46 I- multiple  shop  chains,  shops  belongine to  a  cooperation  and  big shops. 
II- independent  firms  and  small  chains,  including retailers,  associated 
with  collective buying organisations or belonging to  voluntary  shains. 
The  following table  shows  the evolution of the number of establishments  in 
both categories. 
Table  32 
The evolution of the  number  of unlicensed retailers,  according  to  size-
categories 
Year 
1963 
1968 
1970 
1972 
1974 
Grouo  I 
2462 
2158 
2057 
2696 
2923 
Source:  ElM  "Het  Kruideniersbedrijf"  1969  and  1974. 
Group  II 
20.883 
17.805 
15.570 
12.612 
11.085 
The  decline  in the number  of  shops  belonging to group  I  until  1970  is  due 
to  a  large extent to  the reduction of  shops  belonging to  a  cooperative  chain. 
The  dutch  cooperative  movement  got  into financial  difficulties in  the early 
seventies. 
As  table 34  demonstrates  the  majority of unlicensed  retailing shops still 
belogs  to  the  group  of  one-shop  firms  and  small  chains.  The  distribution 
of  establishments  to  numbers,  however,  does  not  correspond to the  real 
magnitude  of the  two  groups,  according to beer-turnovers. 
Shops  belonging  to  the  big-chain organisations  are  more  important beer-sellers 
than  the  one-shop  firms  and  small  chains.  Marketshares  of  the  two  groups 
are  given  in  tabel  35.  The  data refer to the situation at  1-1-1976. 
Table  33 
Marketshares  of  beer sold  in groceries  for various size-classes 
Group  I 
Group  II 
of which  shops  with  a  total turnover 
of  365.000-920.000  florins 
shops  with  a  total  turnover of less 
than  365.000  florins 
Source:  Bureau Nielsen. 
47 
63% 
37  % 
20  % 
17  % It can  be  seen,  that  firms  belonging to  group  I  are  approaching  a  two-
third's share of  beer sales,  sold via groceries. 
The  classification,  uses  in  table  33,  is not  strictl~r com,arable  to  the 
classification used in  table  32.  Group  I  used  in  table  32  conpri3es 
vutlets with  turnovers  lar~er than  1  million  florins. 
There  are  two  large  chains  of supermarkets  operating on  a  national  scale 
and  several  chains  of so-called consumer-markets,  which  have  locally or 
regionally  confined activities. 
The  biggest  supermarket  chain  (Albert Heijn)  has  about  50%  of  total sales 
of  these  two  categories  taken  together. 
Beside beers of the well-known brands,  these  chains sell beer under their 
own  firm-name  or carry unknown  brand-names.  Prices of such beers  are 
considerably below  those of the well-known brands. 
In  recent years  a  back-ward integration movement  carried out  by  these 
leading  chains  can  be  observed.  Beer  - produced by  small  independent 
breweries under wage-contract  conditions  - is  increasingly  promoted by 
these retailing-organisations. 
4.0  Aspects  of  behaviour  and  performance 
4.1 Cartel-agreements  in  the Dutch beer-industry 
Cartels  and  other less  formal  agreements  are often  an  indication of non-
competitive behaviour.  A  cartel has  detrimental effects on  competition, 
when  agreements  concerning price,  facilities,  quality or other parameters 
replace  the  uncertainty,  existing previously with  respect  to  these 
parameters  in  individual  company  behaviour. 
Before stable cartel-agreements  can  emerge  a  certain degree  of  ~roduct­
uniformity  and  (horizontal)  concentration have  to  be  attained. 
These  conditions were  fulfflled  in Dutch  brewing  at  the beginning of the 
twentieth  century. 
Bottom-fermentation had  led  to  a  rather homogeneous  product  and  new  production-
techniques  together with  fierce  facility-competition  had  resulted  in  a  sharp 
increase of  concentration. 
In  1902  the  "Bond  van  Nederlandse  Brouwerijen"  (Dutch  Brewer's Union)  was 
established.  All  big breweries,  but  two  were  organised  by  this cartel. 
48 Regulations with  respect  to  several parameters  of  behaviour were 
made  by  the  cartel  and  controlled  by  the  cartel-office. 
These  agreements  were  not  limited  to beer-producers  but  included 
beer-wholesalers  too.as  well  as  margins  and  obligations of  the beer-
agents. 
Minimum-prices  for the different beer-types  and  quantity-reductions  given 
to  buyers  were  prescribed by  the cartel,  but  more  important  than  price-
agreements  was  the  agreement  regulating facilities,  especially credits. 
The  facilities-agreement  contained  a  uniform interest-rate on  loans  and 
certain requirements with  respect  to  the solvability of  cafe-owners. 
Market-segmentation  came  out  as  a  result of the obligation posed  upon  cafe-
owners  to buy  beer  from  the  brewery  which  had  given  financial  assistance. 
Cartel  members  agreed  mutually  to  respect  the outlets  acquired in this way. 
In  1938  the  "Centraal Brouwerij  Kantoor  "  (Central  Brewery  Office)  was 
founded.  This  office  took care of  collective barley-purchasing.  All 
breweries  but  one  are  members  of  the Central  Brewery  Office.  Besides  central 
purchasing  and  distribution of barley ,  the  CBO  also surveys  competition 
regulating agreements.  The  best-known  regulation is the Beer-Price  Agreement 
of  1947.  By  this agreement  beer-prices were  collectively determined  from 
producer till consumer. 
The  price-agreement  expired  in  1956  at  the  request of the  Dutch Ministry 
of Economic  Affairs. 
From  that year onwards  individual vertical price-arranBments  came  into 
existence.  Regulation  of facilities was  practised during  the  fifties  by  the 
"Gentleman's  Agreement  on  Facilities".  Market-segmentation had  taken  the 
shape  of delivery  contracts  between  the breweries  an  their cafe-customers. 
The  Central  Brewery  Office  collects monthly  sales- and  other data of 
member-breweries,  specified according to  beer-types  and  regional  markets. 
These statistics are  distributed  amoungst  the  members  of the Office. 
In  this way  every brewery  is fully  aware  of its own  and of competitors' 
marketpositions  and  of  the  changes  there  in.  The  Central  Brewery  Office thus 
acts  as  an  information  cartel. 
Information  about  the bottled beer-market is collected by  a  commercial 
market  research office.  Monthly  studies of  the  evolution of bottled beer-sales 
differentiated according  to retail-outlet are  made  at  the  request  of the 
big~breweries.  Such  information is  made  available  to  small  breweries  at  a 
moderate  price.  Outsiders  can  dispose of it only  at  an  extremely  high 
price,  however. 
Although  collective vertical price-agreements  were  forbidden  by  the 
Government  in  1956,  individual  vertical price maintenance  continued its life 
49 until well  into the seventies.  Such  arrangments  are  not  illegal. 
Since  1974  the  big breweries  one  after the  other were  forced  to  abandon 
price-maintenance  by  the  low  price-actions of  some  retailers. 
4.2 Prices 
Generally  the demand  for  a  product  is  influenced both  by  changes  of  the 
product's price  and  by  changes  of real  income.  The  rapid increase of beer-
consumption  per head  in  the  previous  decades  can  be  ascribed for the  larger 
part to the rise  in  real  incomes. 
Prices  may  not  be neglected  fully,  however.  The  appearance of low-priced 
beers,  sold by  the  supermarkets,  will have  contributed to  the  rise of beer-
consumption. 
Consumption  of beer is expected  to rise further in the  future. 
Whether its growth will  continue  at  the  same  rate,  however,  is doubted by 
some  experts.  Other experts prospect  consumption-levels of  100 liter a  head 
or more  in 1980. 
Such  expectations  are  chiefly based  on  the  low  levels of dutch per capita 
beer-consumption  as  compared with those of other countries. 
Whether  this expectation will be fulfilled depends  to some  extent  on  the 
development  of prices  in  coming years.  In  the  post-war period beer price-
rises have  lagged behind other price-increases. 
Table 34 
The  development  of beer-prices  in  the  Netherlands  (prices  are  in Dutch  cents) 
1939  1973  1974  1975  index  1975 
1939  =  100 
Glass  (outdoor)  20  95  100  110  550 
Bottle of 30  cl  15  51  54  57  380 
Bottle of  45  cl.  19  6H  74  77  405 
Overall  consumer 
level  index  100  +  619  +  680 
Source:  Annual  Reports  of  the  "Produktschap voor bier". 
Table  34  indicates,  that beer-prices  have  risen less  than  the overall  con-
sumer price-level.  The  most  important  event  in recent years  was  the 
abandonment  of the systems of individual  vertical price-fixing in 1974  and 
1975.  This break-through was  initiated by  some  medium-sized  chains of 
consumer-markets  and  cash  and  carry shops.  The  established supermarket  chains, 
like Albert  Heijn,  followed  only hesitatingly.  Apparently  they  did not  want 
to upset  their relationship with  the  leading breweries. 
50 At  first,the big breweries  resisted this break-down  fiercely.  Several  legal 
proceedings  were  undertaken  aganist  the price-cutters  in  1974. 
However,  at  the beginning of  1975  Heineken  had  to give  in  and  abandoned  the 
system of vertically  fixed  prices.  Its marketshare was  threatened. 
Prices  are  now  determined  at  the retail level and  differ from  one  shop 
to  the other.  The  prices  given  in table 34  are  those  as  advised  by  the 
breweries.  Really  paid prices  may  be  even  lower  depending  on  the retailer 
where  the beer is  bought. 
Thus,  a  limited investigation  in  a  particular Amsterdam  shopping quarter 
shows  that price differences  are  important.  Results  are  presented in table 
45.  The  five  shops  investigated  can  be shortly described  as  follows: 
Two  shops  belong to  a  multiple  shop  retail organisation  (Albert  Heijn) 
but  operate under different  names  Albert  Heyn  and  Simon.  One 
recently established shop  is part of  a  licensed retail chain of three 
shops  all situated  in  Amsterdam. 
Another  shop  belongs  to  a  chain of  consumer-markets,  called Dirk  van  der 
Broek.  The  last shop  is  a  small,  independent  grocery-shop. 
Table  35 
Beer-prices• in  an  Amsterdam  shopping quarter 
Organisation 
Albert  Heyn 
Simon 
Dirk  v.d.  Broek 
Licensed  retailer 
Independent  grocery 
Brands 
Heineken 
Albert  Heyn  (Skol 
Grolsch 
Heine  ken 
Simon 
Amstel 
Grolsch 
Export (Bavaria) 
Heine  ken 
Grolsch 
Heineken 
Price 
Class  Royale  (import) 
Bavaria 
in Dutch 
84 
59 
76 
79 
59 
65 
75 
49 
70 
74 
80 
60 
60 
cents 
•All  prices  refer to half-liter bottles.  Grolsch bottles contain 0,45  liter. 
Only  the brands,  sold  at  one  moment  in  time  are  included. 
The  most  remarquable  conclusion  to be  drawn  from  table  35  is that Heineken, 
the  most  dispersed beer in Holland,  is sold  at quite different prices. 
51 The  difference between the highest  and  the  lowest  price paid for Heineken 
amounts  to  14  cents,  being 20  percent  of  the  lowest  price. 
The  price differences  for Grolsch beer  are  the least. 
All  shops,  except  the  licensed retailer,  sell at least  two  brands,  a  well-
established one  and  an  unknown  one,  at  considerable price-differentials. 
Thus  it appears  that price discrimination with  respect  to distinguishable 
marketsegments  and  price-variation according to  type of outlet  and  locality 
have  become  a  common  policy. 
4.3 Stability of marketshares 
To  get  an  impression  of  the  competitiveness of behaviour in dutch  brewing, 
the evolution of marketshares  of firms,  divided into several size-classes 
is presented  in table  36. 
Departing on  the  assumption,  that  competition  in  an  industry will  lead to 
a  reshaking of marketshares with eains  for the  most  competitive  firms,  a 
comparision  of  marketshares  in  time  can elucidate some  aspects  of  the 
competitive process.  Table  36  has  been  drawn with this idea in mind. 
Table  36 
Evolution of marketshares of firms  in the dutch beer-market,  divided 
according  to size-classes 
Category  Sales  in mio  Number  of  firms  Market  shares  (var. 
florins  1970  1974  1970 
1  > 
300  1  1  54.3 
2  100-300  0  2 
3  25-100  3  2  31.4 
4  10-25  3  1  8.5 
5  2-10  2  2  1.25 
6  others  5  4  4.55 
14  12  100 
sales) 
1974 
54.8 
26.8 
10.1 
2.2 
1.3 
4.8 
100 
It becomes  apparent,  that the largest  firm maintained its marketshare  at·almost 
the  same  level.  The  number of  firms  in  the  three  lowest  size-classes  •l 
diminished  by  3  and  their marketshare  decreased  from  14.3 to 8.3  %. 
The  number  of firms  in  the  three highest  classes  increased by  one  and their 
total marketshare  by  6%. 
52 Shifts,  occuring in size-classes  do  not tell the whole  story,  for  by  the 
large  growth  in  turn-overs,  which  amounted  60%  in  the  1970-1974 
period,  firms  automatically  move  to  larger size-classes. 
Therefore  a  more  accurate  way  to measure  changes  in marketshares  is to 
compute  a  mobility-coefficient.  In this  computation marketshares of all 
firms  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end  of  the  investigated period  are 
compared.  The  mobility-index used  is of  the  following  mathematical  formula: 
F 
m  =  £..  di 
i=1 
di  indicates  the differences  between  marketshares  of individual  firms  in 
time.  Put  into symbols: 
di  /  ai  (t) 
In  1974  a  merger occured.  Taking this  merger  into  account,  the  value 
of  the mobility-index  amounts  0,08.  Neglecting the merger,  the value of 
the  mobility-index decreases  to  0,07. 
The  maximum-value  of the  index is 2,  its minimum 0.  Mobility  in the 
beer-industry is thus  very  low.  The  largest shifts,  in  contrary  directions 
however  took place at  the  firms,  ranking  2  and  3. 
4.4 Profitability 
Profitability-figures of  the  two  firms will be  given  in the  proceeding 
lines. 
Profitability is not  an  unbambiguous  concept.  A  high profits-sales 
ratio  may  be  the  outcome  of both  a  competitive process,  being beneficial 
to  consumers  and  the  abuse  of  a  powerful  position by  a  dominant  firm. 
To  reach  final  conclusions,  more  variables  have  to  be  taken  into  account, 
like prices,  investments  in  new  technology  a.s.o. 
Table  37 
Net  ;erofits  as  a  :eercentag:e  of sales  + 
Year 
~ 
Heineken  Skol 
1971  7,7  1,6 
1972  6,9  1,6 
1973  5,8  2,0 
1974  5,1  1,6 
1975  3,8  1,5 
53 Table  38 
Cash  flow  as  a  Eercentage of sales 
Year 
'2 
Heine  ken  Skol 
1971  10,5  6,3 
1972  11,8  6,0 
1973  11,3  6,3 
1974  10,8  5,3 
1975  9,2  5,2 
Source:  Annual  reports  Heineken  and  Skol 
+  Sales  are  consolidated  firm. -sales,  thus  non-beer sales  are 
included 
I  Book-years  run  from  october-octoqer f.i.  1971 means  oct.  '70-
oct.  '71. 
The  Skol-data refer to the subsidiary Skol/Holland.  Data of Grolsch, 
the  third  dutch brewery  can not  be  given,because Grolsch is  a  family-firm 
and  therefore  is not  obliged to publish  annual  reports. 
Net-profit rates of Heineken  have  been steadily declining.  Skol  has  maintained 
its net profit rate  at  almost  the  same,  but  lower level  throughout  the 
period. 
The  cashflow  concept  used here,  consits of net profits  +  depreciation 
allowances, 
figures. 
akin  to  the  method used  by  Heineken  in  computing  cash  flow 
A  comparision  of  the  two  tables  learns,  that depreciation allowances 
of Heineken,  measured  as  a  percentage of sales  are  much  larger than 
those  of Skol.  To  show  to  which  degree  share-holders  have  been benitifed by 
net profits,  dividends as a percentage of net profits are computed in table  41. 
Table  39 
Dividends  as  a  percentage of net Erofits 
Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Source:  Annual  reports. 
Heineken 
28,7 
29,9 
31,5 
30,7 
35,3 
Skol 
54,8 
35,4 
no  dividends  paid 
no  dividends  paid 
no  dividends  paid 
It is striking,  that  Skol  starting at  a  high % of net profits paid to 
shareholders,  stops  paying dividends  in  1973. 
54 During the last three years  Skol  has  added all net profits to  reservations 
and  no  dividends  were  paid.  Skol  keeps  all the  money  in  the  firm  to  make 
(depth)  investments  and  guarantee  the  future  existence of  the  firm.  as  is 
declared  in  the  annual  reports. 
Another  interesting ratio is the  investment  to sales  ratio.  Taken  together 
with  the  cash  flow/sales  ratio it gives  an  indication  how  firms  use  the 
funds,  they  have  at  their disposal. 
Table  40 
Domestic  investments  as  a  percentage of sales 
Year  Heine  ken  Skol  Grolsch 
1970  3  6,5  10 
1971  ~  4,6  5,3 
1972  7  9,5  27,5 
1973  8,5  5,4  6,1 
1974  4,8  7,6  19,7 
The  high fluctuations  of investment-figures  are  due  to  the  irregular  pace 
in which  investments  are carried out.  Heineken  has built  a  new  brewing-
plant  in  Zoetermeer during the last  few  years.  Skol  has  been  engaged  with 
acquisitions  in  recent years,  all acquisitions  relate to  non-beer activi-
ties,  like soft-drinks,  liquors  and wholesale-trade. 
Grolsch has  been  by  far the  largest  investor,  if related  to sales. 
Remarquable  is,  that Heineken  spends  least  on  investments,  related  to 
sales of the  three breweries. 
The  relatively  low  investment  volume  of Heineken  may  be  explained by  the 
active  expansion,  Heineken  is realizing in  foreign  countries  and  on  non-
beer products.  Foreign sales  grew  faster  than domestic sales.  Beer sales 
of Heineken  in the Netherlands  grew  by  61%  in  the  1970-1974 period.  Total 
sales of Heineken  taken  on  a  world-scale  increased by  153%  in the  same 
period. 
Beer-sales of Grolsch  have  increased by  86,7  % in the years  1970-1974, 
thus  leading to  a  higher marketshare of Grolsch  in 1974,  compared to  1970. 
As  table  40  shows,  great  investment-efforts  are  made  by  Grolsch  in order 
to  achieve  these  results. 
Beer  sales of Skol/Holland  have  grown  by  43%  during the  investieated 
period,  making  Skol  the smallest  grower of the  three breweries  in this 
way. 
Another criterion,  that  can  be  used  as  an  indication of  a  company's 
profitability is the  course of its quotations  on  the  stock exchange. 
55 It has  to  be  kept  in mind,  however,  that apart  from  profits, 
expectations of  future  profit  and  growth  play  a  large role in these 
quotations. 
In  table  41  Stock Exchange-quotations  for Skol/Holland  and  Heineken 
are  compared.  The  dutch Skol-subsidiary of Allied Breweries  is  the  main 
part of its International Division,  which  covers  about  10%  of total sales 
of Allied Breweries. 
Table  41 
Profit  pro  share  and  quotation-courses  of Skol/Holland  and Heineken 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976  (jan-
feb) 
Net  Profits pro  share  of 25  Dfl. 
Heineken 
7,44 
8,90 
11,63 
8,55 
8,76 
7,64 
Skol 
+ 
9,57 
10,60 
14,50 
13,50 
3,76 
quotation courses 
Heineken  Skol~ 
in Dfl. 
131  99,35 
176  115 
273  134,7 
113,3 
192  87 
138  85 
149 
Sources:  Investments-publications  of the  ABN  (a bank),  Annual  reports  Skol 
~ Quotation-courses  refer to quotations  of Convertible Skol  Bonds 
+  Computed  from  Skol  Annual  Reports.  Share capital  grows  suddenly  in  1975, 
because  of  conversion of bonds  into shares. 
Beside  Heineken  shares  and  the  convertible bonds  of Skol  no  stocks of 
dutch breweries  are  quoted  on  the Stock Exchange. 
The  quotation  courses  are  yearly  averages  .  The  years  1972  and  1973 were 
peak-years  both  for Heineken  and  for Skol.  At  the  moment  (october  1976) 
the  course  of  Heineken  shares  has  returned to its 1970-level  and  amounts 
133.  Skol  bonds  quote  81,50  in october  1976  and  in this way  has  fallen below 
its 1970-level. 
Although  dividends  paid by  Hetneken have  been steadily rising  from  2,31 Dfl. 
in  1970 till 3,50 Dfl.  in  1975  pro  share of 25  Dfl.,  course quotations  have 
not  kept  pace with  the  sound  financial  results  Heineken  has  attained.  There-
fore  it appears  that  course  quotations  van  not  be  used  as  a  reliable 
indication for profitability. 
Summing  up  the  information  given  in this paragraph,  it becomes  obvious, 
56 that Heineken  has  been  more  profitable than  Skol,  both  in  relation to net 
profits  and  to cash  flow  figures.  Data of  other dutch  breweries were  not 
available,  unfortunately.  Heineken  is  a  generous  dividendspayer,  but  not 
a  great  investor,  at least  not:  in  the  Netherlands.  It is not  possible 
to  draw  definite conclusions  from  the  presented data with  respect  to  the 
industry's behaviour. 
4. 5 Advertising 
Advertising  as  an  aspect of  firm behaviour will be  looked upon  now.  We 
may  describe  advertising as  an  attempt  to non-physical  product differentiation. 
Apart  from collective advertising-campaigns,  which  for beer were  executed 
during the  fifties  and  early sixties,  by  means  of  advertising  a  firm 
tries  to create  a  distinctive market  for his  own  brand product. 
If  a  firm  succeeds  in establishing a  market  for his  own,  competition 
can  be  evaded. 
What  one  needs  with this kind of product  differentiation is not  a 
distinctive product,  but  the  financial  means  to  make  it look  distinctive. 
In this respect  packaging takes  an  intermediate position.  It is  a  kind 
of non-physical  product-differentiation,  attained by  physical  means. 
The  traditional  swing-stoppered bottle  used by  Grolsch,  the  third brewery 
in  the Netherlands,  is  ru1  attempt  to  create  an  image  of  traditionally 
brewed  beer.  Swing-stoppers  are  abandoned  by  other firms,  because  crown-
corks  are  cheaper.  Grolsch  on  the  contraryfortifies in this way  the 
traditional craft-image,  it also  exposes  in advertising. 
Grolsch'  advertising campaigns  have  been  emphasizing traditionality  and 
skillness  in brewing for years. 
Heineken  has  created  an  image  for its Heinekenbrand of  a  beer,bringing joy 
and  companionship  to  every-one  who  joins it. 
Campaigns  for  the  Amstel-brand  are  directed  at  associating Amstel-beer 
with  good  brewership  and  therefore with  conscious,  connaisseur-like 
drinkers. 
Skol  presents its brand as  a  good  extra-hoppy beer,  for  which  claim no 
proof  seems  te exist.  The  smaller brands  do  not  advertise heavily. 
Table  42  gives  some  evidence  about  the  advertising costs,  made  by  breweries 
in  the  Netherlands. 
57 Table  42 
Estimated Publicity Budget  for Selected Brands  of Beer  in the Netherlands 
1971-1973  (  x  1000  Dfl.) 
Brand  1971  1972  1973 
Heine  ken  1706  1841  1920 
Amstel  1334  1292  654 
Total  Heineken  3040  3133  2574 
Skol  n.a.  1149  ~3 
Grolsch  1194  1242  1615 
Stella Artois  n.a.  89  ~2 
Brand  23  26  28 
Source:Admedia. 
It appear.s  from table 42,  that the  three  lareest  dutch brewing-firms 
are  the  main  advertisers.  Grolsch  is  a  relatively large  and  Skol  a  relatively 
small  advertiser.  Advertising expenditures  for the Amstel  brand  has 
diminished  sharply.  After being taken over by  Heineken  in  1969,  the Amstel 
brand was  given  a  new  image  at  the  expense of large advertising-costs. 
A  positive relationship exists between  an  increase  in advertising-
expenditures  and  an  enlargment of marketshare.  Grolsch has  increased its 
advertising-budget  at  the  most  rapid rate  and  is also  the largest  grower 
of dutch  beer-firms. 
Advertising-expendisures  of Skol  increased  and  Skol  also  experienced  a 
decline  in marketshare  during the  examined  period. 
Although  no  claims  can be  made  from  the data presented,  that  advertising 
efforts  are  the real  cause  of  (increased)  concentration,  it surely is  a 
contributing factor,  which  is worth attention. 
Diversification 
The direction  and  the  magnitude  of  diversification of  firms,  participating 
in  an  industry is an  important  feature of that  industry. 
Diversification,  in  general,  comes  to  the  fore,  when  a  firms  sees  shrinking 
growth-opportunities  in its original market.  This will  be  the case,  when 
demand  for  the industry's product  stagnates or declines.  Another possible 
cause  for pessimistic expectations,  held by  a  firm is  a  marketshare of  a 
size,  that  can not  be  enlarged easily  an~ore. 
Although  some  people  expect  a  slack.ening of  the growth of  beer-demand 
in the near  future,  the latter reason  is  a  more  important  motive  for 
beer-firms  to diversify. 
58 We've  seen  in preceding paragraphs that  the  marketshare  of 
Heineken  does  not  erow  anymore  and  that Ileineken 
is  very  reluctant  to price-competition.  It is  more  advantegeous  to  this 
firm  to  expand  on  other markets  than  on  its traditional beer-market. 
Diversification,  therefore,  has  become  a  policy of  increasing  importance 
to  Heineken. 
When  a  firm diversifies,  this  means,  that it will  devate  most  of its selling 
efforts  and  innovative  a  managerial  capacities  to  the  new  markets. 
How  far have  diversification-activities of breweries  gone  and  how  have  they 
affected  behaviour.With  these questions  the  following  paragraph will 
be  concerned. 
With  respect  to  the  first question,  it can  be  noted,  that  the big breweries 
have diversified  into other sub-markets  of the beverages-market.  At  the 
moment  Heineken  is  the  first seller of soft-drinks  and  the  second 
liquors-seller in  the Netherlands. 
Heineken  achieved  this position by  taking over existing firms  and bring 
them  to  expansion. 
Heineken  made  attempts  in  1976  to  take  over Bols,  the  largest seller of 
liquors  in  the  Netherlands.  These  attempts  however,  dit not  succeed, 
because  of the  refusal  of  Bols'  board of directors. 
Now  Heineken  is expanding its liquor plant-capacities  in order to  gain 
a  larger marketshage  in  this way.  Apart  from  its activities on  new  dutch 
beverages-markets,  Heineken  is  fiercely  intruding into  foreign  beer-markets 
too. 
Heineken  owns  breweries-subsidiaries  in Europe,  Africa,  Asia  and  Sout-
America,  of which  the  non-european sales  are  growing  fastest. 
Heineken's  activities on  the  new  dutch  markets will  be  decribed 
thoroughly  in  the  reports  on  the dutch soft-drinks-industry  and  liquor-
industry.  Only  a  few  indications of  its  efforts  in  these  fields will be 
reported here. 
Table  43 
Developments  of Heineken-sales  in different markets  in mio  florins 
index:  1970  =  100 
World Beer Sales 
Dutch  Beer  Sales 
Soft  Drinks~ 
Spirits  and  Wines 
1970 
550 
304 
86 
23 
Source:  Heineken,  annual  reports. 
1974 
1352 
507 
167 
206 
index  1970=100 
245 
167 
194 
895 
~ Soft-drinks sales  and  sales of spirits are  for the ereater part  domestic 
sales. 
59 Table  43  shows,  that sales of non-beer products  and  beer-sales  in  foreign 
markets  rise faster  than  domestic beer-sales. 
Sales of wines  and  spirits grew  at  a  very  rapid rate,  due  to Heineken's 
take-over policy of distilleries  and  wine-merchandises. 
Heineken's  total sales still consist  for  78%  of beer however. 
Skol/Holland also operates  on  the markets  of soft-drinks  and  wines  and 
spirits. 
It owns  3  soft-drink  firms  and  4  distilleries. 
izg. 
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61 Introduction and conclusions 
Consumption of spirits has increased at a  rapid rate in the Netherlands 
in recent decades. 
This development it has in common  with other alcoholic beverages.  Dutch 
consumption o£ beer and  spirits trebled since 1960.  Consumption o£ wine 
even grew  to  a  level which  was  five  times that o£  the volume  consumed  in 
1960. 
During the period investigated  (1971-1974)  sales grew by  30  per cent to 
an amount  of 700  million florins in 1974.  The  number  o£  employees re-
mained rather stable between  the  levels of  2200  and  2400  people. 
Consumption of foreign spirits grew £aster than consumption o£ domestic 
spirits and also  than exports.  Foreign spirits increased their market-
share till 15%  o£  sales in 1974. 
A large but diminishing number  o£ firms participate in Dutch spirits-
manufacturing.  The  largest £our firms cover more  than hal£ o£  production 
however.  young  geneva is the most  popular spirit with a  marketshare of 
about  50  per cent o£ domestic production.  Other important domestic spirits 
are vieux  (Dutch  cognac),  berries  geneva and  a  spirit becoming  popular 
called Beerenburg  (a herb-bitter).  The  most popular foreign spirits are 
whisky  and cognac.  Concentration within the most  important  sub-markets 
is slightly higher than in the total market.  Sub-markets o£  a  smaller 
size,  e.g. old geneva,  advocaat,  berries geneva  and  beerenburg are more 
heavily concetrated than  the larger markets. 
The  research brings on that the most  important £actor explaining 
concentration in the Dutch  spirits-industry are take-overs. 
Thus,  the  largest firm,  Bols,  has enlarged its market  share mainly by 
means  of acquisitions.  Heineken,  the  second  spirits-manufacturer has 
entered the spirits-market by  taking over  some  old-established firms 
with reputed brands.  Firms of a  smaller size  too,  have  been active on 
the merger-frontier.  Most  acquired plants continued production after the 
take-over. 
Brand-names o£  the acquired firms were  kept  and  firms continued to  advertise 
as heavily on behalf o£  these brands as o£  their "own". 
63 Competition has been  an unfamiliar phenomenon  in the  industry for  a 
long  time.  The  spirits-cartel and vertical price-agreements have 
controlled prices since  the  Second World War.  Since  1967  a  liberalization 
of the  law has allowed more  retail-outlets to  be established. Along-
side traditional licensed retailers,  spirits-chains and  discount-markets 
appeared.  The  first infringment on controlled prices was  the intro-
duction of "white"  spirits. These  were  the  spirits of unknown  brands 
which were  sold at much  lower prices than the products of well-known 
brands.  In 1975  the  system of vertically controlled prices was  disrupted 
by  some  retailers,  who  sold well-established brands at much  lower prices. 
They  started to  sell geneva at prices of 10 florins or lower  a  bottle, 
while  the officially fixed prices amounted  to  some  14,5 florins. 
In contrast to earlier court-judgments,  legal proceedings were  settled 
to  the  advantage of the price-cutting retailers. 
Manufacturers,  wholesalers and a  lot of retailers asked  the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs to  set a  minimum-price.  This request was  granted and 
£rom  the first of January 1976 on,  minimum  prices for  the most  important 
spirits-categories are operative.  The  minimum-price o£  young  geneva is 
now  between 13 and  14 florins a  bottle,  after a  raise o£ excise tariffs. 
Part I  Production and  consumption o£  spirits and liquors 
1.1  Raw-materials 
Basic raw materials used in the manufacture o£ spirits are malt wine,  grain 
alcohol  and molasses alcohol.  Molasses  and molasses-alcohol are  a  by-
product o£  sugar production. It is therefore not  a  coincidence  that the 
sugar-industry has an interest in alcohol-production. 
The  alcohol-industry-presently consists of the  following alcohol-manufacturers: 
1. The  "Zuid-Nederlandse Spiritusfabriek"  (ZNSF)  at Bergen op  Zoom  in the 
South o£ Holland.  This factory is wholly owned  by  two  sugar companies, 
SU  and  CSM,  which are the only sugar manufacturers in the Netherlands. 
The  "Suiker Unie"  (su)  has an  interest o£  61  percent and  the "Centrale 
Suiker Maatschappij"  (CSM)  one o£  39  per cent in ZNSF. 
In addition,  ZNSF  has  a  50  percent interest in "Henkes",  the  third 
spirits manufacturer. 
2.  The  "Koninklijke Gist- en Spiritus£abriek"  (KGSF)  at Delft,  a  subsidiary-
company  o£ Gist-Brocades.  KGSF  has the other 50  per cent interest in 
Henkes. 
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3.  A.K.z.o.  at Herkenbosch 
4.  De  Koning  at Schiedam,  a  subsidiary-company of Lucas Bols, 
Distilleries,  largest  spirits-manufacturer in the Netherlands. 
The  ZNSF,  KGSF  and AKZO  co-operate in the "Spirits Verkoop  Kantoor"  at 
Rijswijk,  a  centralized sales bureau,  which  has monopolized  the Dutch 
market for decades. 
The  Lucas Bols'  subsidiary-company De  Koning  does not cooperate in this 
sales bureau.  The  output o£  De  Koning  fully covers  the alcohol needs of 
the Bols distillery;  redundant quantities are exported. 
1.2  Manufacturing of geneva,  liquours and advocat. 
Malt wine,  grain alcohol  and molasses  alcohol are  the basic ingredients in 
geneva-manufacturing. 
In fact  the production of geneva is nothing more  than  a  blending  (mixing) 
of malt wine,  grain alcohol  and  molasses alcohol which mixture is flavoured 
to perfection with herbs  and  juniper berries. 
In former  days  several men  were  busy for  days on end with  the measuring  and 
mixing. 
Nowadays  this measuring- and mixing-process takes place by means  of a  switchboard 
with various buttons to  introduce  a  particular recipe,  which opens and  shuts 
various taps,  thus regulating measured  quantities. 
Obviously,  there are countless  small  differences among  the various brands 
of geneva,  and every distiller has his own  secret recipe,  handed  down  through 
generations,  which  he  guards  like his greatest  treasure. 
Manufacturing of liquours is a  special part of  the  Dutch  spirits distilling 
industry.  The  equipment of liqueur-production essentially is the  same  as that 
which is used in geneva-production.  Whereas  geneva is composed of a  limited number 
of raw material,  liqueurs are made  of,  besides distillates of wine  and grain, 
sugar,  water  and  the aromatic extracts from  numerous herbs,  seeds roots and peels. 
Another  important product of the Dutch  spirits distilling industry is "advocaat". 
There  are  two  kinds,  the  genuine Dutch  ver~ion, heavily emulsified  (thick 
65 advocaat),  and  the much  lighter variety £or export  (thin advocaat). 
Basic elements £or this typical Dutch drink are  the fresh yolk o£  an egg, 
sugar  and  aromatic brandy. 
The distinction between old and young geneva is in "old geneva,  young geneva, "ladies"-
geneva~t has  to  do  with  the higher proportion o£ maltwine  to  grain or molasses 
alcohol  in old geneva.  The  old type has a  somewhat  stronger aroma  and a  light 
golden colour,  whereas  the young  variety is rather more  neutral in taste, 
quite clear and colourless. 
When  a  Dutchman  talks about a  "small glass",  he  is thinking o£  a  glass 
o£  geneva. 
Before his dinner,  after the daily rush o£ life, he  likes to  enjoy an 
"honest glass o£  geneva". 
Young  geneva is the most  popular spirits-variety;  growing  demand  o£  young 
geneva has partly been at the expense o£ old geneva. 
Popular with  the  ladies is berries-geneva  a  gin flavoured with black 
currant juice;  lemon  geneva,  a  gin with  lemon  flavour which is often taken with 
a  little sugar,  and  advocaat,  a  drink which is so  syrupy,  that it cannot 
be  drunk  in the ordinary way  and has to be consumed with  the help o£  a 
small  spoon. 
Liquours and cremes  (liquours with a  high  sugar content)  are  drunk after 
dinner as  pousse-ca£~ with co££ee.  They  are also used in the preparation o£ 
pudding,  fruit salads and as ingredients £or cocktails.  There are a  lot o£ 
varieties: 
cocoa and co££ee-liquour,  apricot brandy,  peach brandy,  cherry brandy, 
blackberry brandy,  creme  de menthe,  etc. 
1 • 3 Consumption 
Despite the £act that spirits consumption is still on the  increase,  Dutchmen  are 
moderate drinkers. 
On  the 1974 worldlist per capita spirits coasumption,  the Netherlands rank 
13th with  2.75 litres at 100 per cent alcohol.  Poland,  Japan and  the D.D.R. 
head  the list with 4.0,  3.74 and  3.4 litres respectively. 
As  is shown  in table 1,  the Dutch spirits consumption has considerable moved 
ahead in recent years,  stimulating both domestic production and  foreign  trade. 
This expansion - which may  also be observed in most other West-Eu~pean 
countries - can berelated to both per capita expenditure by consumers  and  to 
66 a  greater acquaintance with alcoholic beverages,  partly as a  result of 
tourism. 
Table 1: Apparent  and per capita consumption of spirits,  1968-1975 
(at 100 per cent alcohol) 
Year  Apparent  Per capita 
consumption  1  consumption 
(hectolitres •ooo)  (litres) 
1968  224  1.76 
1969  242  1.88 
1970  266  2.04 
1971  279  2.11 
1972  304  2.28 
1973  343  2.55 
1974  373  2.75 
1975  463  3. 39 
1 = production +  imports - exports 
Source:  Produktschap voor Gedistilleeroe Dranken,  Annual  Report  1975, 
Schiedam,  May  1976. 
From  1968  to  1975  apparent spirits consumption increased by 107  per cent 
to  reach 463,000 hectolitres at 100 per cent alcohol,  that is to  say an 
average  annual  increase of 13 per cent. 
In the  same  period per capita consumption almost  doubled. 
As  shown  in table  2,  the Netherlands are rather a  spirits consuming  country 
than a  beer- or wine  drinking country. 
67 Country 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Luxemburg 
France 
Italy 
West-Germany 
Gr.-Britain 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Table  2:  Per capita consumption of spirits,  beer and wine  in E.E.C.-
countries  (1974). 
spirits  beer  wine 
litres at  rank  rank 
100  per  li  tres  li  tres 
cent ale.  '73  '74  '73  '74 
2.75  3  2  75.72  7  7  1 o. 38 
1.  90  7  7  1 33  1  3  15.8 
3.1  1  1  1 35  3  2  40.3 
2.4  4  4  44.19  8  8  103.04 
2.0  5  5  14.4  9  9  11 o. 5 
2.65  2  3  147.00  2  1  20.2 
1.54  8  9  114. 3  4  4  5.33 
1.58  9  8  111 ·• 96  5  5  9.66 
1.92  6  6  86.74  6  6  3.6 
Source:  Produktschap voor Gedistilleerde Dranken,  Annual  Report  1975, 
Schiedam,  May  1976. 
1.4 Exports  and  imports of spirits 
Traditionally the Netherlands have been  a  large exporter of spirits. 
However,  in more  recent years  imports have  outgrown exports and  since 
1970  the  Dutch  spirits balance of  trade  shows  a  deficit. 
Table  3:  Imports and exports in volume  and value  (1968-1975). 
Volume  Value 
(hl.  '000  at 100 per cent)  (D. fl. mln.) 
Imports2  Exports3  Imports 2  Exports3 
1968  70  35  24  41 
1969  109  56  41  45 
1970  103  60  49  50 
1971 1  70  28  50  40 
19721  84  60  60  49 
197 3
1  63  49  65  57 
19741  80  79  79  79 
19751  1 36  57  115  69 
1  = exclusive imports  from  and  exports  to  Belgium/Luxemburg 
2 = inclusive  imports for export-purposes 
3 = exclusive deliveries  to  ships and  aeroplanes. 
68 
rank 
'73  '74 
7  6 
5  5 
3  3 
2  2 
1  1 
4  4 
6  8 
8  7 
9  9 Some  correction on table  3  should be provided by taking account o£ imports, 
destined £or re-export after some  processing.  Spirits imported £or  this 
purpose are wine distillates £rom  Greece  and  France,  wodka  and rum. 
The  magnitude  o£  imports,  destined £or re-exports is shown  in table 4. 
Table  4:  Imports destined £or re-export. 
Volume  Value 
hl.  '000  at  100 per cent  (D.£1  ..  mln.) 
1970  61.1  8.6 
1971  28.3  3.4 
1972  40.1  5.4 
1973  14.2  1.2 
1974  24.3  3. 3 
1975  66.5  21 .1 
Source:  Produktschap voor Gedistilleerde Dranken,  Statistiekmapje 
betre££ende de  Nederlandse  invoer van gedistilleerde dranken, 
Schiedam,  February 1972  and April 1976. 
Consumption o£ foreign  spirits is increasing and has  grown  to  16  per cent 
o£ apparent consumption in 1975. 
Table  5:  Apparent consumption o£  spirits broken down  by Dutch  and foreign 
spirits. 
Apparent  consumption 
Dutch  spirits  foreign spirits 
Year  hl.  at  percentage  hl. at  percentage 
100  %  share  100  %  share 
1968  203  90.6  21  9.4 
1969  212  87.6  30  12.4 
1970  225  84.6  41  15.4 
1971  235  84.2  44  15.8 
1972  257  84.5  47  15.5 
1973  I  291  84.8  52  15.2 
1974  31 3  84.2  60  15.8 
1975  388  83.8  75  16.2 
Source:  Produktschap voor Gedistilleerde Dranken,  Annual  Report  1975, 
Schiedam,  May  1976. 
69 The  main spirits imported are whisky and cognac respectively from  the  UK 
and  from  France.  Imports of whisky are increasing at a  very rapid rate 
in recent years.  Whisky  imports rised by 40 per cent in 1975  and  surpassed 
the value of cognac  imports in that year.  Whiskies  had  a  share of  26,5 
per cent of total imports,  imports of cognac  came  to  25.1  per cent. 
The  third important category are liquors with  a  share of 9.8 per cent. 
Most  liquors also  come  from  France. 
Foreign spirits are  imported by Dutch distilleries and by wine merchandisers  • 
Big distilleries such  as Heineken have  penetrated the market of imported 
spirits by acquiring merchandise houses,  but also  large independent 
merchandisers exist. 
By  taking over Reuchlin,  Heineken has a.o.  become  the  sole importer of 
Jagermeister,  a  German  liquor of increasing importance on  the Dutch market. 
Skol's most  important foreign hands are Cointreau  and  Romanoff  Wodka. 
Bols is the official  importer of Ballantine's whisky,  Courvoisier cognac, 
Hennesy  cognac,  Jameson whisky and Appleton rum. 
Untill 1968 every foreign spirits-brand was  solely imported by one  (official) 
importer.  By  a  softening of regulations concerning  imports of foreign 
spirits in 1967,  parallel imports of foreign spirits became  possible. 
Since  that date parallel imports by non-official importers have  become  a 
wide-spread phenomenon.  Such  imports have  lowered consumer-prices considerably, 
reaching  a  level which is hardly higher  than that of Dutch  spirits like geneva. 
Whiskies  in particular are  sold at  low prices. 
The  main export-products of  the  Dutch  distillingindustry are advocaat, 
liquors and  geneva.  (Table  6). 
Table 6:  The  evolution of the composition of Dutch exports,  in percentages 
of export-values. 
Type  of  % 
spirit  1967  1970  1973  1975 
advocaat  44.6  33.2  38.3  37.7 
liquors  27.7  29.8  29.2  24.1 
geneva  18.9  15.2  12.9  19.6 
dry gin  1.2  1 .1  1.7  1.7 
whisky  2.0  1.8  1.2  0.6 
other spir}ts  5.6  18.9  16.7  16.3 
Source:  Dutch export statistics of the  "Produlctschap voor Gedistilleerde 
Dranken". 
70 Great Britain is the main receiving country of Dutch  spirits exports taking 
36  per cent of total exported spirits and  76  per cent of advocaat  exports. 
The  second  importing country is Western  Germany  with  a  share of 15 per cent 
in 1975.  The  larger part of exports  to W.-Germany  is of an  irregular character 
(a.o.  shipments  to foreign  army  forces). 
Part II The  structure of the spirits-branch in the Netherlands. 
2.1  Introduction 
The  Dutch distillery industry is characterized by  a  large number  of companies. 
In 1971  the industry consisted of 161  companies of which  41  had 10 or more 
employees.  In 1975  the  total number  amounted  to  132,  of which  33  companies had 
10 or more  persons  (see  table 7). 
Table  7 
Total  Distilleries with 
number  of  10 - 50  50  or more 
Year  distilleries  persons  persons 
1971  161  28  1 3 
1972  160  23  1 3 
1973  147  24  10 
1974  1 37  35  35 
1975  132  33  33 
Source:  C.B.S.,  Produktiestatistieken: Distilleerderijen en Likeurstokerijen 
1972  +  1973,  The  Hague; 
C.B.S.,  Statistisch bulletin,  The  Hague,  March  23,  1976; 
C.B.S.,  Statistisch bulletin~,  The  Hague,  August 17,  1976; 
Produktschap voor Gedistilleerde Dranken  (Spirits Board Annual  Reports, 
Schiedam). 
The  large  number  of distilleries in the Netherlands can be attributed to  the 
following  reasons: 
1.  the  simplicity of the production process;  the production process is neither 
capital nor  labour intensive nor know-how  intensive. 
2.  The  restraints upon competition by means  of cartellization.The manufacturer's 
price was  choosen in such a  way,  that all cartel-members could realize 
reasonable earnings.  This led to  a  situation in which  smaller distilleries 
were  able  to  survive. 
71 The  developments in the production structure of  the Dutch spirits distilling 
industry can be  shown  by means  of  the percentage distribution of domestic 
sales by  size-class. 
Table  8 
Size-class  Domestic  sales  (volume), 
in  percentage  share of each  size-class 
hectolitres  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
< 1 ,ooo  4.0  3.4  3.5  2.8  2.5  1.8 
1, 000  - 3,000  1 o. 7  7.6  6.1  5.5  3. 3  2.4 
3,000 - 5,000  7.4  5.4  4.2  1. 3  2.6  1.5 
5,000 - 1 o, 000  14.0  9.3  6.1  7.2  4.3  3.1 
10,000 - 15,000  5.4  6.7  6.1  5.4  5.1  2.9 
>  15,000  58.5  67.6  74.0  77.8  82.2  88.3 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  Produktschap  voor Gedistilleerde Dranken,  Rapport over de  enquete 
afzet gedistilleerde dranken in 1973,  Schiedam,  March  1974;  idem  in 
1975,  Schiedam,  March  1976. 
Table  8  shows  the  increasing  importance of distilleries with an output of 
more  than 15,000 hectolitres and,  in particular,  the reduced  share of small 
and medium-sized companies. 
The  total number  of distilleries,  broken  down  to  size-classes is presented 
in the  following  table. 
Table  9 
Size-class  Number  of 
in  distilleries broken down  by  size-class 
hectolitres  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
1,000  105  90  98  90  86  85 
1 ,ooo  - 3,000  43  35  29  27  20  18 
3,000  - 5,000  14  10  8  3  6  4 
5,000 - 10,000  14  9  7  9  6  5 
10,000 - 15,000  3  4  4  4  4  3 
15,000  14  1 3  14  14  15  17 
total  193  161  160  147  1 37  1 32 
Source:  Produktschap voor Gedistilleerde Dranken,  1974 en 1976. 
72 Table  9  shows  the  receding number  of distilleries from  193 in 1970  to 
132 in 1975.  We  can also observe  the  decreasing  significance in number 
of distilleries with  a  production sizeof 1,000 hl., 1,000- 3,000 hl., 
3,000 - 5,000 hl.  and  5,000  - 10,000 hl. Distilleries with  an output of 
10,000- 15,000 hl.  are rather stable over years. 
On  the other hand,  the  number  of distilleries with  an output of more  than 
15,000 hl.  increased from  14  in 1970  to  17  in 1975.  The  latter distilleries 
had a  share of 88.3 per cent of domestic  sales. 
2.2 Concentration 
Dutch  spirits distilling industry is characterized by a  large number  of manufac-
turers with  a  vast assortment. 
During  the last decade  a  great number  of distilleries were  acquired by others 
or merged,  but company-names  and -brands were maintained.  Due  to  this development, 
nowadays more  brands exist than independent distilleries. 
Several concentration-indices will be presented in the following  pages.  These 
indices were  computed  from  data,  collected at the central office of Statistics 
(CBS)  in the Hague.  Data of individual firms with respect to  the variables: 
sales,  employees,  wages  and  salaries,  gross investments,  exports  and domestic 
sales constitute the basis of the  indices.  The  data were  collected according 
to  the following  lines: 
- only firms with more  than 10 employees were  investigated 
excise-duties were  included in the variables sales and  domectic  sales 
sales-figures are exclusive of imports 
An  overall view of the  industry is presented in table 10. 
73 Table  10:  The  evolution of national vliables 1971-1974  (1971  1 oo). 
1971  1972  1973  1974 
Number  of investigated 
distilleries  39  36  34  33 
Sales  (x1000 fl.)  5 34,444  626,1 29  639,514  705,050 
Index  100  117  119  1 31 
Number  of employees  2,163  2, 364  2, 283  2, 272 
Index  100  109  105  105 
Wages  and  Salaries  (x1000fl.)  41,566  53,555  6 2, 36 2  64,421 
Index  100  128  150  154 
Wages  per employee  19' 217  22,654  27' 316  28, 354 
Gross  investments  (x1000)  8,206  1 2, 397  26, 238  16,869 
Index  100  151  319  205 
Exports  (x1000 fl.)  51' 96 3  55' 9 33  61,468  90,587 
Index  100  107  118  174 
2.3 The  measurement of concentration 
As  the coefficients of the following  tables demonstrate,  concentration in Dutch 
distilling is quite high  in spite of the  large number of firms,  operating in 
this field. 
The  industry consists of a  few  large firms  and many  medium-sized  and  small firms. 
The  large firms  have  not gained in importance during  the period investigated 
(1971-1974).  Values of both absolute  and relative concentration-coefficients 
have  decreased for all variables,  except investments. 
Coefficients of dispersion 
The  coefficient of variation  (v)  and  the Gini-coefficient  (G)  describe  the 
degree of relative concentration within an industry. In the case of the distilling-
industry variation-coefficients do  not reach high values  (  around  2.0). 
Relative concentration as measured by  the Gini-coefficient is higher. 
G-values of most variables are between 0.65  and 0.75. 
G-coefficients of gross investments and exports are higher and,  moreover, 
in contrast to  those of other variables increasing. 
Concentration ratio's 
The  four  largest firms have more  than  50  per cent of all variables. 
Absolute concentration therefore is high,  but decreasing slightly over  time. 
The  second  group  of four firms  adds about  20  per cent to  the  share reached 
by  the first four firms. 
74 The  remaining market is dispersed among  a  great number  of medium-sized 
and  small firms.  The  firms  ranking  1  and  2  are Bols  and  Heineken.  Heineken 
does not operate under its own  name  but uses the  brandnames  of the firms it 
has acquired:  Bokma,  Hoppe  and  Schiedamse Molen.  The  third distillery is 
Henkes,  a  subsidiary of  CSM  (central sugar company)  and  ZSF. 
CR4-values are highest for exports and lowest for  the variable employees. 
Generally  speaking it may  be  stated that the four largest firms  invest and 
export more  than their relative share o£ total sales,  employ  less employees 
than  the  average  firm,  but pay  them  better. Their  share of total wages 
and  salaries is therefore more  or less in balance with their share of total 
sales. 
Concentration,  as measured by  the coefficients H and E is low.  Some  shifts 
did occur over  time,  but no  clear pattern emerges. 
Linda-coefficients 
L-values confirm  the main conclusions,  drawn  from  other coefficients. Overall 
inequality is moderate,  as indicated by  the Ls-values,  b~t a  strong dominancy 
of  the largest one  (sometimes  two)  firm(s)  exists. 
The  main characteristics,  that appear from  L-values are 
-Moderate and decreasing values for  the Ls-index,  with an  average value 
o£  about  0.40 for most variables. 
- Variables investments  and exports do  not fit into  this pattern. 
are high for both these variables and also more  volatile. 
L -values  s 
- The  number  o£ firms,  belonging  to  the oligopolistic arena is large,  in 
most cases over  twenty. 
- The  first firm occupies  a  dominant position,  as indicated by  Nh  which 
reaches its maximum-value  for  the  second firm.  This means  that  the first firm 
has  a  leading position,  with  a  great difference in market  share between 
the first and  the  second firm.  There  are only  a  few  exceptions,  for example 
the variable domestic  sales for hal£ o£  the period. 
Donimancy  (o£  the first firm)  is rather pronounced with a  lowest value 
reached of o. 7 3. 
-The second maximum  (N¥n  with its corresponding value LN¥h)  is identical 
to  the first maximum  (N*h  )  except for  the variables gross investments 
and exports. 
Summarizing  the  evidence with respect to concentration,  we  can  say,  that no 
important  increase in concentration has occured during the investigated period. 
Mergers  thus did not contribute  to concentration,  but  the  intended take-over 
75 (1976)  of Bols by Heineken would  have  drastically changed  the  structure 
of the  industry. More  will be  said about mergers  in a  following chapter. 
An  explanation of the relative decrease of concentration may  be  found  in 
the  growing  importance of cheap  ttwhite"  spirits.  Small distilleries evaded 
the price arrangements of the distillery cartel and  sold their products 
at  lower prices.  The  large retailers reduced  the prices of well-known brands 
till the  level of so-called "white"  spirits. Thus it may  be  expected that 
these recent developments will lead  to  an  increasing market  share for  the 
large firms  and  therefore  to  increasing concentration. 
Table 11:  Concentration coefficients of Dutch distilleries: 
variable:  sales 
Year  N  v  G  CR4  CR8  CR12  H 
1971  39  2.03523  .71905  58.10  76.26  86.40  1 31.85006 
1972  45  1 .92794  • 70781  53.50  71.31  81.75  104.82085 
1973  36  1 .69276  • 68 342  53.77  74·.-45  85.01  107.37  352 
1974  35  1.70429  .69929  56.38  77-72  87.66  111.55976 
; 
~ 
Table 12:  Concentration coefficients o£  Dutch distilleries: 
variable:  employees 
~ear  N  v  G  CR4  CR8  CR12  H 
1971  40  1.  83497  .66007  52.06  70.55  81.23  109.17804 
1972  42  1 .6  3873  .62368  48.92  65.38  76.08  87.74852 
1973  41  1 .64261  .62370  48.46  68.27  79.76  94.8251 3 
1974  39  1. 5 3901  • 62370 !  48.46  68.27  79.27 
i  88.64576 
I 
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E 
-111.48150 
-1 21 .98059 
-116.91979 
-114.17440 
E 
-122.35145 
-1 29.45169 
-125.47990 
-1 26.36869 Table  13:  Concentration  coefficients of Dutch  distilleries: variable: 
wages  and  salaries 
Year  N  v  G  CR4  CR8  CR12  H  E 
1971  38  2.26411  ;72045  60.26  77.61  86.54  f6h21616  --109'. 65095 
1972  41  1. 7241  .66488  58.60  76.76  87.78  128.14804  -112.02278 
1973  41  1. 96906  .67566  54.04  71.02  81.91  118. 95565  -120.54742 
1974  39  1. 89438  • 65610  52.10  70.31  81.32  117.65844  -121.03609 
Table  14:  Concentration coefficients of Dutch  distilleries: variable: 
gross  investments 
Year  N  v  G  CR4  CR8  CR12  H  E 
1971  40  2.13214  .70369  57.10  77.52  83.50  138.65081  -114.61789 
1972  32  3.28078  • 81511  79.02  87.84  93.49  367.60969  - 76.46320 
1973  27  2.77755  • 83809  86.77  93.57  97.29  322.76981  - 71.38482 
1974  24  2.16485  .79402  80.44  95.13  98.00  236.94075  - 80.01513 
Table  15:  Concentration coefficients of Dutch  distilleries: variable: 
exports 
!Year  N  v  G  CR4  CR8  CR12 
1971  12  1.77854  • 75039  91.82  99.66  -
1972  21  2.33492  .82744  89.02  97.69  99-53 
1973  20  2.18491  • 80766  86.57  97.35  99.48 
1974  19  1. 95343  .79344  87.36  98.77  99.95 
Table  22.  Concentration coefficients of  dutch distilleries 
Variable:  domestic  sales 
!Year  N  v  G  CR
4 
CR8  CR12 
1971  39  1.92282  • 7021'6  56.71  75-76  84.95 
1972  43  1.89212  .70926  54.61  73.72  83.54 
1973  37  1.64073  .67326  52.44  72.44  83.19 
1974  36  1.59578  .68451  53.65  74.30  85.36 
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H  E 
346.93341  - 59.67888 
307.23029  - 67.77324 
288.69080  - 70.39125 
253.46808  - 71.93997 
H  E 
120.44179  -166.30973 
106.51470  -120.07998 
99.78389  -119.59968 
98.51415  -117-77343 Table  16. Linda-coefficients of  dutch  distilleries 
Variable:  sales 
Year  L  :r..r*  n*  L  N*  n* h<  L  1r* h <  s  m  m 
1971  .49047  38  18  .32955  2 
1972  .40234  44  20  .26328  2 
1973  .41261  35  16  .25790  2 
1974  .41341  34  16  .29704  2 
Table  17. Linda-coefficients of  dutch distilleries 
Variable:  employees 
rtear  L  N~  ~  1rr  • 
s  m  m  N h( 
1971  .36554  39  34  .24482  2 
1972  .31221  41  32  .19180  3 
1973  .31813  38  35  .21828  2 
1974  .32196  37  29  .21419  2 
Table  18.  Linda-coefficients of dutch distilleries 
Variable:  was:es  and salaries 
:Year  L  lf  NiE  L  NiE  I-f  h(  s  m  m 
1971  .49214  37  34  .36601  2 
1972  .50968  30  14  .31902  2 
1973  .40333  40  30  .25779  2 
1974  .40260  38  30  .24695  2 
Table  19. Linda-coefficients of dutch distilleries 
Variable:  s:ross  investments 
Year  L  lf  rl  L rf  ~r[  s  m  m 
~ 971  .44967  39  32  .29354  2 
1972  1.40195  31  14  .78414  2 
1973  1.26182  26  3  .92788  2 
h974  .59742  23  2  .59742  2 
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1.07154 
.80694 
.73536 
.89270 
:JE 
L  lJ  h < 
1.22803 
.76919 
.80745 
1.16514 
1  NiE h  ( 
1.77695 
1.16162 
1.16142 
1.72355 
L  NiE h < 
1.83448 
2.86531 
1.59577 
.59742 
N* 
h 
L  1\J 
.~  h 
2  1.07154 
2  .80694 
2  -73536 
2  .89270 
lfh  *  L  N h 
2  1.22803 
3  .76919 
2  .80745 
2  1.16514 
NiE 
h  L  NiE h. 
2  1.77695 
2  1.16162 
2  1.16142 
2  1.72355 
N:IE 
h 
L  N:IE 
h 
2  1.83448 
2  2.86531 
26  2.17442 
23  2.00722 Table  20.  Linda-coefficients of dutch distilleries 
Variable:  exports 
Year  L  NJE  ~  L~  ~h  s  m  m 
1971  1.10366  11  5  .99405 
1972  1.00072  20  3  .91369 
1973  .98209  19  7  .91719 
1974  -77150  18  4  .69875 
Table 21. Linda-coefficients of dutch distilleries 
Variable;  domestic  sales 
Year  L  1re  NJE  1r  s  m  m 
1971  .46042  38  18  .31622 
1972  .39215  42  21  .29039 
1973  .37018  36  18  .24031 
1974  .35926  35  17  .24820 
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3 
2 
4 
2 
~i~ 
2 
3 
3 
2 
L  ~h  rfh  L  ~h 
1.18522  11  6.51994 
1.08774  20  5.74041 
1.08590  19  13-72440 
.91470  18  22.23173 
L~  h  ~h  L  ~h 
.92182  2  .92182 
.70984  3  .70984 
.69716  3  .69716 
·73018  2  ·73018 2.4.  Productmarkets 
The  market  of spirits and liquors can  be  sub-divided into  a  number  of 
product-markets.  The  most  important product-markets  are:  young  geneva, 
old geneva,  lemon geneva  and  vieux  (also called Dutch cognac).  The 
degree of concentration in the product-markets will be  determined by 
means  of the concentration ratio's of the  four  and eight largest firms. 
Not  all firms  are  included in the  investigation.  Firms with less than 
10  employees  were left out.  This is not  a  big  omission,  as  99  percent 
of domestic  sales are covered by  the  investigation• 
The  two  most  important product-markets  are  those for young  geneva and 
vieux,  together  accounting for  a  share of total spirits production o£ 
66  percent in 1974.  A long  term review of the changes  in the  composition 
of Dutch spirits production is given in table 23. 
Concentration,  as measured by  the concentrationratio's has  not  increased 
during  the period.  In the case of lemon  flavoured spirits it has  even 
decreased. 
The  considerable degree  of market  fluidity,  shown  for all product-markets 
except that of old geneva indicates,  that most product-markets  are  exposed 
to competitive pressures.  An  important cause  o£ competition were  the sales 
of "white spirits",  i.e. non-branded spirits sold at much  lower prices 
than the official brands. 
Sales of "white spirits" grew from  10 percent in 1968  to  20  percent 
in 1974. 
The  changing composition of domestic  sales of Dutch spirits+1960-1973 
Product 
Young  geneva 
Old geneva 
Brandy 
Lemon  flavoured 
spirits 
Dry Gina 
Vieux 
Berries Geneva  and 
other fruit-brandies 
Liquors 
Flavoured bitters 
% shares of the various products 
1960  1966  1973 
37 
19 
4 
10 
0,3 
18 
8 
2 
35 
10 
3 
9 
0,5 
32 
8 
2 
48 
4 
7 
0,4 
24 
10 
2 
4 
:only spirits having  an alcohol  degree of  35%  or more  are included. 
Only  domestically produced dry gin is included. 
80 The  concentration ratio's for  the product markets  ofbrandy, dry gin, 
berries Geneva, liquors  and  flavoured bitters are not  computed.  Of  these 
product markets only  the markets of berries geneva a.s.o.  and  flavoured 
bitters are of quantitative importance.  Heineken has  an important stake 
in the market of berries geneva with its leading  brand Coebergh.  Beeren-
burg,  a  herb flavoured bitter is  the most  important product  in the market 
o£  flavoured bitters. Sales of beerenburg  are rising  fast~y. The  leader 
in the  beerenburg market  is Uto  with its {acquired)  brands  Sonnema  and 
Plantinga.  A small  beerenb~g producer,  enlarging  sales  :at a  very rapid 
rate is Boomsma.  Bols is also establishing itsel£ in this expanding market. 
81 2.4.1.  Young  Geneva 
Young  geneva is the most  popular spirit in the Netherlands.  It has  a 
share of 35  percent of total domestic  sales (imports included).  Total 
spirits production of Dutch firms  consisted in 1971  for  40  percent of 
young  geneva.  This  share increased by  a  few  percentage points  to 43  percent 
in 1974. 
The  most  important  produ~er of young  geneva is Bols.  This firm is the 
market leader with a  share of about  30  percent,  which decreased only 
slightly during  the  examined period. 
The  second manufacturer. is Heineken,  which increased its marketshare 
by some  50  percent  through major acquisitions in 1971.  In this way  the 
large  difference in marketshare between Bols  and Heineken was  diminished. 
Table  24  Concentration ratio's of the  productmarket of young  geneva  Variable:  domestic 
sales 
year  Domestic Sales  Number  CR4  CR8  {x  1000 fl.)  of firms 
X 
1971  203.127  34  62,6  77,5 
1972  248.217  40  62,- 76,4 
1973  259.820  32  60,9  76,5 
1974  300.337  30  63,7  81'' 1 
·x  f.  1rms  with less  than 1  0  employees  are excluded 
The  value of CR8 rose  by  5 percentage points till 81  in 1974. 
This  increase was  wholly  due  to the acquisition of Legner  by  Cooymans; 
the latter firm climbed to the third place  by  means  of this action. 
The  remaining  19  percent of domestic  sales is dispersed among  22  small 
firms. 
Marketstability 
No  shifts in rank order pOSitions of the leading five firms  occured 
between 1971  and 1973.  In 1974  the rank order positions shifted as  a 
result of a  merger.  Rank  order positions of the years 1971  and 1974 
have  been compared  and market  fluidity was  measured  by  means  of the 
Spearmann coefficient.  This  index  amounted  to 0,6. (The  maximum-value 
of this index with complete market rigidity is 1, its minimum-value 
o.)This means  that 40  percent of all possible shifts have  taken place, 
an indication of only moderate positional shifts. 
82 2.4.2.  Old geneva 
Old geneva is a  product  of minor  and  declining  importance.  Domestic 
sales of old geneva  amounted  to  3,3 percent of total domestic sales 
in 1974.  Heineken is the largest seller with  a  market  share of about 
30  percent.  Bols  sold almost  as much  as  Heineken  in 1971,  but its sales 
declined more  rapidly  than total sales in this product market.  The  result 
was  a  lower market  share for Heineken at the  end of the period. 
Other  important sellers of young  geneva are Wenneker,  Henkes  and Cooymans. 
The  number  of firms  operating  in this productmarket  did hardly change. 
However,  concentration,  as  measured  by  the  indices CR
4 
and  CR8  is high. 
This product market's structure may  therefore  be  described as consisting 
of a  few  dominant  firms,  effecting  the  bulk of all sales and  a  tail of 
numerous  small  firms. 
The  evolution of the  CR
4 
and  CR8  ratio's shows  the persistence of high 
concentration during  the period with negligible changes  both in an upper 
and  in a  lower direction. 
Again,  no  great shifts in rank order positions did occur.  The  three leading 
firms maintained  their positions untill 1974. 
Table  25  The  evolution of concentration in the productmarket of old geneva 
Variable:  domestic  sales 
year  Domestic Sales  Number  CR4  CRS 
(x  1000 fl.)  of firms 
1971  30.545  36  76.8  87.1 
1972  28.451  38  76.5  87.1 
1973  24.142  33  75.1  86.5 
1974  21 .651  34  74.3  87.1 
83 2.4.3.  Lemon  flavoured spirits and liguors 
Table  26 
Domestic sales of lemon  geneva  and  sweet  lemon spirits amounted  to 
37.7 million florins in 1974;  this sub-market  therefore  accounted for 
some  6  percent of spirits sales. 
Sales  o£ of this group  of spirits increased more  than proportionately 
during  the period under  review.  Chiefly,  the  medium-si~ed firms,  gained 
the newly  generated part of this growing market,  mainly  by means  of pro-
moting "white" spirits. 
Sales of the largest firms  grew little or even declined.  As  a  result CR
4 
decreased by  10 percentage points during  the period. 
The  first place is occupied by  Bols.  This firm maintained its leading 
position,  but its market  share declined considerably to  some  17  percent 
in 1974.  The  product market's structure was  very unstable.  Many  and large 
shifts in rank order positions occured.  Besides Bols,  Heineken has  an 
important market  share,  while fast growing  sellers are  De  Iuyper  and Skol. 
Inequality diminished visibly during  the 1971-1974 period.  The  leading 
firm was  attacked by  some  fast  growing  smaller firms.  Thus,  apart from Bols, 
seven other firms  nowadays  participate in the  division o£ the lion's share 
of sales in this subm.arket,  each having  a  share lying in the range of 8  to 
15 percent. 
The  evolution of concentration ratio's o£  the product market of lemon 
flavoured spirits  Variable:  domestic  sales 
year  Domestic Sales  Number  CR4  CR8  of firms 
, 971  24.347  35  61 .1  78 
1972  29.153  36  55.4  78.8 
1973  31.804  32  53.3  80.9 
1974  37.697  32  50  82 
84 2.4.4.  The  product market of vieux 
Vieux,  also called Dutch cognac,  is one  of the most  popular spirits in 
the Netherlands.  Vieux  sales  amounted  to 24.3 percent of sales of all 
spirits in 1971.  This  share declined till 22.9 percent in 1974. 
In common  with  the other spirits' product markets nearly all firms  are 
engaged in the production of vieux.  This  productmarket  is the least 
concentrated one.  Bols  and  Heineken bel0ng  to the leading  ten firms,  but 
they  do  not  rank first or second.  Wenneker  is the largest seller of vieux, 
having  a  market  share of something less than 20  percent. 
Cooymans  increased its share of the vieux product-market  by  acquiring 
Legner in 1974 and  became  the number  two.  Concentration,  as  indicated 
by  the CR4  and  CR8 ratio's is rather low,  but persistent over  time. 
No  great shifts in rank order positions occurred in recent years.  Market 
fluidity  as  measured  by  the Spearman coefficient for  the leading 10 
firms  shows  that only  15  percent of all possible shifts took place in 
the years  1971-1973.  In 1974  the product market's structure was  rearranged 
both  as  a  result of a  large merger  and of the rapid increase of some  small 
firms. 
These  changes  were  accompanied  by  a  rise in sales largely of "white" 
vieux,  sold by  small  companies. 
In 1976  the  importance of "white"  spirits declined,  because of the aban-
donement  of vertically tlQ..J  prices by  some  retailers. 
Table  27  The  evolution of concentration ratio's of the product market  of vieux 
Variable:  domestic  sales 
year  Domestic Sales  Number  CR
4 
CR8  (x 1000 £1.)  of firms 
1971  118.179  37  48.6  70.7 
1972  129.998  36  46.9  69.6 
1973  123.243  33  49.1  71.4 
1974  149.152  35  51 .o  70.9 
85 2.4.5.  The  product market of  advocaat 
Advocaat  is an orginal Dutch  liquor made  of eggs  and brandy and is 
mainly drunk by women. 
Domestic  sales of advocaat  are not of a  great magnitude.  They cover 
about 1 percent of domestically produced  spirits and  liquors. In 1971 
Dutchmen  spent 7 million florins on advocaat purchases. 
Advocaat is an  important  export-product,  however.  The  value of exports 
rose  from  15.8 million florins in 1972  to  25.8 million florins in 
1975  accounting for 40  percent of total Dutch  spirits exports. 
No  detailed data about concentration for  this product-market are available. 
However,  only a  few  firms  (about  5)  are engaged in advocaat production. 
Two  of them,  Bols and  Erven Warnink,  a  subsidiary of Skol,  have  about 
70  percent of domestic  sales,  shared  about equally.  Their  share of exports 
is even higher,  because  the other  small  advocaat-producers do  not export 
at all,  or only on  a  very  small  scale. 
86 2.5.  Mergers 
Comments  on the list of mergers/take-overs 
As  can be  seen from  the  accompanying list,  the  3 largest companies  (Bols, 
Heineken  and Henkes)  were chiefly involved in take-over operations. 
Heineken achieved its actual  second place in Dutch distilling only in 1971. 
In that year Heineken  took over  Bokma,  a  large distillery, with an old-
established famous brand in geneva and  enlarged its interest in Coebergh, 
renowned producer of brandies to  a  100 percent ownership. 
Bols  has  been  an active acquirer until 1968.  It enlarged its market  share 
considerably by  taking  over Hartevelt,  an  important geneva-manufacturer 
in 1968. 
Another  important acquisitor  was  Herman  Jansen.  Jansen gained an  important 
place on the product market of "beerenburg"  bitters,  by  take-overs of Plantinga 
and Sonnema,  two  famous  brands  in this field.  Jansen also merged with 
Vlek  in 1972,  in this way  creating Uto,  a  leading  producer of spirits. 
This firm possesses  an  extensive merchandise organisation to-day. 
Acquisitions  by  foreign companies were  performed  by  Skol  Breweries,  a 
subsidiary-company of allied Breweries. 
The  main objective of these acquisitions seems  to have  been  the control 
of brands and  market  shares of the  acquired companies  in order  to fortify 
the market position of the leaders. 
Also,  many  vertical integrations by means  of mergers,  both in a  backward 
and in a  forward direction took place. 
Bols integrated backwards  by  acquiring de Koning  (alcohol-manufacturers) 
and  ensured its raw-materials provision in this way. 
In reverse,  by  taking  over Schaeffers-WUndemanq/Gall  en Gall,  Bols moved 
forward into retailing operations. 
Henkes  has got  an interest in merchandising  by  taking  over Staffhorst and. 
Finj~. It also owns  a  retailing-organisation:Aquilar. 
Heineken moved  forward into the spirits trade by  laying  hands  on Reuchlin, 
an important wine-merchandiser. 
87 Diversification 
The  most  important firms,  which  have  diversified into distilling are 
Heineken  and Skol.  Diversification this far has  only  taken place by  means 
of mergers,  but recently,  aften an abortive attempt  to take overBols, Heineken 
has decided  to build a  new  disti!l~ng plant at Zoetermeer,  near The  Hague. 
Internationalization 
Another motive  for mergers  was  the  attainment of licenses  to  import  famous 
brandsofforeign liquors (of which  the most  important  are whisky  and cognac). 
By  means  of acquiring large import-houses of wines  and  spirits,  along-
side their own  import-activities,  the  leading companies have enlarged their 
market  share in this area. 
Examples  of important  import-houses  taken over,  are Cud  (Bols),  Reuchlin 
{Heineken)  and CP  (Skol). 
Most  small  distilleries are importers of foreign liquors  too,  but  the  brands 
they import are less well  knowD. 
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List o£  take-overs in the Dutch spirits-indnstrx 
Acquiring  company 
Bols 
Bols 
Herman  Jansen NV 
Herman  Jansen NV 
Cooymans 
Herman  Jansen NV 
Bols 
Bols 
Bo:Ls 
Bols 
Bols 
Henkes 
Herman  Jansen NV 
Bols 
Heineken 
Heineken 
Henkes 
Wenneker 
Wenneker 
Heineken 
Henkes 
Utomy  BV 
Heineken 
Henkes 
Henkes 
Skol 
Cooyrnans 
Cooymans 
Skol 
Company  acquired 
Wynand  Fockink 
H.  Bootz 
w.  Jager Gerlings 
Planting  a 
De  Iorenaer 
Sonnema 
"De  Fransche Kroon", 
formerly Hartevelt 
Wed.  G.  Oud  Pzn  en  Co 
Schae££ers  WUrdeman~ 
Gall  and Gall 
Amager  NV 
Blankenheyn en Nolet 
Mispelblom 
Jansen en Wouterlood 
Simon Pijper 
Bokrna 
Coebergh  BV 
Hasekamp  en Co 
Duys  en Co  NV 
Dirk Struys 
Van  Ol££en  BV 
Kleipoolcencern 
{Levert,  Daalmeyer 
en Dani!l Visser) 
Merger  between 
Herman  Jansen NV 
en Vlek  en Co 
M.  Reuchlin en Zn 
Sta££horst 
Finj@! 
Wed.  A.  v.d.  Eelaart 
Legner 
Ganzeboom 
J.J. Melchers  WZ 
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distillery 
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merchandiser 
merchandiser 
distillery 
distillery 
distillery 
distillery 
distillery 
merchandiser 
distilleries 
distillery 
merchandiser 
merchandiser 
merchandiser 
distillery 
distillery 
distillery 
distillery 2.6.  Recent  events 
A shocking  event  in  the Dutch spirits distilling industry occured 
when,  on  the seventh  of April  1976,  Heineken made  a  bid for  the 
Bols  shares. 
At  the  end of  the sixties Heineken  expanded her interest in the 
spiritsector,  guided by  the objective  to build up  a  good  position 
in this market  in order  to be  able  to offer a  complete  assortment 
of beverages. 
In the past years  this strategy could be  realized by  taking over 
famous  concerns like Bokrna  and Coebergh,  but  since strong concen-
tration operations advanced,  there were  fewer  independent distilleries 
with  strong brands to acquire,  \oJhich  could contribute to a  substantial 
strengthening and  growth  of  this sector. 
Heineken  gave  the following  reasons  for  this  takeover bid: 
- The  company  wants  to build up  a  strong position on  the  international 
spiritsmarket.  The  interests of Bols  in the international market  are 
considerably higher  than  those of Heineken;  more  than  50  per cent 
of Bols-sales are realized abroad. 
- Because  of their successful penetration of  the Dutch  spiritsmarket, 
Heineken had  to decide  on  expansion of  their production facilities. 
Bols  has  ample  spare production-capacity in her up-to-date works  at 
Nieuw-Vennep.  By  taking  over Bols  the  combined production-capacity 
could be  attuned to joint future needs. 
- Heineken heavily depends  on outsiders concerning  the  supply of  raw 
materials. 
Beaause  of  their fast  gruwth  they want  to  have  part of this  supply, 
especially grain alcohol,  in their ovm  hands.  Bols  owns  De  Koning 
at Schiedam,  manufacturer of alcohol.  By  taking  over Bols,  Heineken 
would be  able  to  safeguard the continuity in alcohol  supplies. 
On  the  17th of April,  Heineken officially made  a  bid;  they offered 
D.fl.  110.-- for  each Bols  share  (nominal  value D.fl.  10.--) or 
D.fl.  35.-- in cash plus D.fl.  75.-- Heineken bonds;  this meant  a 
bid of D.fl.  256  mln. 
However,  Bols wanted  to stay independent.  Tde  firm enlarged its 
capital stock by  issuing  shares  vTOrth  4.5 million florins  and  placed 
these  shares at  the Bols  foundation. 
In this way  the  takeover bid of Heineken was  warded off and Heineken 
gave up  the attempt. 
After  this  episode  Heineken decided  to enlarge its market  share via 
90 internal  expansion.  In October  1976,  plans  were  announced  to build a 
distillery and  an  alcohol  factory at Zoetermeer. 
The  intended project requires  an  investment  of  50  million florins  and 
the new  plant will  have  300  employees. 
The  new  facilities  are  expected to start production in 1979.  Two 
smaller distilleries of Heineken at Rotterdam  and  Schiedam will 
then be  closed down. 
2.7.  Cost-structure  and  economies  of scale 
In table  28  costs are computed  as  a  percentage  of production-value 
inclusive of profits made  by  p~oducers. Cost-structures presented 
refer  to firms  of more  than  50  employees,  covering about  80  per cent 
of total output. 
Table28.  Cost-structure of large distilleries in percentages  of production-
value  (excl.  excise-duties). 
1971  1972  1.973 
Alcohol  9.5  11 .1  11.6 
Imported spirits  3.4  4.2  4.7 
Fruits and  eggs  5.6  5.7  6.2 
Packaging  12.3  13.4  15.2 
M  .  1  Other  ater~als  ...i!l  6.1  _.§.& 
Materials ConsumEtion  35.1  40.5  45.7 
Salaries & wages 
and social charges  18.6  20.0  22.5 
Depreciation,  other 
costs  and profits  46.3  ~  ll& 
Value  added  &i!2  59.5  .2i!l 
Production value  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1  = incl.  energy and  repayments  of  import- and  ~xcise-duties. 
Source:  CBS  Production statistics 
Distilleries and liquor factories  1972  and  1973 
It will be  seen that  the share of value-added declined.  This  was 
due  to conflicting tendencies  =  whereas  materials  input prices  and 
labour costs rose,  profits and  depreciation came  under  pressure  as 
a  result of  the competitive developments  outlined above. 
91 Economies  of scale 
The  production process  of spirits distilling is a  rather simple  one. 
Therefore  no clear-cut differences  in unit production costs exist 
between large  and small  distilleries. 
Also,  no  production process  innovations,  leading up  to cost  advantages 
were undertaken  in recent years.  Therefore,  firm-size  is not  determined 
by  technical  considerations.  Both  small  and large firms  can exist 
alongside  each  other. 
Whether  a  firm  succeeds  in attaining large size depends  largely on 
its ability to establish and maintain  a  strong brand-image.  Advertising 
is the most  important way  to achieve  this. Large  sources  are  expended 
for  advertising purposes,  which  only  the large distilleries can afford. 
2.8.  Advertising 
Total  advertising expenditures  for  alcoholic leverages  have more  than 
doubled in recent years.  ln particular,  advertising  on  television has 
gained a  larger share. 
Table  29  gives  detailed information about  the  evolution of  total 
advertising expenditure  and its division. 
Table  29.  Advertising  Expenditure  on Alcoholic Beverages  in the  Netherlands, 
1970-1973 
(Fl million) 
1970  1971  1972  .l2.Zl 
Newspapers  3.9  4.1  4.5  6.4 
Hagazines  0.5  1.0  1.5  2.5 
Women's  magazines  0.7  1 • 2  1.5  2.2-
Radio/TV magazines  1.3  1.8  2.1  2.1 
Other  periodicals  2.5  3.1  3.4  3.7 
Total  press  8.9  11 .2  13.0  16.9 
Television  3.0  4.4  7-2  8.4 
Radio  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.5 
Total  12.2  1 5.  8  20.7  25.8 
Source:  Bureau voor Budgetten Controle  (BBC) 
If total advertising  expenditure more  than  doubled,  expenditure for 
some  spirits  ~ith a  quickly expanding  sales-volume  grew  considerably 
faster.  Thus,  expenditure  on  "beerenburg",  viaS  seven  times  as  large 
in 1973  than in 1969. 
92 Advertising  outlays for  (foreign)  liquors  rose five-fold since  1969. 
Apart  from  a  negligeable  amount  of collective advertisement,  all 
advertising is brand advertising.  The  multi-product  firms  have 
different  advertising-campaigns for all of  their spirits categories. 
Horeover,  most  large producers  dispose  of more  than one brand within 
a  particular  spirits-category.  Bols,  for  example,  advertises its 
Bols  geneva but also promotes  the  geneva-hands  Hartevelt  and 
Blanl<enheym.  Heineken  extensively advertises its  h1o  brands  of geneva: 
Bol<ma  and Hoppe. 
Firms  generally carry several  brands  as  a  result of acquisitions. 
In earlier days  all brandsrepresented independent  firms. 
In contrast,  the Dutch beer-industry has  suppressed some brands after 
firms  \.;ere  acquired.  Skol  did not maintain  one  of  the brands it 
acquired in 1969.  All  acquisi  ted brands were  replaced by  one  new  brand: 
Skol. 
Therefore,  in comparision with  the beer-industry, bran~concentration 
within  the spirits-industry is rather low.  Both  as  a  result of  the 
need for  distinction by means  of several brands  and the existence 
of  a  large number  of firms,  advertising \vithin  the spirits-industry,  as 
a  \-Thole  is much  more  dispersed.  However,  in sub-market  advertising 
concentration is very high. 
Some  examples  may  make  this clear. 
The  9  largest manufacturers  of young  geneva had  a  share of  90  percent 
of total advertising expenditures. 
With  respect  to vieux  the five largest manufacturers  paid for  90  percent 
of  total advertising expenditure laid out for  this spirit during  the 
period  1969-1974• 
By  far  the largest part of advertising-expenditures  on  beerenburg  is 
almost  completely  due  to  tv:o brands: Sonnema  aYld  Plantinga both owned 
by  the firm  of Uto. 
Part III Distribution 
3.1.  General  remarks 
Spirits-consumption consists  of  two  categories:  home-consumption 
and hotel- and catering-consumption. 
The  pattern of spirits-consumption has  undergone  remarkable  changes 
in recent years.  Compared with  1961,  when  35  per  cent  (The  Hague)  and 
53  per cent  (Amsterdam)  of all alcoholic beverages  \..rere  consumed  in 
hotels,  restaurants  and  other catering outlets,  the  on-premise  percen-
tages  have  been reduced to  13  and  21  per cent respectively  (see 
table  30). 
93 For  the  total Dutch spirits consumption it may  be  assumed  that more 
than 75  per cent  takes  place at home. 
Table  30.  Sales of spirits to consumers,  broken  down  by  distribution channel; 
~969- 1974  (%). 
Amsterdam  The  Hague 
Hotel- and  Hotel- and 
Retail  trade  catering  Retail  trade  catering 
sector  sector 
1961  47  53  65  35 
1965  53  47  74  26 
1969  75  25  82  18 
1971  73  27  83  17 
1973  78  22  86  14 
1974  79  21  87  13 
Source:  "Produktschap voor Gedistilleerde Dranken",  Annual  Report, 
1975,  Schiedam,  Nay  1976. 
3.2. Wholesale  trade 
The  reason why  distilleries make  use of  the wholesaler's services is 
to get  a  good spread of their various spirits and brands  over 
retailoutlets. 
The  wholesale  trade  to  a  large extent provides  the hotel- and 
catering-sector and is the main supplier of  the majority of 
independent retailers in so far  they are not  linked with purchasing 
organizations. 
vfuen  the system of vertical price maintenance was  abandoned £or 
brandedspirits, the position of  the wholesale-trade deteriorated. 
Since  the beginning of 1976  a  system of fixed minimum  consumerprices 
for  a  number  of spirits varieties is  in force.  As  part of this  system 
the  average wholesaler's margin is set at Fl.  0.35  per litre,  that 
is about  3  per cent of  the consumerprice  (excluding V.A.T.) 
In 1975  the  "Produktschap voor  Gedistilleerde dranken"  had  registered 
1314 wholesalers  in its books. 
94 Table  31.  Number  of wholesalers  registered at  the Produktschap voor Gedistil-
leerde Dranken  (1968- 1975) 
Year  Number  of 
wholesalers 
1968  1568 
1969  1530 
1970  1470 
1971  1400 
1972  1367 
1973  1356 
1974  1331 
1975  1314 
Source:  Produktschap voor  Gedistilleerde Dranken,  Anuual  Reports, 
Schiedam. 
Expectations are  that  the  number  of wholesalers will  decline further. 
The  main  reasons are: 
1.  the  appearance  of purchasing organizations  of retailers. 
These  organizations  are directly supplied by  the manufacturer; 
2.  the  appearance  of  discounthouses,  cash  and carry organizations 
as  well  as  foodchains  and retail multiples,  which  also are 
directly supplied by  the manufacturer; 
3.  vertical integration:  some  distilleries have  their own  wholesale-
groupings. 
4.  an  increase of costs in the wholesale  trade itself and  a  narrowing 
of margins. 
There  are  three major wholesale-groupings  specialized in spirits: 
- the Heineken-group with 40  associated wholesalers; 
- Citadel Nederland B.V.  (Allied Breweries)  with 40  wholesalers; 
- Drako with 28  wholesalers 
95 3.3  Purchasing  o~ganizations 
In an  attempt  to  meet  grovving  competition from  discount  houses,  cash-
and carry firms,  retailmultiples and  food  chains,  a  nwnber of retailers 
have  regrouped themselves in purchasing  organi~at  ions, 
Their main object  is to take advantage  of  large  scale purchases: on  joint 
account  of spirits and wines. 
In  1972  the gross profit  margin of members  of the organizations  was  about 
2  percent  higher thans that  of the retailers,  who  are  supplied by wholesale 
traders. 
Thrre important  purchaising organizations have to be mentioned here: 
"Nederlandse Cooperatieve Kelders"  G.A.  at  Hazerswoude-Rijndijk, 
founded  in 1956  with about  275  members; 
Cooperat ief Wi jnkopersgilde"  G.A.  at  Heerde,  founded  in  1869  :rJi th about 
250  members; 
"Delcave"  B. V.  at  Delft,  founded  in  1961  with  about  560  members. 
Delcave  has its own  distillery and bottleroom ("Bestnat"  B.V.). 
3.4 Retailtrade  (licensed  retailers) 
Under the  "Drankwet"  (the  la~r on alcoholic product 2)  which  was  in force 
until November  1967,  the  number of retail outlets for alcoholic beverages 
was  limited by means  of a  maximum-system,  governing the  ratio between 
the  number of outlets and the  number of inhabitants of a  city or town. 
Under this  law the  owner of an outlet  needed  a  licence,  to  be  granted 
by the  local authorities. 
Under the  "Drank- en Horecawet"  replacing the old  law,  this maximum-
system was  a.banC..oned.  As  a  result,  the  number of outlets increased 
substantially.  New  groups  of retailers,  attracted by  a  fast  growing 
market  v-1i th high margins,  could enter the  spirit  smarket  (see table 32). 
96 Table  32:  The  number of retail outlets for alcoholic  beverages  (1967-1976; 
first  of January  of each year 
Total  number  Retailers with 
Year  of out lets  one  out let  more  than 
one  outlet 
1976  3.335  2.674  661 
1968  3.401  2.720  681 
1969  3.586  2.817  769 
1970  3.720  2.796  924 
1971  3.860  2.847  ·1.013 
1972  3.869  2.832  1.03 7 
1973  3.831  2.756  1.074 
1974  3.808  2.710  1. 097 
1975  3.784  2.659  1. 125 
'1976  3.749  2.620  1.129 
Sources:Economisch Instituut  voor het  Midden- en Kleinbedrijf  (E.I.M.) 
Een  on~erzoek inzake  de  structuur van  de  detailhandel  in alcohol-
houdende  dranken,  The  Hague,  June  1976,  p.  24,  table  7; 
E.I.M.  Bedrijfsgegevens  voor  de  detailhandel  in alcoholhoudende 
en alcoholvrije  dranken over  1972,  The  Hague,  May  1975,  p.  18, 
table  10. 
In table 32  a  strong increase in the  number  of outlets is observed until 
1972  and a  decline thereafter.  The  number  of retailers with  one outlet 
showed a  steady decrease  since  1969,  in contrast  to the  number of retailers 
with  more  than one  out let. 
In  1967  there  were  147  retail multiples with  661  outlets,  that  is to  say 
20  percent  of the total number  of outlets;  in 1976  this number  increased 
to  212  .retail multiples  with  1. 129  outlets,  that  is to  say 30  percent  of 
the total number. 
The  following table gives an  impression of concentration in the retail-
trade of alcoholic  beverages (table 33). 
97 Table  33 
Average  nwnber of retailers in alcoholic beverages  with  more  than one  outlet 
~Middle of June  121~L 
Total 
131  retailers with  2 outlets:  262  out lets 
36  retailers with  3  outlets:  108  out lets 
24  retailers with  4  outlets:  96  outlets 
7  retailers with  5  out lets:  35  out lets 
7  retailers with  6  out lets:  42  out lets 
1  retailer  with  9  out lets:  9 outlets 
2  retailers with  10  outlets:  20  out lets 
3  retailers with  11  out lets:  33  out lets 
4  retailers with  12  outlets:  48  outlets 
2  retailers with  13  outlets:  26  outlets 
2  retailers with  14  outlets:  28  out lets 
retailer  with  16  outlets:  16  out lets 
retailer  with  19  out lets:  19  out lets 
retailer  with  20  out lets:  20  out lets 
2  retailers with  22  outlets:  44  out lets 
2  retailers with  24  out lets:  48  out lets 
4  retailers with 
more  than  25  out lets:  334  out lets 
230  retailers  1.188 outlets 
Source:  Produktschap  voor Gedistilleerde Dranken,  Annual  Report  1975, 
Schiedam,  May  1976. 
In comparison with previous years,  there  was  an  import  ant  increase. 
January 1967:  147  retailers with altogether  664  outlets 
January 1970:  193  retailers with altogether  907  outlets 
Januar~ 1273:  221  retailers with  alto~ether 1.027  out lets 
The  division according to the main types  of retailers is given in table 34. 
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Category of retailers 
a.  retail multiples 
(traditional sales basis) 
b.  retail multiples, 
retailers with  one  outlet 
(on  discount  basis) 
c.  other retailers with  one 
out let: 
-members  of a  purchase  org. 
-non-members  of a  purchase  org. 
Number  of 
outlets 
730  ( 19. 5 %) 
400  ( 10.7 %) 
1060  (28.2 %) 
1516  (41.6 %) 
3750 
Total  sales 
(Dfl.  mln.) 
290  ( 19.7 %) 
385  (26.1  %) 
410  (27.8 %) 
390  (26.4 %) 
1475 
Source:  Economisch  Instituut  voor het  Midden- en Kleinbedrijf,  Een onderzoek 
inzake  de  structuur van  de  detailhandel  in alcoholhoudende  dranken, 
The  Hague,  June  1976,  p.  22,  table  5. 
Notable  is the 26  percent  share of the 400  retailers,  who  operate  on  a 
discount  basis;  on the other hand the  weak  position of retailers,  not 
being members  of a  purchase organization,  is striking too. 
Insiders expect  that  at  least  50  percent  of the retailers in the latter 
category,  but  also those  who  sell in the traditional way,  will have  to 
abandon business  in coming years. 
Finally,  the outlets of the  food  chains,  strong retail multiples,  cash- and-
carry firms  and discounthouses will probably acquire the greatest  share of 
domestic  spirits sales in the future. 
The  most  important  retailchain-organization in the  spirits-and winetrade  are: 
- Gall & Gall,  owned  by Lucas  Bols Distilleries,  operating about  150  outlets; 
- Aquilar,  owned  by Henkes United Distilleries,  operating about  120  outlets; 
-Alberto,  owned  by Albert  Heyn  foodchain,  operating 58  outlets. 
3.5 Competitive  developments  in distribution 
Until November  1967,  when  the "Drank- en Horecawet"  came  into force,  the 
Dutch  spirits market  was  characterized by an easy going rest. 
Under the  "Drankwet "(the  law concerning alcoholic beverages),  the  number of 
retail outlets for spirituous beverages  was  limited to  a  certain maximum 
per number  of inhabitants.  Because it were  local authorities,  who  could 
decide upon the  number of outlets,  this maximum  varied from  town to town. 
As  a  result  of this stiff retail structure,  retailers had  a  strong position 
over against  their suppliers. 
99 To  protect  themselves,  distillers and wholesalers  made  arrangrnents  concerning 
minimumprices,  (that  is to  say they instituted a  system of  individual vertical 
price maintenance,  in which  consumerprices  were  dictated by the manufacturer)  and 
maximum  discounts;  the two  essential features• of the spirits cartel. 
As  a  consequence  price-competition was  an unknown  phenomenon  in the 
spirits branch. 
A  fundamental  change  in the  Dutch  spirits branch  was  the  coming  into 
force  of the  "Drank- en Horecawet",  in which  the  maximum-system 0f retail 
licences  was  abandoned. 
Now  everybody was  allowed to  start  an outlet  for  spirituous beverages, 
provided that  one  could meet  the general  requirements  for  running a  shop. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  number of retail outlets increased importantly. 
A  new  generation of retailers (food chains,  cash-and-carry firns,discount-
houses,  retail multiples and  independent  retailers)  entered the market, 
attracted by  a  fast  growing per capita consumption and high profit  margins. 
The  greater part  of this  new  generation of traders  stood out  by their more 
dynamic  conduct  of  doing business:  they had up-to-date outlets  and practised 
more  agressive  selling-methods. 
Being  inclined to give up  part  of their (high)  margins,  these  retailers 
realized higher sales volumes  and quickly assumed  a  rising marketshare. 
As  a  result  they were  able to force  distilleries to  sell at  lower prices, 
while  by-passing the wholesale trade.  In so  far as these distillers had 
joined the spiritscartel,  this led to their expulsion. 
Thus,  the  "white"  spirits came  into  existence,  especially young geneva and 
vieux,  which  soon gained a  20  percent  marketshare. 
Initially the manufacturers of the  strong brands  assembled in the spirits-
cartel,  succeeded in maintaining their vertically fixed prices. 
Thus,  the  spiritsmarket  was  divided in two  segments:  the "white"  spirits.,-
segment  and the  "branded"  spirits-segment.  The  strang posit ion of the 
branded spirits,  however,  remained an obstacle to  a  larger marketshare 
for white  spirits. 
At  the  same  time there  was  a  strinking increase in foreign spirits consumption. 
Until  1968,  the  imposition of excise tax on foreign bottled spirits departed 
from  a  fictive alcohol  percentage  of.65,  as against  the  real alcohol  content 
for foreign spirits per barrel,  being much  lower. 
As  a  consequence  of this regulation,  the position of the  importers,  officially 
appointed as  sole agents by the foreign manufacturers,  was  inshakable. 
For only these official importers  received spirits in barrel while  others 
had to  purchase  and  import  on bottle which  preluded any free  competition 
from their side. 
lOO Prices of foreign spirits remained high,  partly as  a  result  of advertising-
costs,  but  mainly as  a  result  of high margins,  both for  importers,  whole-
salers  and retailers. 
Being in defiance of the E.E.C.-treaty,  the  regulation was  a  measure to 
protect  the home-market:  so,  in 1968,  the fictive percentage was  replaced 
by the real alcohol  content  for tax purposes. 
Now  other importers  were  able to  compete  with the official 
importers. 
For  instance,  shipmerchants  in former times  engaged in duty-free  deliveries 
to  ships and  diplomatic offices,  extended their sales activities to the 
"new generat ion"-retail out lets. 
The  prices of these so-called "parallel"  imports  could be  reduced by 
eliminating intermediaries  and advertising-expenditure. 
This  led to  an  increased consumption of foreign spirits. 
In particular Scotch whisky and French  congnac  sales did benefit  from the 
increase in price-competition.  The  reduced price-level had  soon to  be 
followed  by the official importers. 
Due  to this intensified price-competition,  the position of the traditional 
retailer worsened. 
On  the  one  hand,  he  was  forced to  grant  price-cuts too  and on the other 
hand,  he  co.uld not  prevent  that  a  part  of his customers  disappeared. 
As  spirits,  both Dutch  and foreign,  formed the greater part  (60-70  percent) 
of his sales volume,  it will be  clear,  that  the traditional retailers 
did experience hard times. 
As  was  observed earlier the  incresing significance of retailers with more 
than  one  outlet  (food chain,  retail multiples,  discounthouses  and cash-and-
carry firms),  leads to further concentration effecting a  fundamental  change 
in the retail  trade  structure. 
This,  in its turn,  will have  its repercussions  on the wholesale trade and 
the spirits manufacturers. 
Table  31  showed the  decreasing number  of wholesalers,  partly as  a  result 
of concentration in the retailtrade. 
The  anticipated further concentration of retailtrade will  lead to further 
concentration at  the production-level.  For the retailer only wants  to sell 
products ·,nth  a  high turnover,  that  is to  say the  established "branded"  spirits 
and the private labels.  Small  distilleries,  with  less knowm  brands,  may  well 
see their distribution channels  closed. 
Moreover,  when  in future  the  Dutch  food retailtrade is allowed to  carry 
spirits in their assortment,  this  development  may  again be  strengthened. 
101 3.6.  The  Temporary price war  in spirits 
The  strengthened position of lthe larger retailers resulted in a  number 
of efforts to get rid of the  system of individual vertically prescribed 
prices for  Dutch spirits. 
Initially the large distilleries offered stout resistance to this by  means 
of instituting legal proceedings  against  such retailers. 
But conflicting verdicts  and  a  great number  of illegal breaches relating 
to  the  system of vertical price fixing,  compelled Lucas  Bols Distilleries, 
followed  by  the other spirits manufacturers  to  abandon the  system  ~n 
September 1975. 
There ensued a  fierce price-war with  average price-outs of about  20  per cent 
per litre. 
In the  same  month  the Dutch  government  announced  an excise tax rise of 
32  per cent,  taking  effect on  the 1st of January 1976. 
Both  developments  led to enormous  spirits sales.  This phenomenon  was 
strengthened by  the  announcement  of the Produktschap voor Gedistilleerde 
Dranken (the Spirits Board)  to establish a  minimum  price for  spirits on 
the 1st of January 1976. 
This was  the first time  that the Spirits Board got  the permission from  the 
government  to establish minimum  prices since the establishment of the 
Board in 1954. 
The  aim  was  to prevent price-stunting with  the main  b~ds and  so to guarantee 
a  desirable margin for  the  traditional retailer and  to slow down  a  too fast 
restructuring of spirits distribution. 
This minimum  consumerprice fixing  was  not restricted to geneva  and vieux; 
in fact,  competition in all other kinds  of Dutch  and foreign spirits was 
limited too: it was  not  allowed to sell these products  below costprice. 
Big  loosers of the price-war were  the "white"  spirits and  the private 
labels. 
Until  September 1975  the retail trade-margin amounted  to about  D.fl.  2.60; 
during  the price-war  almost nothing  remained of this margin.,Under  these 
circumstances  a  great number  of the  traditional retailers could not  subsist. 
After  the establishment of the minimum  price,  the margin varies between 
D.fl.  0.80  and D.fl.  1.89 per litre. 
102 At  present  (October 1976)  the well-known brands  are offered at prices 
between D.£1.  13.00  and  D.£1.  14.00  a  litre. 
These prices are  a  good deal  above  the prices prevailing during  the last 
month  o£ 1975,  but  they are only  a  fraction higher  the  those before the 
price-war. 
In fact this means  that the retailers did hardly pass  on  the excise-increase 
o£  D.£1.  2.05  including sales tax,  resulting in a  considerable reduction 
o£  their margins. 
It is worth noting,  that  the minimum-price regulation £or spirits is an 
unique measure  in the Netherlands.  It is the first time  a  minimum-price 
is prescribed for  an article which  does  not  belong  to the first necessities 
o£ life. 
Only  for  bread,  milk and  sugar minimum-prices  authorized by  the government 
do  exist. 
3.7. Spirits-selling in other branches 
For  a  long  time  the  Dutch  food retail trade has expressed the desire 
to carry spirits in their assortment  o£  drinks,  besides beer,  wine,  sherry 
and soft-drinks. 
Nowadays  spirits are only sold in separate retail outlets and in the hotel-
and cateringsector. 
However,  the present-day "Drank  en Horecawet",prevents  the leading retailers 
£rom  effecting such sales. 
The  main reason given £or this regulation,  which dates  back to the years 
o£  repressive legislation with respect  to excessive drinking,  is said to be 
o£  a  social-hygienic character. 
The  food retail trade,  holds  the view that since the  second world-war social 
and economic  conditions have  changed in such  a  manner,  that the  arguments 
on which  this law is based,  are no  longer valid.  On  this question,  the 
Dutch government consulted the "Sociaal Economische  Raa~' (Social  and 
Economic  Council). 
This council,  however,  gave  a  divided opinion and  so  the existing "Drank 
en Horecawet"  was  not  adapted.  Obviously,  the  tug  o£  war  has not  been 
ended  thereby. 
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The  largest Dutch distilleries 
The  Dutch spiritsmarket is currently dominated  by  three companies:  Lucas 
Bols Distilleries, Gedistilleerd Groep  Nederland  (Heineken)  and Henkes 
Verenigde Distilleerderijen. 
These  companies  own  in their turn a  large number  of subsidiary-companies 
concerned with t4e production,  import  and  distribution of spirits. 
A number  of companies  of lesser importance,  are controlled by  foreign 
companies. 
N.V.  Ioninklijke Distilleerderijen Erven Lucas  Bols 
(The  Heirs  of Lucas  Bols),  at Nieuw-Vennep,  was  founded  in 1595  and  is 
the oldest and  best-known spirits manufacturer in the Netherlands. 
In 1975  the company's  turnover was  D.fl.  515  mln.  of which  51  per cent 
was  derived from  sales on foreign markets. 
Lucas  Bols  owns  subsidiary-companies in many  European and over  seas countries 
and  further controls  the following  Dutch companies: 
- Mouterij-Branderij  De  Koning  B.V.  at Schiedam,  manufacturer of alcohol 
- Likeurstokerij Wijnand Fockink B.V.,  Amsterdam 
-H. Bootz Distilleerderij B.V.,  Amsterdam 
- B. v.  Distilleerderij "De  Fransche X:roon"  v/h Hartevel  t  &  Zoon,  Leiden 
-Wed.  G.  Oud  Pzn & Co  B.V.,  Haarlem  (wine  importers) 
- Schaeffers-WUrdemann  (wine-importers/Gall & Gall retail multiple,  Amsterdam 
- Amager  B.v., Amsterdam  (wine-importers;  exploitation of boeegas) 
- B.V.  Blankenheyn & Nolet's Distilleerderij,  Rotterdam 
- B.V.  Distilleerderij-Wijnkoperij  Simon Pijper,  Amsterdam 
In the years  1968-1970 Lucas  Bols concentrated its output at Nieuw-Vennep, 
where  a  large modern  factory  was  build. 
The  present daily capacity is about  250,000  jars and bottles. 
An  attractive (backward vertical)  integration is Mouterij-Branderij  De  Koning. 
Via this subsidiary Lucas  Bols  can meet  for  their need for  alcohol  (malt 
wine,  grain alcohol  and malasses  alcohol). 
In 1975  Bois  employed  2069  persons of which 1107  in the Netherlands. 
Most  important  brands:  Bols,  Clareyn,  Hartevelt,  Wijnand Fockink  and Parade• 
104 Gedistilleerd Groep  Nederland {Heineken), 
At  the  end of the sixties, Heineken decided  to build up,  besides beer 
and- soft drinks,  a  market in spirits and wines.  In order to effect this 
purpose,  Heineken  acquired the following  companies: 
- Bokma  B.V.  Leeuwarden,  largest manufacturer of young  geneva 
- Coebergh's  Verenigde Distilleerderijen,  Schiedam,  which earlier merged 
with Hoppe  and Hulstkamp 
-Van Olffen B.V.,  Hattern  {wines) 
- Wijnhandel  M.  Reuchlin & Zn.  B.v., 'Rotterdam 
Total  spirits and wine  sales  amounted  to D.fl.  210  mln.  ia the year 1974-1975. 
Most  important brands:  Bokrna,  Coebergh,  Hoppe,  Hulstkamp  and Meder. 
Henkes  Verenigde Distilleerderijen B.V.,  Heudrik  Ido Ambacht. 
Before the  second world war,  Henkes  was  a  typical export-oriented distillery; 
this character prevailed until  the sixties. 
Henkes  is owned  by  the Zuid Nederlandse Spiritusfabriek (50%)  and  the 
Gist- en Spiritusfabriek {50%),  both  important manufacturers of alcohol. 
The  Z.N.S.F.  already had  some  interests in the spirits distilling industry 
via N.V.  Distilleerderij  en Alcoholfabriek "De  Papegaai". 
The  X.G.S.F.  also had interests in the spirits industry via Distilleerderij 
Simon  Rynbende  & Zonen,  Fa.  Catz & Zn.  o£  Pekela,  Calcar/Sappemeer  and 
Roebroeck  Dubois  {wine-importers). 
Since 1870  Henkes  acquired  the  following  companies: 
- Distilleerderij  en Brandewijnstokerij  v/h Mispelblom,  Zutphen; 
- Distilleerderij  Hasekamp  & Co,  Schiedam; 
- The  Kleipoolconcern with  the distilleries Levert,  Daalmejjer and Dani!l 
Visser  and  the retail multiple Heck  & Co,  Van  Vliet  and Levert. 
- Carp  {wine-importers) 
-Wed.  & Gebr.  Staffhorst N.V. 
- Wijnhandel  Finj~ 
By  taking over Carp,  Henkes  became  at once  the largest importer  o£ so-called 
"democratic" wines,  the cheap  wines  in the product range of the  food-companies. 
Production has  been concentrated in Hendrik Ido Ambacht  and Zutphen. 
Most  important  brands:  Henkes,  Rynbende,  Mispelblom,  Oorlam  and  Dunlop. 
105 Skol  Brouwerijen N.V.  {Allied Breweries),  Rotterdam. 
Since 1969  Skol  extended her business  to the soft drinks,  wines  and spirits. 
Skol  owns  5  production and  wholesale-units for spirits and wines  at Doesburg, 
Hilversum,  Rotterdam,  Middelharnis  and Etten-Leur. 
In 1975  the production was  concentrated in a  new  distillery at Etten-Leur. 
In 1974 the  advocaat-factory Warnink was  built at Middelharnis  and  this 
is one  of the most  up~to-date plants in the world.  Ninety per cent of its 
advocaat-production is sold abroad,  Great-Britain being  the largest export-
market. 
Within the Skol-group  the wholesale-activities are co-ordinated in Citadel 
Nederland B.V.  at Breda with 40  units. 
Skol  owns  the "Wijnmart"-retailchain with some  50  outlets. 
Most  important brands:  De  Keizer,  Drie  Sterre~Wed. A.  v.d.  Eelaart, 
St.  Andr~, Warninks  advocaat,  Likeur L'Empereur 
and Oudenbossche Pop. 
Utomy  B.V.,  Schiedam 
Uto  {Unitas Tenet Optimum)  arose from  a  merger  between Herman  Jansen N.V. 
at Schiedam  and  the N.V.  Delftse Distilleerderij v/h Vlek & Co  at Delft. 
Before  the merger  took place.  Herman  Jansen had  taken over  the  following 
companies: 
- Wijnhandel  w.  Jager Gerlings,  Haarlem 
- K.  Plantinga & Zoon,  Bolsward 
-Fa. E.J.  Sonnema,  Dokkum 
- N.v.  Jansen en Wouterlood,  Schiedam 
After  the merger,  production has  been concentrated at Schiedam.  Utomy 
operates 16 retail outlets and  3 units in the wholesale-trade  and has 
145  emplo}Cees. 
Most  important  brands:  Sonnema  Beerenburg,  Vlekje,  Plantiac Vieux Kabouter 
and  Plantinga Vieux. 
Cooymans  B.V.,  's-Hertogenbosch  {founded in 1828) 
Cooymans  is the largest manufacturer of "white"  geneva in the Netherlands  •.  _, 
In 1966  Coeymans  acquired Distilleerderij  De  Korenaer  at Schiedam  followed 
by  Distilleerderij Ganzeboom  at Zwolle  and Distilleerderij J.F.  Legner at 
Schiedam. 
Coeymans  operates  40  retail outlets {Covinette)  and  5  units in the wholesale 
106 trade  and  employs  250  persons. 
Most  important  brand:  Cooymans 
Wenneker,  Roosendaal  {founded in 1693) 
In 1971  Wenneker  acquired Distilleerderij  Duys  & Co  N.V.  and Dirk Struys 
& Zoon  B.V.,  both at Schiedam. 
Wenneker  employs  85  persons. 
Most  important  brands:  Goblet  and  Du  Jardin. 
De  Kuxper  B.V.,  Schiedam {founded in 1695) 
In 1932  De  Kuyper  founded  a  distillery in Canada followed by  a  distillery 
in the United States in 1934 and  a  distillery in New  Zealand in 1962. 
De  Kuyper  employs  100  persons in the Netherlands. 
Most  important  brand:  De  Kuyper 
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1.1  Introduction and general  survey 
In this repart  the  situation of the  Dutch  soft  drinks  industry with 
respect  to  concentration and competition will  be  reviewed. 
Soft  drinks  sales have  gone  through  a  rapid,  but  interrupted expansion. 
During the  1970-1974 period,  sales rose  by 40  per cent  to  a  total amount 
of nearly  SOO  million florins  in 1974. 
Exports  have  contributed almost  SO  per cent  to this expansion.  The  value 
of  exports  rose about  7. S  fold to  an amount  of  6S  million florins  in 1974. 
Two-thirdth of these  go  to W-Germany. 
Domestic  sales rose  only 23  per cent,  an increase  smaller than that  of 
beer and spirits. 
Of the traditional soft  drinks,  sales of Colas  rose fastest,  accounting 
for  23  per cent  of total soft  drinks  sales in 1974.  Sales of "new",  non-
alcoholic  drinks,  like pure fruit  juices and mineral waters  increased 
very fast.  Pure fruit  juices are only partly produced within the  soft 
drinks  industry.  Sales of these  juices rose  by 30  per cent  in 197S,  as 
compared to the previous year.  Mineral  waters are  imported mainly from 
Belgium. 
Looking at  concentration in the  soft  drinks  industry,  we  have to dis-
tinguish between firm-concentration and brand-concentration. 
The  difference  is caused by the  independent  bottleries.  Firm-concentration 
is lower than brand-concentration;the CR
4
-values hover 3.round  SO  percentage 
points for most  variables. 
Brand-concentration has  been  computed for the most  important  product-
markets:  fruit-based  lemonades,  colas,  lemon-lime  drinks and tonics. 
The  concentration ratio's for the  product-markets,  computed in the 
sense earlier described,  reach values  lying between  70  per cent  and 
98  per·cent,  that  is on a  very high  level. 
The  number of firms,  participating in this  industry has  declined steadily, 
from  46  in 1970  to  28  in 1974. 
Most  firms  merely  disappeared.  Some  were  taken over,  for example  two 
coca-·cola bottleries were  taken over by Skol/Holland. 
The  most  important  take-overs within the  soft  drinks  industry had already 
occurred before  1970.  In  1964 the American firm W.R.  Grace  en Co.  took 
over Raak,  the  second soft  drinks producer in the Netherlands. 
ll7 The  first  Dutch  soft  drinks  firm  in 1974:  Vrurnona  was  acquired by 
Heineken  in  1968.  Another  large firm:  Hero  is 70  per cent  Swiss  owned. 
Besides breweries  (Heineken,  Skol  and Grolsch)  dairies have  diversified 
into the  soft  drinks  industry (CMC;  Coberco,  Friesland). 
Another  way  in which  foreign firms  acquired a  stake  in Dutch  soft 
drinking was  via the  introduction of their (american)  brands or by 
means  of the  establishment  of subsidiaries or by licensing Dutch 
firms. 
As  a  result  of these  international and diversifying activities,  only 
two  Dutch original  soft  drinks  firms  have  been left  in the  industry. 
Retailers,  and especially supermarkets are the most  important,  distri-
butional outlets for  soft  drinks.  Although  not  connected with  legal 
proceedings against  retailers (as happened in the beer- ·  and spirits 
sectors)  retailers have  proved to  be  a  competition stimulating force. 
Prices as  recommended by illanufacturers  were  abandoned in the early 
seventies. 
Both  cheap  brands  (Raak,  Loots)  and official hands  are  nowadays  sold 
at  reduced prices (Coca-Cola,  7-Up). 
1~2  General  development  of the  dutch  soft  drinks  industry 
Contra,ry to the  development  of conswnption of beer and spirits,  conswnption 
of soft  drinks  did not  follow  a  straight  increase  during the years  inves-
tigated. 
Conswnption per head was  subject  to  large fluctuations and was  lower 
in 1974 than in 1970.  The  decrease of conswnption in  1972  is generally 
ascribed to the higher excise-tax introduced at  the first  of January 
of that  year.  The  decrease,  occurring  .. in 1974  cannot  be  so  simply explai-
ned:  no  obvious  reason  seems to  exist. 
The  rapid increase  of exports  compensated  to  some  extent  for the disap-
pointing development  of the  domestic  market. 
ll8 Table  1.  General  develoEment  of the  Dutch  soft  drinks  industr;y: 
1262  1270  1271  1272  1273  1274 
Domestic  Production (mil- 372.8  693.9  769.8  707.3  852.4  818.1 
lion liters) 
Consumption per capita  55·5  60.2  53.3  59.7  53.5 
(liters) 
Domestic Production  (mil~  346.8  428.9  427.5  517.8  489 
lion florins at  producers 
prices) 
Imports  (million liters)  22.5  23.3  24.0  27.3  26.6 
Exports  (million liters)  14.9  23.2  38.5  98.5  132.6 
Domestic  sales (million  702.1  769.9  692.8  781.2  712.1 
liters) 
Source:  CBS,  production statistics 
Imports  were  more  stable and were  far  surpassed by exports at  the  end 
of the period.  Imports consist  almost  wholly of mineral waters and fruit 
juices.  Most  imports  come  from  Belgium,  followed by W-Germany. 
1.3  The  comEosition of soft  drinks Eroduction 
Because  no  disaggregated data of imports with  respect  to product-type 
were  available,  they are  neglected in this paragraph. 
Soft  drinks,  packed in large  siphon- bottles also  are not  included 
in the following classification. 
These  two  categories together covered about  5 per cent  of sales in 1974. 
Domestically produced soft  drinks are statistically broken  down  into the 
following categories:  fruit  based  lemonades,  cola drinks,  lemon-lime  drinks, 
other synthetic based carbonated drinks  (gazeuse),  tonics and  soda-waters. 
Fruit  juices and  syrups  are  not  included. 
Some  indication about  the  development  of the product ion of fruit  juices 
can be  found  in the  paragraph  relating to  product  markets. 
Cola  drinks have  gained a  considerably larger share of total soft  drinks 
product ion. 
However,  fruit  based  lemonades  remain the most  important  soft  drinks 
category with  a  share of more  than 50  per cent  of production. 
Lemon-lime  drinks,  tonics and  soda waters are ail decreasing in popula-
rity. 
ll9 Table  2.  Domesticalll Eroduced soft  drinks  accordinB: to  cat  e~ories (% 1 ;::,  uf 
output  in liter:::.) 
126~  1270  1271  1272  1273  1274 
Fruit  based  lemonades  34.4  48.4  54.6  54.9  55.1  52.0 
Cola drinks  38.11  15.0  14.2  16.5  19.3  23.8 
Lemon-lime  drinks  )  22.2  20.5  19.2  17.8  18.0  -
Gazeuse  24.0  10.8  7.4  5-7  4.7  3.5 
Tonic  3-51  3.4  3. 1  3.6  3.0  2.6 
Soda  waters  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1 
100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source:  CBS,  Production statistics,  1973 
120 Part  II. 
The  structure of the  Dutch  soft  drinks  industry 
2.1  Total  industry 
The  industry's structure is characterized by a  rapid decline  in the 
nwnber of firms  and a  rather high  level of concentration,  both  in the 
absolute  and relative  sense. 
Concentration ratio 's of the  leading four firms  rose  during the  inves-
tigated period to  over  50  per cent  for most  variables.  Concentration 
ratio's for gross  investments and exports were  much  higher.  In particular 
export  concentration is extremely high:  the  leading four  companies  account 
for nearly 90  per cent  of exports. 
Comparing the concentration coefficients,  it is clear that the  soft  drinks 
industry is the  least  concentrated sector of the  beverages-industry. 
Inequality,  as  indicated by  indices V and G has  slightly diminished during 
the period.  This  may  be  a  consequence  of the relatively faster growth of 
smaller firms. 
Absolute  concentration,  contrariwise,  has  increased,  as the concentration 
ratio's and the Herfindahl- and Entropy- indices  indicate. 
The  four largest  firms  are Heineken  (Vrwnona),  Raak,  Hero,  and the  soft 
drinks  division of allied Breweries  (Skol). 
Within the  soft-drinks industries'  leading group  of firms  not  much 
change has  occurred.  The  four largest  firms  occupied these positions 
with respect  to all variables already in 1970.Heineken is the  largest 
firm and has maintained this position uncontested. 
The  Spearmann-coefficient,  computed for the five  leading  firms~Evariable 
sales),  shows  that  35  shifts in the  rank-order positions  on  a  total of 
100  have taken place  during the years  1970-1974. 
The  data,  on the basis of which the concentration indices were  computed 
were  collected at  the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)  in the Hague. 
The  investigated period covers the years  1970 till 1974.  Coefficients, 
presented in the  following tables were  figured out  along the following 
lines: 
- Firms  with  less than  10  employees  were  excluded 
121 Concentration was  measured with  respect  to  firms.  Within the  soft 
driru~s industry many  bottleries operate.  Most  of them are  legally 
independent,  although they bottle beverages of other firms.  In the 
concept  of "firms",  used here,  bott leries are  included.  Concentration 
indices with  respect  to  brands(economically independent  firms)  are 
given in the paragraph about  product  markets. 
The  concept  of sales refers  to  sales of  domestic  producers.  Imported 
soft  drinks are  excluded,  but  this  is only a  slight  error. 
Wages  and Salaries are  inclusive of social  charges. 
Sales-figures are  exclusive of excise-tax 
The  concept  cash flow used consists of:  depreciation allowances,  rents, 
interest,  some  minor  cost-categories,  which  could not  be  statistically 
included within the three ma:i;n  cost  groups used by the CBS,  and profits. 
Sales-figures are at  producer's prices 
122 Linda-coefficients 
The  Linda-coefficients,  presented in tables  12  till 18  reveal,  that  a 
clear,  but  declining dominancy of the first  firm prevails. 
The  first  maximum r h  or N*h (  is  reached by the  second firm for all 
variables. 
However,  the  dominance  has  declined as  can be  seen from the  evolution 
of  LN*h(  () values. 
F,)r all variables,  except  gross  investments  and exports,  the  seconci 
maximum  is identical to the first  maximum. 
In spite of this market  leadership of the  largest  firm,  values of Linda-
indices are the  lowest  of the Dutch beverages-industry as a  whole. 
The  picture of the  soft  drinks  industry given earlier is thus  confirmed 
by the Linda-coefficients. 
All  L-values and especially L -values  increased slightly over the period. 
s 
Again,  L-values  reached for gross  investments  and exports are  exceptio-
nably high. 
The  number of firms,  composing the oligopolistic arena,  declines at  a 
rate which  is even more  rapid that  that  of the total number  of firms. 
LNx  -values are  declining. 
m 
The  reduction of inequality,  as  indicated earlier by the  indices V and G 
is not  confirmed by L-values  in all respects,  therefore.L -values,  except 
s 
these for exports  increased slightly over the period. 
123 Table 4  The  evolution of  some  variables  (1970-1974)  1970=100 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974 
Number  of firms  46  43  37  37  28 
(including bottleries) 
Sales (x 1000  D fl.)  346.762  428.933  427.510  517.765  488.955 
Index  100  123  123  149  141 
Sales (million liters)  694  770  707  852  818 
Index  100  111  102  123  118 
Domestic  Sales  (x  1000  339.882  416.446  408.778  470.699  421.175 
D fl.) 
Index  100  122  120  138  123 
Number  of employees  4.144  4.660  4.238  4.007  3.561 
Index  100  112  102  96  86 
Wages  en Salaries  67.236  84.734  93.422  103.877  104.939 
(x  1000  D fl.) 
Index  100  12§  138  154  156 
Average Annual  Wages  16.225  18.183  22.044  25.924  29.469 
per employee  (florins)  100  112  136  160  181 
Gross  Investments  50.620  45.241  34.297  32.554  36.656 
(x  1000  florins)  100  89  67  64  72 
Exports  (x 1000  D fl.)  8.794  13.024  20.814  45.671  65.215 
Index  100  148  237  519  742 
124 Index 
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Linda  curve  structure Dutch Soft drinks  Industry 
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130 Table  5  Concentration coefficients of the soft  drinks market.  Variable:  sales 
year  nwnber  SpFead coefficients  concent rat  ior  other concentration 
of firm.  ratio's  coefficients 
v  G  CRL,_  CRq  H  E  c 
1970  47  1. 63798  .65637  47.5  64.4'  78.36094  -131.78095 
1971  44  1.57886  • 66388  48.6  64.6  79.38202  -128.58831 
1972  38  1.40718  • 63214  47.7  65.4  78.42482  -126.61540 
1973  38  1.35556  .60614  46.3  66.7  74.67230  -128.87901 
1974  29  1.32377  • 64058  53.1  78.4  94.90940  -114.09620 
~able 6  Concentration coefficients of the soft  drinks market.  Variable:  employees 
year  nwnber  Spread coefficients  concent rat  ior  other concentration 
of firmf  ratio's  coefficients 
v  G  CR
4 
CR8 
H  E 
1970  47  1.39862  • 61281  41.1  59.9  62.89656  -137.86929 
1971  44  1.46454  • 63772  44.6  64.3  71.47442  -132.28980 
1972  38  1.28697  • 58528  42.6  63,.9"  "69 .. 90217  -131.70067 
1973  38  1.28933  • 58986  45.3  65.5  70.06250  -130.72250 
1974  27  - - 54-4  80.4  - -
Table  7  Concentration coefficients of the  soft  drinks market.  Variable:  wages  & 
salaries 
year  N  Spread coefficients  concent rat ior  other concentration 
ratio's  coefficients 
v  G  CR4 
CR8 
H  E 
1970  47  1. 54875  • 64403  45.3  64.4  72.31119  -133a77039 
1971  44  1.722303  .66595  '  50.4  67-.5  90-..20035  -127.32677 
1972  38  1.51853  • 63534  48.0  67.7  86.99861  -125..59568 
1973  38  1.48097  .64287  49.-2  69-.4  84.03317  -124.70171 
1974  27  1. 43459  .66725  59-4  81.7  113.26150  ""'"!108.01550 
'-'·· 
131 Table  8  Concentration coefficients of the  soft  drinks market.  Variable:  Cash  flow 
year  N  v  G  CR4 
CR8 
H  E 
1970  29  1.28256  • 55970  51.7  69.1  91.20567  -121.52364 
1971  27  1.13455  • 53820  51.4  68.1  84.71943  -120.70035 
1972  23  • 98713  .48460  50.8  70.0  85.84423  -118.57005 
1973  18  ot76953  .41210  48.9  75.1  88.45410  -113.12182 
1974  16  .Bo087  .44726  52.4  84.5  102.58749  -105.35132, 
Table 9  Concentration coefficients of the  soft  drinks market.  Variable:gross  investments 
year  N  v  G  CR
4 
CR8 
H  E 
1970  40  1. 72400  • 70936  55-5  73.0  99.30408  -118.13954 
1971  24  1.19117  • 58169  53-4  78.1  100.78655  -112.42969 
1972  35  1. 62389  .66794  55.6  73.3  103.91458  -117.52446 
1973  39  1.77336  • 70842  51.8  71.4  106.27676  -116.33593 
1974  28  1.69065  .73127  67.3  86.3  13 7" 79582  - 99.96434 
Table  10  Concentration coefficients of the  soft  drinks market.  Variable:  etports 
year  N  v  G  CR4 
CR8 
H  E 
1970  11  1. 54523  • 69308  89.6  99.3  307.97512  -64.81264 
1971  12  1.14265  • 60106  81.6  98.~  192.13784  -78.86472 
1972  11  1  .. 33719  .65905  87.4  99-9:  253.46161  -68.74303 
1973  9  1.17645  • 62052  98.2  - 264.89327  -60.92345 
1974  10  1.02408  • 55827  87.1  - 204.87314  -73.71545 
132 Table  11  Concentration coefficients of the  soft  drinks market.  Variable  domestic  sales 
year  N 
-- v  a  CR
4 
CR8 
H  E 
1970  48  1.67558  .65857  48.2  63.8  79.32458  -132.09468 
1971  44  1.59812  .66286  49.3  64.8  80.77270  -128.47036 
1972  37  1.40687  .62111  49.0  65.9  80.52141  -126.43837 
1973  39  1.41368  • 60461  48.9  65.7  76.88469  -129.36957 
1974  29  1. 35088  .63657  54-4  77.1  97.40959  -115.05669 
Table  12  Linda-coefficients of the  soft  drinks  industr;z.  Variable:  sales 
year  L  Nx  Nx  LNX  ~h  LNX 
s  m  m  h 
1970  .28763  46  30  .20102  2  ~69559  ~ 
1971  ~33815  43  17  .19540  2  ~ 18094 
1972  .29722  37  20  .19040  2  .64996 
1973  ,.28568  37  18  .20064  2  ~53497 
1974  .31894  28  12  .. 25938  2  • 55224-
Table  13  Linda-coefficients~  Variable·)  emElo;zees 
year  L  Nx  Nx  L~  rh  LNX 
s  m  m  h 
1970  .26895  46  23  .16067  2  • 75059 
1971  .28543  43  23  • 17761  2  .84852 
1972  .27085  37  25  .17129  2  .84706 
1973  .24953  37  37  .18664  2  • 64111 
1974  .35975  28  5  .24006  2  .51823 
133 Table  14  Linda coefficients  Variable:  wa~es & salaries 
year  L  Nx  LNX  Nx  LNX 
s  m  m  h  h 
1970  .31314  46  20  .19005  2  .80059 
1971  .36716  43  21  .21951  2  1.02873 
1972  .34102  37  21  .20505  2  .90243 
1973  .33625  37  16  .20371  2  .69165 
1974  .37875  26  12  .30070  2  • 66958 
Table  15  Linda coefficients  Variable:  ca~h flow 
year  L  Nx  Nx  LNX  Nx  L~h  s  m  m  h 
1970  .31989  28  24  .21612  2  .69472 
1971  .31410  26  16  .18839  2  -54536 
1972  .28729  22  20  .19502  2  • 58615 
1973  .27998  17  16  .19904  2  • 52273 
1974  .35644  15  7  .21975  2  • 66411 
Table  16  Linda coefficients  Variable:  gross  investments 
L  r  ~  L~ 
X 
L~h.(  Nx  LNX  year  s  m  m  N h(  h  h 
1970  .36623  39  13  • 25581  2  .52878  39  • 70261 
1971  .40468  23  9  .24560  2  .67151  2  • 67151 
1972  .36098  34  23  .24873  2  • 69228  34  1.06550 
1973  .42161  38  16  .21248  2  .99070  38  61.07877 
1974  .43399  27  12  .36669  2  .58623  27  23.18269 
134 Table  17  Linda coefficients  Variable:  exEorts 
L  r  Nx  1r 
X 
Lrh<  ~h 
LNX  year  s  m  m  N h<  h 
1970  .98628  10  5  .90398  3  1.17712  10  2.88313 
1971  • 50520  11  5  .36378  2  • 74605  11  2.89700 
1972  • 70002  10  5  • 56074  3  .80434  10  13.28756 
1973  -49357  8  4  -44715  2  • 55602  8  29.90500 
1974  -49045  9  4  • 3503 7  2  .64568  9  67.32092 
Table  18  Linda coefficients  Variable:  domestic  sales 
year  L  Nx  Nx  LNX  rh  LNX 
s  m  m  h 
1970  .28984  47  31  .20034  2  • 70713 
1971  .34837  43  17  • 19557  2  .80302 
1972  .31014  36  20  .19175  2  .67654 
1973  .26880  38  38  .19066  2  • 61491 
1974  .33642  28  16  .26341  2  .67484 
135 2.2  Cost-structure 
The  cost-structure of large  soft  drinks  firms  (more  than 10  employees) 
has the following general  shape  (see table  below~. 
Cost-structure of  individual firms  differ only slightly from this average 
picture,  according to the CBS. 
Cost-structure of large  firms, -as  a  percentage of production-value,  (excise-
tax excluded) 
Sugar and glucose-syrup 
Fruit  juices 
Essences  and extracts 
Other materials,  energy 
and packing costs 
Total material-costs 
Wages,  Salaries and  social  charges 
Depreciation allowances,  other 
costs and profits 
Production-value 
.1.21£ 
16.7 
8.4 
7.3 
12.1 
44.5 
21.0 
34.0 
55.5 
100 
.1.2ll 
16.1 
7.6 
6.0 
15.4 
45.2 
19.8 
35.0 
54.8 
100 
The  table  indicates that the  soft-drinks  industry is a  materials-intensive 
branch,  in which  wages  and social  charges are  relatively unimportant. 
136 Part  III  Product  markets 
3.1  General  remarks 
In the following pages  concentration in the most  important  product-markets 
will be  reviewed.  The  fol1owing product  markets  of the  soft  drinks  industry 
can be  distinguished:  fruit  based  lemonades,  cola's,  lemon  lime  drinks, 
tonics,  soda waters  and synthetic based carbonated drinks.  Concentration 
ratio's of the  latter two  product  markets  have  not  been computed,  because 
of their small  size.  The  fast  growing market  of fruit  juices is only partly 
incorporated in the statistics provided by the CBS. 
A problem,  which appears  in investigating the various  sub-markets  is the 
distinction between firms  and  brands.In every sub-market  about  20  firms 
operate  but  only harldful  of  brands are  sold.  Though  all firms  are  indepen·dent 
in a  legal  sense,  many  firms  do  not  produce  a  brand of their own,  but  bottle 
and distribute drinks,  sold under a  well-known  (american)  brand-name. 
The  most  telling example  are the Coca-Cola bottleries.  Six of them 
sell Coca-Cola  on the  Dutch market,  of which  two  are 
owned  by Allied Breweries.  Another  large multinational,  Heineken,  sells 
american  brands too.It has acquired the  Dutch  license for Pepsi  Cola and 
Seven-up. 
Apart  from these foreign brands,  Heineken markets  soft  drinks under its 
own  brand-name:  Vrumo~. 
Foreign brands  sold by  dutch bottleries are:  Coca Cola,  Fanta,  Sprite, 
Minute  Maid,  7-Up,  Pepsi-Cola,  Kinley Tonic. 
Summarizing:  the  following  systematization of dutch  soft  drinks firms  can 
be  made. 
1.  Fil~s,selling soft  drinks under their own  brand-names. 
Several kinds  of firms  belong to this category. 
a.  Independent,  not-diversified firms.  Only two  of these firms  have 
remained on the  dutch market.  Herschi  (Hoensbroek)  and  Loots  (Haarlem). 
b.  Not-diversified firms,  which are  owned  by foreign  companies.  Examples 
are Raak,  owned  by W.R.  Grace & Co  and Hero,  which  is 70  per cent 
Swiss  (and 30  per cent  Dutch)  property. 
137 c.  Soft  drinks producers,  belonging to  a  company,  which has  diversified 
into the  soft  drinks  industry. 
Such moves  have  been undertaken fFequently by breweries  and dairies. 
2.  Firms  selling soft  drinks of foreign brands.  Two  types of  such bottleries 
can be  distinguished: 
a.  Small  bottling firms,  whose  exclusive activity consists of bottling 
products of an american origin. 
b.  Bottleries,  that  telong to  a  big multi-activity firm.  Examples  include 
the Coca Cola bottleries owned  by Allied Breweries  and the Pepse  Cola 
and Seven-up bottling activities of Heineken. 
Concentration in product-markets  is measured with  respect  to brands,belonging 
to  an  independent  economic unit. 
The  product  market  for  f1~it based  lemonades  is the only one,  in which  firms 
operate with more than one  brand-name.Coca Cola for  example participates in 
this product  market  with  two brands and Heineken sells lemonades under the 
labels Vrumona  and Si-Si. 
138 3.2  The  product  market  of fruit  based  lemonades  (still drink8) 
Carbonated and non-carbonated drinks.  made  on the basis of fruit  juices 
is the  most  popular drinks category in the  Netherlands.  A  large but 
declining share  (from 45  per cent  in 1970  to  40  per. cent  ln 1974)  of soft 
drinks  sales belongs to this category.  Several kinds of lemonades  on 
a  fruit  base  exist,  corresponding to the  different  fruits used.  The 
most  popular is the  one  based on orange  juices  Other fruit  lemonades  are those 
on the basis of black currants,  lemon,  cherries or a  combination of two  fruits 
(Lift).  Hero  has the largest  assortment  of fruit tastes. 
All  firms,  participating in this market  produce  an orange-based  lemonade. 
The  leading four firms  within this product  market  are Heineken with its 
Vrumona  and Si-Si brands,  Hero,  Coca-Cola  (with its Fanta and Lift  brands) 
and Raak. 
Table  19  Concentration ratio's for the  product  market  of fruit-based  lemonades. 
Variable:  turnovers 
year  Nx  CR4 
CR8 
1970  16  79.3  93.3 
1971  16  73.8  91.0 
1972  14  72.7  91.8 
1973  11  77.6  94.6 
1974  10  79.2  97-5 
~umber of brands,  belonging to  independent  economic  units. 
Concentration,  as  measured by the ratio's is high  and not  subject  to 
big shifts.  The  leading four firms  continuously cover about  80  per cent 
of the market. 
The  four  leading firms  remained the  same  during the period,  but  all 
rank-order positions were  changed in 1974,  as  compared to  1970.  Heineken 
expanded rapidly in these years and occupied the first  position in 1974. 
The total number  of firms  participating in this product  market  declined 
from  28  in 1970  till 15  in 1974. 
The  number  of brands  decreased by five to  10  brands  in 1974. 
Of  the  disappearing brands 3  belonged to  independent  firms,  one  to  a 
brewery (Stella Artois)  and one to  a  grocery-chain (de  Gruyter). 
139 3.3  The  product  market  of cola-drinks 
Sales  of cola's at  producer's prices more  than doubled between 1970 
and  1974.  Their share of domestic  sales at  producer's prices  rose  from 
15  per cent  in 1970  till 23  per cent  in 1974. 
The  structure of the cola-market,  as described by the two  concentration 
ratio's did hardly change. 
Two  brands(Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola)  sold by two  concerns  (Coca-Cola  and 
Heineken respectively)  have  more  than two  thirdth of the total market. 
Besides these two  leading brands the product  market's structure is charac-
terized by  a  tail of a  shrinking number  of firms. 
This tail is shrinking in numbers,  but  not  in importance,  as the  comparison 
between the  CR
4 
and CR8  ratio's indicate. 
Table  20  Concentration ratio's for the product  market  of cola drinks.  Variable:  sales 
year  Nx  CR4 
CR8 
1970  14  98.0  99.3 
1971  14  95-5  98.4 
1972  13  94.4  99.0 
1973  10  95-7  99.5 
1974  10  95.8  99.8 
~umber of brands  (is identical to  n~ber of independent  economic  units. 
Coca Cola's Holland Branch  employs  six bottling firms,  of which  two 
belong to Allied Breweries'  subsidiary Skol.  Heineken with its Pepsi  Cola 
brand has  increased its market  share  during the investigated period. 
Competition between these two  cola-brands has  intensified in recent  years. 
Competition takes place  by means  of advertising and price-setting. 
Although the two  cola-brands have officially the  same  price,  Pepsi-Cola 
is priced lower in most  super markets  and other retail-outlets. 
The  sales ratio of Coca-Cola versus Pepsi-Cola has  diminished from  6:1 
in 1970  to 4:1  in 1974. 
Rank  order positions of the first three firms  remained unchanged during 
the period.  The  posit~ons of the other participating brands  changed,  however. 
140 The  total number of firms  (including bottleries) operating in this market 
declined form  26  in  1970  to  15  in  1974. 
Five  of them were  bott leries,  of which three continued product ion after 
being taken over.  The  other 6  firms,  which  had closed down  were  indepen-
dent  firms  (2)  or soft  drinks  divisions of larger groups(4). 
3.4 The  product  market  for  lemon-lime  drinks 
The  share  of  lemon-lime  drinks  in total turnovers  declined from  20,6%  in 
1970 till 14,1%  in  1974. 
This product  market  is dominated by Heineken,  which has acquired the  license 
for  7-Up  production in the Netherlands.  7-Up  is distributed from the Vrumona-
plant  of Heineken in Bunnik  and from  two  plants,  one  in the Southern and 
one  in the Eastern part  of the Netherlands.  Other sellers are Raak  and 
Coca-Cola with its Sprite-label.  No  changes  in composition and rank-order 
positions of the first  four-'firms  occurred during the  investigated period. 
Heineken,  with its 7-Up  brand increased its market  share to  more  than 
50  per cent.  In contrast  to the market  for fruit-based  lemonades,  consumers 
show  a  strong brand-loyalty in lemon-lime  drinks.  The  brand-label  7-Up 
is almost  considered identical for  lemon-lime  drinks  by consumers. 
Table  21  Concentration ratio's of the product  market  for  lemon-lime  di·inks. 
Variable:  turnovers 
year  Nx  CR
4 
CR8 
1970  13  90.6  97.4 
1971  13  88.3  96.7 
1972  12  89.7  98.0 
1973  10  88.6  99.4 
1974  10  90.3  99.6 
x  Number  of brands,  belonging to  independent  economic units. 
Coca-Cola with its Sprite-label has not  succeeded in establishing a 
great  acceptance. 
The  total number  of firms  declined from  26  in 1970 till 15  in 1974. 
Within this sub-market  6  bottleries disappeared as  independent  companies, 
of which three  continued production after being taken over. 
Two  bottling plants were  closed down. 
141 3.5 The  product  market  for tonics 
Sales· of tonics are of minor  importance.  Their share of soft  drinks  sales 
declined from  3. 9 per cent  in 1970  till 3. 5 per cent  in 197 4. 
Again,  Heineken is the market  leader of this product  market  with its 
Royal  Club Tonics. 
Other  important  brand labels are  London  Tonic  (produced by Raak)  and 
Kinley Tonic  (produced by Coca-Cola). 
Apart  from  some  brands,  which  disappeared from the market,  no  changes 
worth mentioning,  took place. 
The  rank order positions of the first  four firms  remained the  same  during 
all the years  examined. 
The  total number  of firms  (including bottleries) fell by 8  to  14  firms 
in 197 4.  Ten firms  left the market.  Four of them were  small bott leries, 
four were  independent  firms  and two  belonged to  a  larger diversified 
group.  Two  new-comers  entered the market.  One  of them was  established as 
a  division of the Friesland cooperative,  a  dairy-firm,  and represented 
a  diversification.  The  other was  a  bottling plant  of Heineken. 
Table  22  Concentration ratio's of the product  market  for tonics.  Variable:  turnovers 
year  Nx  CR4 
CR8 
1970  16  92.4  97.6 
1971  15  90.1  96.4 
1972  12  92.8  98.9 
1973  10  91.6  99.1 
1974  10  90  99.5 
x  Number  of brands,  corresponding to  independent  economic units. 
142 3. 6  The  product  market  for fruit  juices 
Growth  in sales were  rather fast  and originate from three  sources: 
imports 
In contrast to other soft  drinks  categories,  imports play an important,  but 
declining role in sales of fruit  juices.  Belgium  and W-Germany  are the 
main  exporters of these  drinks.  Imports  declined from  12.8  million florins 
in 1972  to  11.3  million florins  in 1974. 
Domestic  production of fruit  juices outside the soft  drinks  industry 
The  vegetables- and fruits canning industry also  produces fruit  juices 
but  no  indication of its importance  are available. 
Domestic  production of fruit  juices by soft  drinks  firms 
Production of fruit  juices within this category rose  more  than four 
fold,  during the period 1970-1974.  Though  the  share of domestic  output 
of these producers  in total soft  drinks  remained  low  with 3.8 per cent 
in 1974.  Five  firms  are active in this product  market:  Hero,  Coberco, 
Coca-Cola,  Raak  and Friesland.  Hero  is the most  important  seller with 
a  share of over  50  per cent. 
143 Part  IV 
Distributional  and performance  aspects 
4.1  Packing and distribution 
Soft  drinks  are packed in bottles and in t incans.  Canned  soft  drinks 
were  introduced in 1971  but  they do  not  take more  than 5 per cent  of 
sales currently. 
All bottles used are returnable glass bottles.  Two  types of bottles 
are used:  large one-liter bottles and  small bottles with  a  content 
of 0.2  - 0.3  lit.er. 
Large  bottles have  become  popular and have  overtaken small bottles as 
the most  usual  way  of packing soft  drinks (table 23). 
Table  23  The  share of bottled soft  drinks,  packed in large bottles (in percentages). 
Fruit  based  lemonades 
Caffeine  drinks 
Lemon-lime  drinks 
Tonic 
Soda waters 
Total  non-alcoholic  drinks 
1966 
53 
58 
59 
57 
1970 
70 
75 
731 
I 
) 
.i' 
71 
1973  1974 
87  85 
70  69 
90  90 
75  76 
0  0 
84  82 
The  decrease  in the  share  of  large bottles,  which  occurred in 1974  can be 
attributed to the  general  recession in soft  drinks  output  of that  year. 
Large  bottles felt  the brunt  of this decline  more  than  soft  drinks,  packed 
in small bottles. 
In  1971  there  were  some  800  wholesalers for  soft  drinks,  handling 65  per 
cent  of total sales.  Since then,  the  number of wholesalers  and their share 
of the soft  drinks market  has  decllned.  In  1974  only 400  wholesalers for 
beverages  were  left.  Some  large  soft  drinks producers have  integrated forward 
into wholosaling,  mostly by taking over existing firms.  Coca Cola has 
been an exception:  the  firm has  always used its bottleries to  make  deliveries 
to  retailers and Horeca-firms. 
144 With  respect  to distribution,  the most  important  distinction to  be  made 
is that  between out  door and home- consumption.  Soft  drinks are usually 
consumed at  home.  The  Horeca sector accounted for  some  20  per cent  of total 
soft  drinks  sales in  1971  and this  share probaby decreased since then. 
The  remaining 80  per cent  is sold by various categories of retailers (table 24) 
The  share of grocery-outlets and especially of supermarkets  rapidly increased 
in recent  years. 
Table  24  Soft  Drinks Distribution by Type  of Outlet,  1971 
(per cent) 
Sales to the Horeca  sector 
Sales for  in-home  consumption 
of which:a 
Grocery out lets 
Dairy outlets/milkmen 
Off-licences 
Greengrocers 
Others 
a  figures  do  not  add-up  due  to  rounding 
Source:  Marketing in Europe,  January 1972 
20 
80 
38 
18 
2 
2 
19 
Distributor's labels for soft  drinks  exist,  but  are of declining importance, 
covering less than 20  per cent  of total soft  drinks sales.  The  most  impor-
tant  private label is the Albert  Heijn label,  which  is manufactured by Raak. 
Just  like beer,  retailers sell two  or more  different  brands of the  same_soft 
drinks variety:  an  expensive well-established producer brand and  a  cheap, 
less well-known or private label.  7-Up,  Coca-Cola and to a  lesser extent 
Hero  are priced higher than comparable  soft  drinks brands. 
4. 2  Advert ising 
Manufacturers of the  so-called A-labels  (well-established,  and expensive), 
mentioned earlier compete  almost  wholly by means  of advertising.  In parti-
cular,  Coca-Cola  ·and Pepsi-Cola carry out  a  heavy  rival:::·y for the  consu-
mer's guilder.  Other soft  drinks brands  (B-labels)  are much  less heavily 
promoted.  Although advertising remains  an  important  competition weapon  in 
the hands  of at  least  some  firms,  total advertising expenditures for soft 
drinks have  declined almost  continuously since  1970.  Table  25  gives the 
data,  collected by the  BBC  (Bureau for Budget  Controls). 
145 Total advertising expenditures  are underestimated by these  data,  because 
expenditure  for cinema-advertising is not  included.  Coca-Cola,  Pepsi-Cola 
and  7-Up  are the prominent  cinema-advertisers. 
Table  25  The  Evolution of Advertisin  enditures  on Soft  drinks.  Some  Media 
Medium  1970  .121l  .l.2ll  .1lli 
Newspapers  2.5  1. 7  0.76  0.9 
Family magazines  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2 
Women's  magazines  2.4  1. 57  1. 4  1. 7 
Radio/TV magazines  0.2  0.37  0.04 
Other magazines  0.6  0.3  0.5  0.7 
Total  in print  6.0  3.87  3.33  3. 54 
Television  4. 1  5.3  5.0  4.8 
Radio  0.3  0.4  0.27  0.3 
Overall Total  10.4  9-57  8.60  8.64 
Source:  BBC  (Bureau for Budget  Controls) 
4.3 Prices 
As  a  result  of  stagnating demand,  the  Dutch  soft  drinks  industry had large 
overcapacities during the first half of the  seventies. 
The  increase in excise-tariffs by  14  cent,  introduced in 1972,  resulted 
in further  sta~nation. 
Unutilised capacities and other competition-rousing factors put  pressure 
upon prices,  which  could not  be  resisted.  Price-competition came  to the 
fore  on two  levels: 
1.  Manufacturers  were  no  longer able to pursue the former  policy of general 
price-increases. 
Some  manufacturers,  carrying well-known brands  (Coca-Cola,  7-Up,  Vrumona) 
tried to avoid this price-competition as much  as possible,  but  others 
(Raak,  Loots)  strove to  improve  capacity-utilisation by means  of price-
cutting in the hope  of attracting demand. 
2.  No  so  long ago,  consumer-prices  were  recommended  by  manufacturers  and 
were usually ahhered  to  by retailers. 
However,  in recent  years most  retailers have  added a  cheap  brand-variety, 
to their soft  drinks  range. 
146 Table  26 
Examples  are Raak  and Loots. 
On  the  ,other hand,  retailers have  started to price the  leading brands 
at  lower  levels than those  recommended  by manufacturers. 
Table  26  gives  a  summary  of the development  of soft  drinks prices during 
the  seventies. 
RetailErices for  some  Eroduct-brands  1271-1276  (cents  per liter) 
Brand  Price  1271  Price  12I6 2) 
Fruit-based  Hero  85  95 
lemonades  1)  Raak  3)  85  79-90 
Fanta  85 
Loots  79 
~  Coca-Cola  83  109-118 
Pepsi-Cola  83  89-99 
Raak  70  79-90 
Loots  79 
Lemon-lime  7-Up  100  109-123 
drinks  Raak  70  79-90 
Loots  95 
Tonics  London  Tonic  96  110-135 
Royal  Club Tonic  96  125 
Source:  Marketing in Europe,  January  1972  and own  observations. 
l. all orange  flavoured 
2.  prices,recorded autumn  1976  in some  selected shops. 
The  interval gives the  lowest  and highest  price noted. 
3.  prices of Albert Heijn's private label are considered as Raak-prices. 
Cornrnonto  on table 26 
A conclusion,  to  be  drawn  from table 26  is,  that  prices of soft  drinks 
have  shown  only moderate  increases during the last  five  years.  In some 
cases,  the  increase is even less than the higher excise-tariff of  14  cents. 
147 Summarizing,  it may  be  said that  price-Bompetition has  become  a  common 
feature of the market  for  soft  drinks.  In this respect  the three  sub-
markets  of the Dutch beverage-industry show  a  remarkable  resemblance. 
Price-reductions within the  soft  drinks  sector have  been small,  if compared 
to other sectors. 
Price-setting by retailers can be  considered to  be the main  cause  of price-
competition within this sector too.  Unutilised capacities may  have  prompted 
some  firms  not  to  raise prices.  Part  of the  price stability can be attributed 
to retailers,  in search for cheap  brands,  however.  Other large manufacturers 
(Heineken,  Coca-Cola)  tried to  create and enforce  brand-loyalty by means 
of advertising.  Here  the only cause  of price-reductions were actions of 
retailers. 
148 In this respect  the  soft  drinks  industry resembles of breweries and  dis-
tillerles where  price competition has also  been  sharpened,  though  in these 
two  latter industries,  price-reductions were  of an even more  general nature. 
So,  prices of distilled products  decreased to an extent  larger than the 
rise of excise-tariffs introduced in 1976. 
In the  different  product-markets divergent  developments  occurred,  however. 
Competition in the product  market  for fruit-based  lemonades  (the orange 
flavoured ones)  was  very fierce.  Raak  set  its prices on a  low,  competitive 
level and could enlarge its market  share  in this way.  Hero,  as  a  well-esta-
blished brand,  was  sold at  relatively low prices by retailers,  of the overall 
price uniformity prevailing in 1971  not  much  is left  in 1976. 
Within the product  market  for colas,  the two  levels on which  competit~on 
takes place,  can be visualized clearly. 
On  the  on.e  hand Raak  is sold as a  cheap  cola-brand,  a  position,  Raak  already 
occupied in 1971.  On  the other hand,  Pepsi-Cola as an official Cola-brand 
is sold (by retailers)  at prices,  below those of Coca Cola. 
The  price,  as  recommended  by manufacturers amounted  130  cents per liter, 
for both Coca Cola and Pepsi  Cola  (autumn  1976).  In practice,  however both 
Colas are  sold at  lower prices than those  recommended,  and Pepsi Cola  even 
much  lower. 
The  brand with the greatest  reputation within the product  market  for ~­
lime  drinks is 7-Up.  No  brand with an equivalent  reputation has established 
itself in this product  market  untill now,notwithstanding several efforts. 
Raak  and Loots are two  cheap  brands of lemon-lime  drinks. 
The  product  market  for tonics is exceptionable in the  sense,  that  official 
brands prevail.  English brand-names,  having a  certain snob-appeal are used 
for tonics.  London  is the tonic brand of Raak  and Royal  Club belongs to Hei-
neken.  Prices of tonics  do  differ,  per  retail~utlet, but  in general they 
are on a  high  level if compared to other soft  drinks categories.  Raak,  a  fierce 
price competitor in other product  markets, relies upon its brand-image to 
sustain its markets~re here. 
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